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ABSTRACT

Information security policy compliance is one of the key concerns that face organizations
today. Although, technical and procedural securities measures help improve information
security, there is an increased need to accommodate human, social, and organizational factors.
While employees are considered the weakest link in information security domain, they also
are assets that organizations need to leverage effectively. Employees’ compliance with
Information Security Policies (ISPs) is critical to the success of an information security
program. This study adapts the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB) to examine users’ behavioral intention to comply with ISPs.
Compliance and systems misuse has been investigated heavily in the last couple of years.
However, there are still huge gaps in this area, and more investigation is needed as the
systems abuse dilemma is more likely to persist in the future. Different theories were
borrowed from criminology, sociology, and other social and behavioral sciences to help
understand the factors motivating either compliance or non-compliance behavior, or systems
misuse intentions and behaviors. This study identifies the antecedents of employees’
compliance with the information security policies (ISPs) of an organization. Specifically, the
impact of structured and unstructured information security awareness on behavioral intentions
to comply with an organization’s ISP was investigated. Drawing on TAM and TPB, the study
posits that along with perceived behavioral control (self-efficacy and controllability) and
subjective norms, an employee’s intention to comply with the requirements of the
organization’s ISP is associated with the degree to which s/he believes or perceives
compliance to be difficult to understand, to learn or operate (perceived complexity; PC),
and/or to the extent that safeguarding the organization’s information technology resources
will enhance his/her job performance (PUOP).
Data was collected using a survey instrument that captured employees’ perceptions and
intention regarding compliance with the organizations’ ISPs. A sample of 878 employees
working in nine different banks in Jordan was used to test the research model. Results
indicated that employees’ intention to comply is significantly influenced by PC, PUOP, and
subjective norms. Employees’ awareness of security countermeasures was found to
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significantly affect perceived usefulness of protection and perceived complexity, and they, in
turn, affect their intentions to comply with the requirements of organizations ISPs. General
information security awareness and technology awareness were also found to significantly
influence employees’ intention to comply through PUOP and PC. Controllability was found
to have no significant impact on PC and PUOP.
Overall, this study presents significant contributions toward explaining the role of Information
Security Awareness (ISA) and employees’ perceptions of the usefulness and complexity of
the requirements of the organization’s ISP to boost compliance behavior.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background and Motivation
Information security and data protection has become one of the most important concerns and
challenges facing organizations and users today. Despite the effort and money these
organizations spend to secure their assets, many incidents of data breaches and information
loss continue to happen every year (CSI, 2009). Today, organizations realize that securing
information is a continuous and complex task. The burden of keeping information secure is
not only the responsibility of the IT department; it lies on the shoulders of all people of the
organization (Herath & Rao, 2009a; Kraemer & Carayon, 2005; Thomson & von Solms,
1998; Werlinger, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 2008). In view of that, users must be aware of their
roles and responsibilities in protecting information assets and how to respond to any potential
threat (NIST 800-16 R1). From here came the security awareness programs to focus on
addressing the needs to enlighten users on how to effectively protect information assets
(Aytes & Conolly, 2003; Bray, 2002; Chen, Shaw, & Yang, 2006; Hansche, 2001; Kruger &
Kearney, 2006; McCoy & Fowler, 2004).
To secure information assets and to reduce the risk associated with these systems,
organizations typically concentrate on technical and procedural security measures (e.g.
Besnard & Arief, 2004; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
Although these solutions help improve information security (Straub, 1990), relying on them
alone is not enough to eliminate risk (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010a; Siponen,
2005). Even though organizations are investing more in information security technologybased solutions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a), evidence from empirical surveys found that
respondents reported large increases in information security incidents in 2009 (Richardson,
2009). Organizations need to effectively manage and control security threats, beyond reliance
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on the deployment of security technologies software and hardware such as anti-virus,
firewalls, intrusion detection, etc. (Aytes & Conolly, 2003; Bernard, 2007; Dinev & Hu,
2007; Zhang, Reithel, & Li, 2009). In addition human, social and organizational factors must
be considered as well (Beznosov & Beznosova, 2007; Werlinger et al., 2008). Technology is
an important factor but inadequate to the success of security. Technology is dependent on the
users’ behavior (Ng & Xu, 2007). In a study aimed at mapping the current information
systems and security research, Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) found that the use of socioorganizational factors to understand information systems security is still at the theory building
stage.
Recently, information security researchers realized that management’s attention to secure
information resources is required (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002) to design effective security
policies (Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2007; Whitman, Townsend, & Aalberts, 2001), and
to motivate human and organizational factors to enhance users’ security awareness to comply
with information security policies (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009).
Information security policies must be designed to provide employees with guidelines on how
to address the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information resources while they
use information systems in performing their jobs (Straub, 1990; Whitman et al., 2001).
Despite creating comprehensive information security policies and guidelines that govern and
control employees’ behavior to implement secure practices in an organization being a first
priority matter, compliance with these policies is still lacking. Therefore, defining the factors
that motivate employees’ awareness to comply with an organization’s information security
policies is an important step in helping information security managers to understand and solve
individual behavioral issues in information security management.
Most of the security awareness programs available to date may not be effective to fill the gap
between perception and behavior as most of security awareness programs failed to prepare
users with the ability of projecting potential security risks (Shaw, Chen, Harris, & Huang,
2009), some researchers believe this gap is due to the lack of a pre-defined methodology to
deliver these programs (Valentine, 2006). In order to fill this gap, attention has been directed
toward deploying behavioral theories to understand and change users’ behavior to be more
security-conscious (e.g. Dinev & Hu, 2007; Layton, 2005; Ng & Xu, 2007; Rhee, Kim, &
Ryu, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009).
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Information Security Policy Compliance
Studies showed that the majority of security problems are caused by employees’ noncompliance behavior or violation of security policies of their organizations (Myyry, Siponen,
Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009; Trevino, 1986), which may be due to the fact that
information security policies (ISPs) fail to impact the users on the ground, or to address the
ignorance of users of the policies existence (Mason, 1986). Protecting an organization’s IT
assets against theft of proprietary information and from other forms of crimes and destruction
begins with developing comprehensive ISPs (Whitman et al., 2001). However, creating best
security systems, guidelines, and policy focusing on the basic security goals of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, will ensure maximum protection in return for the
organization's security investment (Cohen & Cornwell, 1989; Whitman et al., 2001), but are
not enough to ensure employees' compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Herath & Rao, 2009b),
and will not eliminate threat if these policies are not used properly.
Information security policies are designed to provide employees with the appropriate rules
and guidelines for the protection of the information assets of the organization while they
utilize information systems to perform jobs (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Whitman, 2008).
According to Kwok and Longley (1999), ISP includes a definition of information security; a
statement of management intention supporting the goals and principles of information
security; an explanation of the specific security policies, standards and compliance
requirement; a definition of general and specific responsibilities for all aspects of information
security, and an explanation of the process for reporting suspected security incidents. ISP sets
the strategic direction, scope, and tone for all security efforts within the organization, and it
also assigns responsibilities for the various areas of security and addresses the legal
compliance (Whitman, 2008). The ISP typically addresses compliance in two areas; general
compliance to ensure meeting the requirements to establish a program and the responsibilities
assigned therein to various organizational components, and the use of specified penalties and
disciplinary actions (Schou & Shoemaker, 2007). Accordingly, a person is said to comply
with the ISPs if she/he acts according to the behavior, guidelines, rules, and procedures
specified by the security policy (Verizon, 2009).
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Compliance with ISPs incorporates activities related to the initial execution of the policy to
comply with its requirements; it is defined as the “process of ensuring that security policies
are being followed” (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder, & Van Oppen, 2009, p. 24). This will
include working with organizational personnel and staff to best implement the policy in
different situations and ensure that the policy is understood by all who are required to
implement, monitor and by those required to enforce the policy through monitoring, tracking,
and reporting (Molok, Chang, & Ahmad, 2010). In contrast to compliance, researchers
investigated system abuse and misuse (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Harrington, 1996;
Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990). Various definitions have been utilized to describe
inappropriate or illegal activities involving information systems. Straub (1990, p. 257) used
the term computer abuse to comprise “the unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the
local organizational information system by individuals, including violations against hardware,
program, data, and computer services”. Hu, Xu, Dinev, and Ling (2010, p. 1379) focused on
internal computer offense and defined it as “any act by an employee using computers that is
against the established rules and policies of an organization”, which include “unauthorized
access to data and systems, unauthorized copying or transferring of confidential data, or
selling confidential data to third party for personal gains, etc…”.
Thus, achieving effective information security requires that employees are not only aware of,
but also comply with information security policies and guidelines (Pahnila, Siponen, &
Mahmood, 2007). Few definitions of information security compliance were introduced in the
literature, so for the purpose of this study we define ISP compliance as the activities
incorporated to the execution of the policy to ensure that employees act according to the
behavior, guidelines, rules, and procedures specified by the security policy.

Problem of the Study
Various studies have investigated employees’ compliance behavior from different
perspectives. In a newly published study, drawing from the Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB), Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) have identified antecedents of employee compliance with
information security policy. They traced employees’ attitudes toward compliance with ISP
back to its underlying set of compliance-related beliefs rooted in the rational choice theory
(RCT). The role of information security awareness and its effect on employees’ attitudes
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toward compliance is also examined. Herath and Rao (2009b) investigated motivational
factors rooted in protection-motivation theory (PMT), deterrence theory, and organizational
behavior to examine the adoption of information security practices and policies. Siponen and
Vance (2010) suggest a model for policy compliance drawn from neutralization theory and
deterrence theory. They argue that neutralization techniques influence employees’ intentions
to violate ISP. This study will complement the work of others and extend the knowledge
about employees’ compliance with ISPs by examining the role of information security
awareness in enhancing employees’ compliance with ISPs.

Research Questions
Drawing on the technology acceptance model (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989) it is
proposed that an employees’ intention to comply with the organization’s Information Security
Policies (ISPs) is influenced by perceived complexity (PC) and Perceived Usefulness of
Protection (PUOP). Perceived behavioral control (PBC); self-efficacy and controllability, was
traced back to its set of compliance perceptions, which are rooted in the theory of planned
behavior. Also the role of information security awareness has been investigated and it is
postulated that it will influence employees’ PU and PC toward compliance. This model will
help identify factors that shape an employee’s decision to comply with ISPs and the process
leading to this action. Specific hypothesis that identify relationships between each of the
constructs are empirically tested. Data was collected using a survey instrument designed
specifically to test this model. The study will try to answer the following questions
1. How can employees’ security behavior toward compliance with ISPs be improved in
order to reduce security incidents?
2. What is the role of information security awareness in forming employees’ behavior
toward compliance with ISPs?
3. What are the employees’ perceptions about their roles and responsibilities, as set in the
ISPs, in safeguarding an organization’s information resources toward compliance with
ISPs?
4. What are the employees’ perceptions about the degree of difficulty in complying with
ISPs?
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Significance and Contribution
The results of this study will help senior management understand the factors that influence
employees to comply with Information Security Policies (ISPs), and encourage positive
behaviors and decrease the human errors which will eventually reduce the cost of security.
The results will also be very helpful in developing appropriate information security training
and education programs to enhance positive behaviors based on different socio-technical and
organizational variables that were used in this model, and in employing satisfactory
technology and better utilizing the benefits of current technology within the organization.
This study will contribute to the understanding of the theoretical background of the existing
IS security awareness approaches, and will also point out to what extent IS security awareness
approaches incorporate empirical evidence on their practical effectiveness. Eliciting such
information will benefit practitioners, since approaches based on empirical evidence can be
considered more credible in terms of their practical usefulness and efficiency than approaches
lacking such evidence. IS security practitioners would benefit from concrete guidance on how
to implement the approaches in their organizations.
From an academic perspective, this study will contribute to the library of security awareness
research. The field of security awareness research is lacking in studies that look at this
concept from a behavioral perspective and that employ behavioral theories, such as TRA,
TPB, TAM, and others. This study will be the first to research the behavioral intention of
users toward the adoption of security measures using the original TAM with the effect of
external variables included as predictor variables.

Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is arranged as follows. The next chapter presents a review of the
relevant literature and highlights this study’s contributions. The third chapter presents the
research theoretical foundation; and discusses the research model and develops research
hypotheses to be tested. The fourth chapter describes the research methodology, survey
instrument, sample, and data collection method. The fifth chapter presents and discusses the
results of the study. The final chapter concludes the dissertation and discusses the limitations
of the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the information security compliance literature that is relevant for the
development of the study’s research model. It begins with a definition of the information
security then an overview of information security evolution in the last few decades is
presented. Different kinds of threats and vulnerabilities are defined concentrating on the
insider threat to information security. A review of behavioral information security literature
was categorized based on the dependent variable; systems misuse/abuse studies, information
security policy compliance studies, and protective and preventive technologies studies. The
chapter concluded by defining the gap in the literature review and explaining how this study
will bridge this gap.

Information Security
Definition
The terms information security and information systems security were used interchangeably
by some researchers, while others differentiated between them. Hill and Pemberton (1995)
describe information security as “… systems and procedures designed to protect an
organization's information assets from disclosure to any person or entity not authorized to
have access to that information, especially information which is considered sensitive,
proprietary, confidential, or classified” (p. 15). In the same context, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) defined information security as “the protection of
information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability”
(NIST, 2009, p. B4). The principle of information security is to ensure business continuity
and to minimize business damage by preventing and minimizing the impact of security
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incidents (von Solms, 1998). To overcome problems inherent in other definitions and to
create a firm foundation for further practical work in the measurement of information
security, Anderson (2003, p. 310) defines information security as “a well-informed sense of
assurance that information risks and controls are in balance”.
The core concept of information security is to establish and maintain programs that ensure
availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the organization’s information resources
(Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2004). Other research took a different perspective on information
security by focusing on “behavioral information security” which is defined as “the complexes
of human action that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information
systems” (Stanton, Stam, Guzman, & Caldera, 2003, p. 4). Based on the goal of information,
Parker (1998) sees that information security base should be set to meet an organization’s need
to maintain the security of information from intentional and unintentional misuse and abuse.
Most of the widely used definitions of information security signify the importance of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, which is known as the CIA triad
(Hansche et al., 2004; McCumber, 2005; Swanson, Hash, & Bowen, 2006). This triad has
been criticized because it fails to relate information security in an organizational and business
context, it is insufficient in response to the new challenges that are emerging for information
security, and it lacks the adequate emphasis on the organizational actors’ roles in working
with information security (Kolkowska, Hedström, & Karlsson, 2009). Therefore, new
definitions and new concepts were introduced to replace the information security concepts.
According to von Solms & von Solms (2005), security is not merely preserving and
protecting information and sensitive data of the organizations, but protection of the business
itself. On the other hand, Dhillon (1997) views the entire information system as a protection
object. Information security is considered an important division of information security that
includes all forms of information storage and processing (Schweitzer, 1990), and in whatever
form the information is exchanged or stored, it should always be properly protected
(ISO/IEC17799, 2005). In this context, Schweitzer (1990, p. 62) defines information security
as “the protection of the operations and data in process in an organization’s computing
systems.”

9
All of these have introduced a description and definition of information security that involve
protecting the availability, integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of information.
Definitions of these four elements are presented in Table 2.1 (McCumber, 2005).
Table 2.1: Security Elements
Security Elements
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Authenticity

Description
Making information available only to those people who need it, when they need it,
and under the appropriate circumstances.
Ensuring the information is accurate, complete, and robust.
Having the information when it is needed.
The quality of being genuine or original, rather than reproduction or fabrication.

Evolution
Information security has been a management concern since the introduction of computer to
the business world. Early studies of computer security discussed the consequences of poor
security to organizations. Allen (1968) described the kinds of threats a security system must
deal with, and indicated the directions security measures ought to take. Management should
take appropriate actions for security; controlled access, production control, duplicates files,
and internal security group. Wasserman (1969) proposed different security controls and audits
for electronic data processing activities that include; punched cards, magnetic tapes, and disks
which help companies create significant procedures to guard computer programs and data
against error, malice, fraud, disaster, or system breakdowns. The computer environment of the
1960s and 1970s consisted of stand-alone mainframes computing that were used when
computers were first introduced in business (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). These computers
were extremely large and vulnerable to environmental conditions and hence, had to be housed
in a completely separate building. Securing these computers was needing to access the
computer building was kept under physical security control. Although the system only
allowed one user to work on it at a time, and did not grant access to the data, making it nearly
impossible for unauthorized users to have access to the data. Environmental issues were the
major threats to a computer; i.e., floods, earthquakes, fires, and civil disorders, so it was
relatively easy to take precautions to minimize these threats (Thomson & von Solms, 1998).
Information security was very basic in its early days, mostly comprised of simple document
classification schemes, and due to the primary idea that the main threat to security was
physical theft of equipment, no application classification projects for computers or operating
systems were found (Whitman & Mattord, 2009).
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Then along came a multi-users computing environment that brought with it new threats,
specifically, more people were able to work on the machine outside the confines of the
computer center at the same time (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). In addition, as workstations
were situated in the users’ work environment, access control was no longer sufficient to verify
users’ validity; users were electronically granted access to computer systems, and system
components were shared, e.g. memory, databases, printers, etc. (Whitman & Mattord, 2009).
Elimination of these threats was surmounted by the implementation of security controls such
as a user authentication system that is embedded within mainframe operating systems.
Consequently, information security from the senior executives was mainly viewed as the
management of log-in IDs and passwords, and therefore it was located within the IT
departments and typically buried somewhere within the data center operations management
(Fitzgerald, 2007). In this computing stage, workstations used were considered dumb
terminals (all intelligence resided on the central computer) and restricting users to work in
certain areas was relatively easy. Therefore, physical and technical security measures were
adequate to ensure effective information security (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). Information
technology (IT) at this stage was considered an overhead expense to support organization
functions; also it was considered a technical theme and hardly understood by the senior
management, yet still important (Fitzgerald, 2007). In this “Zone Security” stage, as
(Shimazu, 2007) called it, security meant a wall surrounding entire company systems and
forcefully controlling the gates of the wall so the data and machines behind those walls was
secure.
In the early 1980s, with the introduction of the personal computer, a significant change
occurred to information security (Fitzgerald, 2007); information was now an asset to be
valued, traded, and, most of all, protected (Hurd, 2001). The introduction of the personal
computer and the growth of end user computing (EUC) brought new security concerns for
organizations; end-users control their own inputs, processing, outputs, and even software
development (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). Contrasted to the stand-alone computing
environment where knowledgeable IS professionals were controlling the computing
environment, computer security partly shifted to end users themselves (D'Arcy, 2005), which
was found to be the sixth most critical issues facing IS executives (Brancheau & Wetherbe,
1987). The proliferation of end-user computing offers the promise of improved productivity,
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but also entails risks; e.g. inadequate data integrity, “orphan” applications, and fragmented
systems. Alavi and Weiss (1985) identify data integrity, unauthorized access, and data
security as the main risks associated with EUC. Little or lack of security training for end users
was another concern (Leitheiser & Wetherbe, 1986). Benson (1983) considered lack of data
security and integrity, database access control, significant training to users, inadequate
documentation, and poor data backup procedures as critical issues associated with EUC.
Despite the increased number of threats to information systems as a result of the growth of
EUC, management still underestimated the importance of information security at this stage. In
a study conducted by Ball and Harris (1982), among eighteen management issues that MIS
management might address, data security was ranked in the twelfth place and information
privacy was in fourteenth place. According to Brancheau and Wetherbe (1987), information
system executives did not rank security and control among the top twenty critical issues of
management. While out of eight problem areas, Hackathorn (1987) found that general
executives ranked security of data in fourth place and they thought of it as less important than
the incompatibility of hardware and software, while MIS executives thought that data security
was the most important issue. Hoffer and Straub (1989) indicated that an estimated 60% of
organizations assigned full or part-time members to administer security, but still legislators
have paid more attention to computer crime and abuse reports in the media than to managers,
as evidenced by laws dealing with computer crimes in all fifty states.
The advent of the personal computer (PC), and the increasing complexity and reliability of
networks environment, has brought about a great challenge in the area of information security
(Thomson & von Solms, 1998). The systems that used to be protected by a data center have
been moved to a shared network environment; wide area networks (WAN) and local area
networks (LAN) were utilized, and recently the Internet, extranets, and intranets all
accelerated the multi-user and EUC environment (D'Arcy, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2007). While it is
still considered as mainly an IT issue, it is during this stage that information security came to
the forefront, since information systems are becoming the central hub to the successful of
many organizations’ daily operations (Fitzgerald, 2007; Thomson & von Solms, 1998).
Despite the fact that many organizations have become heavily dependent on computer-based
and information systems, and that the interruption of either may lead to outcomes ranging
from inconvenience to disaster (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992), information security
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continues to be ignored by top managers, middle managers, and employees (Straub & Welke,
1998).
With the low cost of producing PCs and portable computers, along with networking resources
“the Internet” was made available to the public in the late 1990s for accessing internal
systems remotely, and new security concerns were introduced (Fitzgerald, 2007). Due to the
competitive nature of business, users’ profiles changed significantly and developed into a
situation where managerial people often needed access to information on a “must have now”
basis. This situation, along with other similar situations, resulted in people gaining access to
or modifying data that they were not supposed to have, whether intentional or unintentional
(Thomson & von Solms, 1998). The growing computer literacy has created increasingly
sophisticated users of technology, who are becoming more skillful at committing different
types of computer abuse (Straub & Nance, 1990).
Today network and computer attacks have become pervasive. The exponential growth in
network-centric connectivity brought different kinds of threats to information systems; any
computer at home or business that is connected to the Internet is under threat from viruses,
worms, hackers attacks, theft, defacement, and other forms of internal and external security
threats (D'Arcy, 2005; Hansman & Hunt, 2005). Although countermeasures, such as antiviruses, firewalls, security patches, and passwords control systems, and other technologies
and techniques that can be automated, are available to improve information security, they are
not well utilized by users even if they are freely available (Workman, 2007; Workman,
Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Threats cause different damages to the information systems; a
denial-of-service can result in stopping an organizations’ operations for a period of time,
which might cause a financial loss to these companies (Hovav & D'Arcy, 2003). Damages due
to security incidents such as the Code Red virus in 2001 was estimated at $2.1 billion and at
$1.1 billion due to the Melissa virus in 1999 (Telang & Wattal, 2007).
Recent industry research indicates the importance of security threats to information systems,
although, security breaches have become very common in today’s network environment. In a
recent survey by Ernst and Young (2010), results show that many organizations recognize the
risks associated with current trends and new technologies; 46% of respondents indicated that
their annual investment in information security is increasing. The Symantec Global Internet
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Security Threats Report specifies that more than 16 million new malicious code threats were
reported in 2008, (265% increase over 2007). The 2009 CSI Computer Crime and Security
survey reported big jumps in incidence of financial fraud (19.5 percent an increase of over 12
percent from last year); malware infection (64.3 percent and increase of over 50 percent from
last year); denials of service (29.2 percent, an increase of over 21 percent from last year),
password sniffing (17.3 percent, an increase of over 9 percent from last year); and Web site
defacement (13.5 percent an increase of over 6 percent from last year) (Richardson, 2008).
The 2009 Ponemon Institute benchmark study (2010) found that data breach incidents cost
U.S. companies $204 per compromised customer record in 2009, compared to $202 in 2008.
Despite an overall drop in the number of reported breaches (498 in 2009 vs. 657 in 2008
according to the Identity Theft Resource Center), the average total per-incident cost in 2009
was $6.75 million, compared to an average per-incident cost of $6.65 million in 2008.
Financial losses were not the only consequence facing organizations as a result of security
threats, other detrimental impacts included negative publicity, competitive disadvantage, and
even reduced organizational viability (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003).
The increased numbers of information security incidents stimulated academic and practitioner
interests in information security. In today’s information intensive society, the secure
management of information systems has become critically important (Herath & Rao, 2009b).
In defining the 10 key issues for IT executives, Luftman and Ben-Zvi (2010) found that
security and privacy is still one of the top 10 IT management concerns; it was ranked ninth in
2009, eighth in 2008, and second in 2005. On the other hand, security technology lags behind
IT management expectations, having traditionally been ranked in the top 10, but in 2009, it is
not even in the top 20 (Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2010). Although 90 percent of organizations
view information security as a highly important factor for achieving their overall objectives
(Ernst & Young, 2010), only 53 percent of the surveyed organizations allocated 5 percent or
less of their overall IT budget to information security (Richardson, 2008).
In summary, as organizations became more and more dependent on computer-based and
telecommunications intensive information systems and with the evolution of information
technology, this created a panacea of threats to information systems assets. Today
organizations in both the public and the private sectors are aware of the needs of information
security to protect their information systems and corporate systems (Hawkins, Yen, & Chou,
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2000). In essence, management's concern with information security has changed over years
making it one of the top 10 issues of IT management.
Threats and Vulnerabilities
Every day the world witnesses new information security incidents, which cost millions of
dollars annually, as a result of computer theft, fraud, abuse, and other security threats. In its
1.6 dictionary release (2011), Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) introduced 460 different attacks to information systems classified into 15 categories
based on the attack mechanism. The 2008 Computer Security Institute (CSI) survey on
Computer Crime and Security Survey found that 43% of respondents detected computer
security incidents in the last 12 months; 47% of them reported 1-5 security incidents, and 26%
did not know the number of security incidents they had. Studies showed neglect of
information security in the past by management created a less secure system that led to more
frequent and damaging security breaches (Straub & Welke, 1998; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).
Management, practitioners, and employees alike must understand the threat facing their
organization’s information systems and examine the vulnerabilities inherent in those systems
because of such threats (Whitman, 2004).
The literature shows a paucity of empirical research in information security threats
classifications, effects, types, management strategies, and determinants. Some of this research
is summarized in Table 2.2. The results of Whitman (2004) study illustrate the need for
increased levels of awareness, education, and policy in information security to address the
threats. A security threat taxonomy is essential to the threat inventory process because it helps
to keep the threat inventory complete and representative (Im & Baskerville, 2005). Different
security threats classifications were introduced to help with managing risk and setting the
appropriate controls. Peltier (2005) classified threats into two categories; common and
accidental. CAPEC (2011) classified risk into 15 categories based on the attack mechanism.
In an empirical study Whitman (2003) found that, deliberate software attacks, technical
software failures or errors, acts of human error or failure, deliberate acts of espionage or
trespass, and deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism are the top security threats to
information systems.
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Table 2.2: Information Security Threats
Peltier (2005)
CAPEC (2011)

Whitman and Mattord (2008)

McCumber (2005)
Schou and Shoemaker (2007)
Hansman and Hunt (2005)

Loch et al. (1992)

Workman et al. (2008)

Mármol and Pérez (2009)

Type of threats Identified
Common and accidental threats
Data Leakage Attacks, Resource Depletion, Injection, Spoofing, Time and
State Attacks, Abuse of Functionality, Probabilistic Techniques,
Exploitation of Authentication, Exploitation of Privilege/Trust, Data
Structure Attacks, Resource Manipulation, Physical Security Attacks,
Network Reconnaissance, Social Engineering Attacks, and Supply Chain
Attacks
Acts of Human Error, Compromises to Intellectual Property, Deliberate
Acts of Espionage, Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion, Deliberate
Acts of Sabotage, Deliberate Acts of Theft, Deliberate Software Attacks,
Deviations in Quality From ISP, Forces f Nature, Technical Hardware
Failures or Errors, Technical Software Failure or Errors, and
Technological Obsolescence
Environmental, Internal; Hostile and Non-Hostile, and External
Outsider and Insider Threats
Threats that use a single attack vector and threats that do not use an attack
vector or are too trivial such as Viruses, Worms, Trojans, Buffer overflow,
DOS, Network attack, Physical attack, Password attack, and Information
gathering attack
Target of the attack; Hardware and Software (Operating System,
Application and Network).
Vulnerabilities and exploits that the attack uses.
Sources (Internal and External),
Perpetrators (Human and Non-human),
Intent (Accidental and Intentional) and
consequences (Disclosure, Modification, Destruction and Denial of Use)
Unauthorized Interception of Information;
Unauthorized Modification of Information;
Exposure of Information to Unauthorized Individuals;
Destruction of Hardware, Software and/or Information
Attack intent
Attack target
Required knowledge
Attack cost
Algorithm dependence
Detectability

Markus (2000) argued that IT-related risk is fragmented, and the appropriate IT security
management considerations are through IT-related risk rather than security by itself. To
capture the view of IT management about threats to information systems and resident data,
Loch et al. (1992) classified threats to information systems based on the source (internal vs.
external), perpetrators (human vs. non-human), intent (accidental vs. intentional), and
consequence (disclosure, modification, destruction, and denial of use). To better understand
the numerous threats facing organizations, Whitman and Mattord (2008) developed a scheme
that group threats based on their respective activities. Their model consisted of 12 general
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threat categories; acts of human error, compromises to intellectual property, deliberate acts of
espionage, deliberate acts of information extortion, deliberate acts of sabotage, deliberate acts
of theft, deliberate software attacks, deviations in quality from ISP, forces of nature, technical
hardware failures or errors, technical software failure or errors, and technological
obsolescence.
Hansman and Hunt (2005) classify threats into three categories, first based on the means by
which the attack reached its target; threats that use a single attack vector and threats that do
not use an attack vector or that are too trivial, such as viruses, worms, Trojans, buffer
overflow, DOS, network attack, physical attack, password attack, and information gathering
attack, second based on the attack target; hardware and software, and finally attacks based on
vulnerabilities and exploits. On the other hand, Mármol and Pérez (2009) classified threats
based on the attack intent, targets, required knowledge, cost, algorithm dependence, and
detectability.
Human Threats and Information Systems Misuse
In a very simple classification, threats to information security were classified as internal and
external threats (e.g. McCumber, 2005; Schou & Shoemaker, 2007). All of the previous
classifications rest under this taxonomy. One of the most important classifications is human
error (insider threats), either intentional or unintentional, which is a vital internal threat
category. It is recognized by information security researchers that insider threats represent one
of the most critical threats to information security (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Dhillon,
1999; Whitman, 2003). Verizon (2009) reported that the results of 600 incidents over five
years showed that insiders are behind the majority of breaches, whether intentionally or
unintentionally. Human attack is not a new issue for organizations, but might be of less
concern than external threats for an organization (Stanton, Caldera, Isaac, Stam, &
Marcinkowski, 2003). Human threats are often ignored (Wood & Banks, 1993), but are
always present and evident in many ways and should be examined in the context of changing
technical, social, business, and cultural factors (Colwill, 2009). The legitimate and privileged
access to an organization’s information assets lends a strong power to the insiders to have the
highest potential risk to cause damage to the organization (Colwill, 2009; Dugo, 2007).
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People are recognized to be the weakest link in information security (Bresz, 2004; Thomson
& von Solms, 2005; Zhang et al., 2009), but they also can be great assets in the effort to
reduce information security threats (Bresz, 2004; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a). Human threats have
been ongoing concerns for organizations as the literature shows; Wasserman (1969) was one
of the earliest researchers to discuss the importance of human errors and its effect on the
company. Insiders can accidently or intentionally compromise information confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (Colwill, 2009), which can cost millions of dollars without criminal
intent on anyone’s part (Wasserman, 1969). The 2010/2011 CSI Computer Crime and
Security survey reported that 40.9 percent of respondents stated that at least some of their
losses were attributable to malicious insiders, but clearly non-malicious insiders are the
greater problem, since 14.5 percent of respondents estimated that nearly all their losses were
due to the non-malicious careless behavior of insiders, and 46 percent estimated between 20
to 80 percent of their losses were due to careless behavior of non-malicious insiders
(Richardson, 2011). Organizations usually are reluctant to disclose security incidents fearing
negative publicity that might destroy their image, and only a fraction of security incidents are
actually discovered and reported, suggesting that the magnitude of the problem might be
underestimated (D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Hoffer & Straub, 1989).
Recently, more attention was directed toward the human side of computer abuse (Lee, Lee, &
Yoo, 2004), as a more important step toward effective information security management (Hu
et al., 2010). A plethora of research has been conducted to explore “negative” or improper
computing behavior in the last years. The majority of the information security research to
understand employees’ misconduct or misuse, and even criminal acts toward the
organization’s IT systems, has been conducted from different theoretical lenses (Hu et al.,
2010). General Deterrence Theory (GDT) was one of the most used theories to study
employees’ behavior since their misconduct or misuse against information systems is related
to criminal behavior (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2010; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Straub,
1990). In light of the turbulent future, security managers hold the key to the success or failure
of a company’s well-being, and since systems are used by people, information security is an
organizational and social issue (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). Thus, people who use the
systems are responsible for them, and play a key role in the security of individual and
organizational systems (Lee et al., 2004).
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Behavioral Information Security Literature
Behavioral information security research has become an important component of the
information security literature. Stanton, Caldera, et al. (2003, p. 3) defined behavioral
information security as “the complexes of human action that influence the availability,
confidentiality, and integrity of information systems”. Industry research helped to signify the
importance of human factors in securing organizations’ information assets. Information
security success depends in part upon the effective behavior of the people involved in its use
(Stanton, Caldera, et al., 2003). Thus, the development of effective protective information
technologies is not enough strategy to fight the threats, but understanding user attitudes,
intention, and behavior, in addition to policies, are also important to successfully defend
against information security threats (Dinev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 2009). Appropriate
(compliance) and improper (abuse) use of information systems has been explored in the
existing behavioral information security literature (D'Arcy, 2005). The literature shows
different approaches to studying employees’ behavior toward information security; some
studies employed behavioral theories to examine information system abuse (e.g. Bulgurcu,
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010b; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2010;
Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Straub, 1990), while other studies employed
behavioral theories to examine employees’ compliance with ISPs (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal,
2010; Greene & D’Arcy, 2010; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010), and other studies
examined a protective approach (e.g. Boss et al., 2009; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Puhakainen &
Siponen, 2010; Workman et al., 2008).
Information System Misuse Studies
Since computer abuse and employee misconduct against IS are considered criminal behavior,
IS scholars have been attracted to the field of criminology to understand employees’
misconduct behavior and criminal acts against organizational IT systems (Hu et al., 2010). A
number of studies adopted GDT to examine the impact of security countermeasures on
information systems abuse or misuse (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2009;
Harrington, 1996; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Hu et al., 2010; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Lee
et al., 2004; Pahnila et al., 2007; Straub, 1990), since it provide a theoretical explanation for
the use of security countermeasures as a process to reduce IS misuse (D'Arcy & Hovav,
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2009). Other studies adopted other theories such as fairness theory, neutralization theory and
organizational justice theory, to examine the misuse behavior (Posey, Roberts, Lowry, &
Bennett, 2010; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Warkentin, Willison, & Johnston, 2011). Table 2.3
presents a summary of these studies.
Straub (1990) was the one of the first IS scholars to use GDT in IS security. He argued that
information security procedures can deter potential computer abusers from violating
organizational policy. A survey of 1,211 randomly selected IS managers from different
organizations indicated that different preventive and deterrent techniques were found to be
effective in lowering computer abuse; such as weekly and overall weekly hours dedicated to
data security, use of multiple methods to disseminate information about penalties and
acceptable system usage, a statement of penalties for violation, and the use of security
software. Moreover, the more that preventive security software is used, fewer abusers are
expected as they become aware that IS security is actively monitoring their systems activity,
preventing actual abuse and deterring possible violations of others. D'Arcy et al. (2009)
suggested that security countermeasures; encompassing security policies; Security, Education,
Training, and Awareness (SETA) programs; and computer monitoring, to be effective tools to
reduce users’ IS misuse. A sample of 269 computer users from different companies was used
to test the model. Results showed that users’ awareness of security controls has an impact on
sanctions perceptions, which in turn reduced IS misuse intentions. It was also found that
perceived severity of sanctions is more effective than perceived certainty of a sanction in
reducing IS misuse intentions. Regarding users’ awareness of SETA programs, the study
provides evidence that these programs help to reduce IS misuse because they increase
perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment for such behavior. It was found that
users’ awareness of security policies reduce users’ perceptions of the possibility of getting
caught for misusing the system. Users’ awareness of computer monitoring has a significant
effect on users’ perceived certainty and severity of sanctions that help deter IS misuse.
Hu et al. (2010) tested a model of computer offences that adopted three popular criminology
theories; general deterrence theory, rational choice theory, and individual propensity. A
sample of 207 employees from five large Chinese companies was used to test the research
model. The study found that when an individual is ruminating whether to abuse (offence) the
computer systems, the perceived benefits dominate the perceived risks in the rational decision
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making process. Deterrence was found to have a limited impact on the offensive intentions
through increased perceived risk. The study results suggested that computer offences are a
result of overestimating the benefits and underestimating the risk by employees when the
situations for committing the offences are present and they have the means to conduct the
offensive acts.
Harrington (1996) employed deterrence theory from an ethical perspective, and assessed
whether general and IS-specific codes of ethics affect computer abuse judgments and
employees’ intentions to abuse information systems. Computer abuse was defined as any
action of writing or distributing viruses, cracking, computer fraud, illegal software copying,
and corporate sabotage. The study found that general codes of ethics had no effect on
computer abuse judgments and abuse intentions of all employees, but it was found to affect
those IS personnel who tend to deny responsibility. As compared to general codes, IS-specific
codes of ethics had a direct effect on computer sabotage judgments and intentions, but had no
contrasting effect on those high in denial of responsibility. Based on the Theory of Planned
Behavior (TPB), Lee et al. (2004) tested the effectiveness of an integrative model of GDT and
Social Control Theory (SCT) to address computer abuse intention by insiders. Security policy,
security awareness, and security programs were hypothesized to impact intention by acting as
deterrent factors. In addition, organizational trust factors; attachment, commitment,
involvement, and norms, were also assumed to have impact on intention and were expected to
reduce computer abuse. A sample of 182 MBA students and middle managers from six
Korean companies were used to test the model. The study found that security policies and
security systems had no impact on the computer abuse behaviors. Results also showed that
involvement (participation in informal meetings, personal relationships with many people,
and loyalty to the company) was found to be effective in reducing computer abuse intention,
as was the belief by employees that computer abuse is unacceptable and reduce computer
abuse.
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Table 2.3: Computer abuse empirical studies
Author (s)

Dependent
Variable
Computer
abuse

Predictors

Theories

Findings and Comments

Deterrents and preventive
security software

GDT

D'Arcy et al.
(2009)

IS misuse
intention

GDT

Hu et al. (2010)

Intention to
commit
computer
offense

Harrington
(1996)

Computer
abuse
intention

Security countermeasures
(security policies, SETA
programs, and computer
monitoring), severity and
certainty of sanctions
Low self-control, perceived
deterrence, perceived
extrinsic benefits, perceived
intrinsic benefits, perceived
informal risks, and perceived
formal risks
Codes of ethics, Denial of
Responsibility

Lee et al.
(2004)

Computer
abuse

GDT, SCT

D'Arcy and
Hovav (2009)

IS misuse
intention

Security policy, security
awareness, physical security
system, attachment,
commitment, involvement,
norms, self-defense, and
induction control
Security policies, SETA
programs, and computer
monitoring
Advanced Notification,
Organizational SETA
Efforts,
Explanation Adequacy
Organizational Trust

Deterrents and preventive
security software lower level
of computer abuse
User awareness of security
countermeasures reduced IS
misuse intention through
perceived certainty and
severity of sanctions
Rational choice framework
has strong effect on intention
to commit computer offense.
Deterrence was less effective
in predicting intention to
commit computer offense.
General codes did not affect
the computer abuse
judgments and intentions. ISspecific codes had a minor
effect on computer abuse
judgments and intentions.
Deterrence factors
(security system) have a
significant effect on Self
Defense Intention
related to computer abuse

Straub (1990)

GDT, RCT,
SCT

GDT

GDT

SETA and computer
monitoring has low effect on
intention to system misuse.
Posey et al.
Internet
Fairness
Advance notification, SETA
(2010)
Computer
Theory
programs, organizational
Abuse
trust, and explanation
adequacy significantly
decreases internal computer
abuse incidents.
Siponen and
Intention to
Neutralization techniques,
Neutralization Neutralization and informal
Vance (2010)
violate IS
formal and informal
theory,
sanction are excellent
security
sanctions, shame
GDT
predictors of intention to
policies
violate ISPs.
Dugo (2007)
INFOSEC
PBC, SN, attitude, perceived TPB
Attitude, SN, perceived
violation
punishment certainty,
GDT
punishment certainty, and
intention
perceived punishment
severity are good predictors
severity, organizational
of behavioral intention to
commitment, and security
violate. INFOSEC
culture
Organizational commitment
and security culture are not
significant predictors of
violation intention.
GDT-General Deterrence Theory, RCT-Rational Choice Theory, SCT-Self-Control Theory, TPB-Theory of
Planned Behavior
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Researchers

in

criminology and

social

psychology suggested

that

the

security

countermeasures deterrent effect is not uniform across individuals due to personal and
organizational differences that impact the perceived strength of sanctions. To investigate this
issue, D'Arcy and Hovav (2009) presented a model grounded in GDT to explore the
moderating impact of computer self-efficacy and virtual status on sanction perceptions. Their
model contains user awareness of security policies, the SETA program, and computer
monitoring, and is built on the assumption that the deterrence mechanism of security
countermeasures depends on the actions and awareness of end users, and therefore it is not
important to understand the impact of these controls from the user’s perspective. Researchers
also assume that end users are not fully aware of the existence of many security
countermeasures. Total samples of 507 participants were used to test their model; 238 MBA
students and 269 employees. Two IS misuse scenarios, unauthorized access and unauthorized
modification, were designed to capture respondent’s intentions. Study results found that the
moderating influence of computer self-efficacy has a significant negative affect on the
relationships between computer monitoring and IS misuse intention. The results showed that
deterrent effectiveness of SETA programs and computer monitoring is not consistent across
all individuals; computer savvy individuals are less deterred, and these countermeasures are
also less effective on employees that spend more working days outside of the office. As a
result , the study recommended that security education and training programs should take into
consideration the employee’s level of computer understanding.
Posey et al. (2010) used fairness theory to explain why security policy sometimes backfires,
and actually increases security violations. Fairness theory assumes that employees have an
immanent need to blame the decision maker or have accountability to the decision maker
when they experience a negative organizational event (Posey et al., 2010). The study expected
explanation adequacy to increase employees’ trust in their organization, and this trust should
also increase internal computer abuse incidents following the security changes
implementation. A sample of 397 full time employees from banking, financial, and insurance
industries was used to obtain data for testing the study model. The study found that giving
employees advance notification for future information security changes positively influenced
employees’ perceptions of organizational communication efforts. The adequacy of these
explanations is also maintained by SETA programs, and explanation adequacy and SETA
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programs worked in harmony to foster organizational trust, which significantly decreased
internal computer abuse incidents. The findings show how organizational communication can
influence the overall effectiveness of information security changes among employees, and
how organizations can avoid becoming a victim to their own efforts.
Siponen and Vance (2010) argued that employees’ violation of IS security policies, based on
research in criminology, is not always best deterred by fear of sanctions, since employees may
use neutralization techniques which allow them to reduce the perceived harm of their policy
violation. Therefore, they proposed a theoretical model in which the effects of neutralization
techniques could be tested with those of sanctions described by deterrence theory. The study
used six techniques of neutralization; denial of responsibility, denial of injury, metaphor of
the lodger, condemns the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, and defense of necessity.
They also used informal and formal sanctions and shame from the deterrence theory to
examine employees’ intention to violate IS security policy. A hypothetical scenario method
was used to assess the research model, and a sample of 1449 administrative personnel from
three organizations in Finland was used. The study found that neutralization is an excellent
predictor of employees’ intention to violate IS security policies. Intention was considered as a
measured reflection of a predisposition to commit an act, so neutralization significantly
affected the predisposition to violate IS security policy. As for the deterrence effect of
sanctions, the study found that informal sanctions are insignificant predictors of intention to
violate IS security policies in the presence of neutralization, and formal sanctions were also
found to be insignificant predictors of IS security policy violation intention.
Drawing on the TPB and GDT, as well as organizational commitment, Dugo (2007)
developed a model to examine information security (INFOSEC) violation intention. The study
examined the effect of organizational security culture on violation intention. A sample of 113
participants (mostly students) from a professional government school was used to test the
study model. The study found that the greater the attitude and subjective norm toward
intentional INFOSEC policy violations, the greater the intention is to commit intentional
INFOSEC policy violations. Perceived punishment certainty and perceived punishment
severity were found significant in reducing intention to violate the INFOSEC policy.
Organizational commitment and security culture were not significant predictors of INFOSEC
policy violation intention.
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Information Security Policy Compliance Studies
Employees’ compliance with Information Security Policies (ISPs) is an important concern for
organizations (Puhakainen, 2006) to prevent and reduce information system resources misuse
and abuse by insiders (Straub, 1990). Taking different perspectives, various studies (see Table
2.4) employed behavioral theories to examine employees’ compliance with ISPs to reduce
systems misuse and abuse. Drawing on TPB, Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) argue that along with
normative belief, self-efficacy, information security awareness (ISA), an employee’s attitude
toward compliance will determine compliance intention with the ISP. Building on that, they
trace employee attitude toward compliance with ISP back to its underlying set of compliancerelated beliefs rooted in the rational choice theory (RCT); benefits of compliance, cost of
compliance, and cost of noncompliance. The role of information security awareness also
investigated. A sample of 464 employees, who used the IT resources of their organizations
and had access to the Internet, was used to test the study model. It was found that attitude,
normative belief, and self-efficacy has a significant effect on employee’s intention to comply
with the ISP. Also, it was found that outcome beliefs significantly affected the beliefs about
overall assessment of consequences, which in turn significantly affected an employee’s
attitude. Information security awareness also was found to have significant effects on both
attitude and outcome beliefs.
Likewise, Li, Zhang, and Sarathy (2010) employed the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) to
examine the factors that influence Internet Use Policy (IUP) compliance. The study
concentrated on defining the major costs and benefits that factor into employees’ intention to
comply with the IUP and the relationships among these factors, and the mechanisms that
could facilitate IUP compliance. The study developed a model in which IUP compliance is
examined as a cost-benefit-based behavior influenced by personal norms and organizational
context factors. A sample of 246 employees from different organizations with IUPs was used
to test the research model. The study found that employees are more likely to comply with the
IUP when perceived benefits are outweighed by potential risks from formal sanctions and
security threats. Sanction severity was found to be an ineffective mechanism for the majority
of employees, except for employees with very low personal norms against Internet abuses.
Also, social influence from subjective norms was not a significant predictor of an employee’s
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intention to comply with the IUP. Besides the cost–benefit analysis, compliance intention was
also influenced by employees' personal norms or moral standards against Internet abuses.
To explore the aptitude of moral reasoning and values to encourage compliance with IS
security policies, Myyry et al. (2009) developed a theoretical model that combines the Theory
of Cognitive Moral Development (TCMD) (Which consists of three levels; Preconventional
level: Focus is on self, Conventional level: Focus is on relationships, and Postconventional
level: Focus is on personally held principles) and the Theory of Motivational Types of Values
(TMTV) (which consists of a two-dimensional continuum; Openness to Change versus
Conservation.). They argue that theories of moral reasoning are related to information security
policies (ISPs) as the intention or decision to violate an ISP can be interpreted in terms of
moral conflict. To test their model, data from a sample of 132 individuals in Finland,
technical service center employees and part-time master students with work experience, was
collected. In regard to moral reasoning, the study found that preconventional moral reasoning,
which focuses on fear of sanctions and ‘What’s in it for me?’ thinking, is positively related to
both hypothetical and actual compliance in the information security context, while
conventional moral reasoning, which focuses on acts to please others and on following the
laws and norms for their own sake, correlates negatively with compliance behavior. Of the
value dimensions, the study found that openness to change was negatively related to
behavioral choice in the information security context, while conservation was found to be
positively related to behavioral choice in the information security context.
Siponen et al. (2007) combined the PMT with the modern GDT and TRA to explain how
employees’ compliance with information security policies and guidelines can be improved.
The study argued that the stronger the intention is to comply with ISPs, the more likely it is
that the individual will actually comply with the ISPs. It was hypothesized that threat
appraisal, self-efficacy, and response efficacy would positively affect employees’ intention to
comply with the ISPs, and also it was hypothesized that intention to comply with ISPs and
sanctions would positively affect actual compliance with ISPs. A sample of 917 employees
from four Finnish companies was collected to test the research model. The results showed that
threat appraisal, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and sanctions had a significant effect on
employees’ intention to comply with an organization’s ISP. Talib and Dhillon (2010) have a
different view, suggesting that emancipation leads to better protection of information. Their
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study suggests that emancipating employees with respect to information access would make
them more likely to comply with an organization's security policies. The higher the privilege
granted to employees to access information, the higher the commitment toward the
organization, and the tendency to comply with the ISP.
Similarly, Herath and Rao (2009b) adopted PMT, GDT, and organizational behavior to
develop and test an integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence model of security policy
compliance under the umbrella of Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior (DTPB).
Drawing upon PMT the study incorporated an evaluation of threat appraisal and coping
appraisal to identify attitudes toward security policies. The study also assessed the effect of
employees’ organizational commitment on security policy compliance intentions, and the
influence of environmental factors such as deterrence, facilitating conditions, and social
influence. A sample of 310 employees from 78 organizations was used to test the research
model. The study found that employees’ understanding of the severity of the threat
significantly affected their concern regarding security breaches, but certainty of security
breaches was found to have no significant impact on the security concern. Results suggest that
if employees believe that complying with policies is an obstacle to their day to day job
activity, they are less likely to comply with ISPs. It was also found that resource availability,
self-efficacy, and perceived effectiveness of employee actions played a significant role in
behaviors related to ISP compliance, while the impact of attitude on employees’ compliance
intention was found insignificant. In another study which builds upon Principal Agent Theory,
Herath and Rao (2009a) investigated the impact of extrinsic incentives (penalties and social
pressures) and intrinsic incentives (perceived value or contribution) on policy compliance
intention. Using responses from 312 employees, the study found that intrinsic and extrinsic
motivators have a strong influence on policy compliance intention. Severity of penalty was
found to have a negative effect on compliance intention.
Greene and D’Arcy (2010) incorporated elements from moral development research models,
the TRA and TPB, as well as criminological perspectives including Social Bond Theory
(SBT), differential association, and neutralization theory, to examine the influence of
security-related and employee organization relationship factors on users’ IS security
compliance decisions. Specifically they presumed that security culture, job satisfaction, and
perceived organizational support have a positive effect on users’ IS security. Data were
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collected using two online surveys, and a sample of 127 computer-using professionals located
in various organizations in the US. The results found that the relationship between security
culture and security compliance intention supported the notion that security culture is an
important factor for supporting and guiding information security programs, while perceived
organizational support, was not found to be a significant predictor of compliant behavior
intention. Using Social Learning Theory (SLT), Warkentin, Johnston, and Shropshire (2011)
examined the influence of an informal social learning environment on individual compliance
outcomes. The study argued that self-efficacy mediates the effect of external cues (situational
support, verbal persuasion, and vicarious experience) on employees’ behavioral intentions to
comply. A sample of 202 healthcare professionals from nine separate and diverse healthcare
organizations was used to test the research model. The study found strong evidence of the
influence of an informal social learning environment on employees’ perceptions of
information privacy policy compliance intentions.
Based on compensation theory, Zhang et al. (2009) combined perceived technical security
protection into the TPB to examine the impact of technical protection mechanisms on enduser security behavioral intentions to comply with security policies. The study was built on
the assumption that the attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms (SN), and perceived
behavioral control (PBC), determine an individual’s intention to comply. An online survey
was conducted, and a sample of 176 computer end-users from various industrial organizations
in the United States was used to examine the research model. Both PBC and attitude were
found as significant predictors of users’ intention to comply with ISPs, and perceived
technical protection was also found to have a significant impact on intention to comply with
the ISPs. Regarding subjective norms, the study found that it plays a larger role with users
who have less experience. In addition, the existence and effectiveness of technical support
enhanced users’ compliance intentions. To study individual intentions to engage in securityrelated behavior, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) employed PMT, along with TRA and TPB, to
examine the behavioral intentions of individuals who are motivated to take the necessary
precautions under their direct control to secure their own computer and Internet in a home
setting. They theorized that intentions are determined by attitudes toward security related
behavior, social influence in the form of subjective and descriptive norms, and psychological
ownership of the relevant object. A survey and an experiment were conducted to test the
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research model. A sample from subscribers of a locally based ISP and undergraduate students
enrolled in an introductory business course at a large university were collected. The study
found that home computer users’ intentions to perform security-related behavior are formed
by a combination of cognitive, social, and psychological components.
Developing their fear appeals model based on the PMT, and fear appeal theory, Johnston and
Warkentin (2010) examined the influence of fear appeals on end users’ intention to perform
recommended individual computer security actions, specifically compliance behavior. A
sample of 275 experienced computer users (faculty, staff, and students) from multiple sites at
a large university was used to examine the research model. The study found that fear appeal
has an inconsistent impact on end users’ behavioral intention to comply with recommended
individual security acts. Behavioral intention was found to be determined in part by
perceptions of self-efficacy, response efficacy, threat severity, and social influence. Similarly,
Chenoweth, Minch, and Gattiker (2009) developed a model that applies PMT to the spyware
domain. The model hypothesized that maladaptive coping is mediating the relationship
between behavioral intention and threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Based on data
collected from 204 undergraduate students, the study found that perceived vulnerability,
perceived severity, response efficacy, and response cost were found to be significant
predictors of users’ intention to adopt antispyware protective technology.
Siponen et al. (2010) took a different approach, by building a model based on PMT, GDT,
TRA, innovation diffusion theory (IDT), and rewards to understand why some employees
comply with their organization’s ISPs and why other do not. The study argues for clear
language in ISP documents, and for overall visibility of information security. Data from a
sample of 917 employees was collected from four Finnish companies in the area of
information and communications technology business operations, information security,
logistics, and supermarket chains. The results showed that threat appraisal, self-efficacy,
normative beliefs, and visibility of information security policies are significant predictors of
intention to comply with organizations’ ISPs. Deterrence was found to have a significant
impact on actual compliance with ISPs, whereas rewards did not have a significant impact on
actual compliance. In another study also aimed to understand why one would or would not
follow a well-specified ISP, Pahnila et al. (2007) developed a theoretical model that combines
GDT, PMT, TRA, Information Systems Success, and Triandis’ Behavioral Framework and
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Rewards. Based on a sample of 245 employees from a Finnish company, the study found that
information quality has a strong effect on actual compliance with ISPs; while employees’
attitude, normative beliefs, and habits have a significant effect on intention to comply with IS
security policy. Sanctions were also found to have no significant effect on intention to
comply, and rewards had no significant effect on actual compliance.
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2008) focus on demotivational factors (burden of
compliance), and motivational factors (ISP awareness, fairness of the ISP, and facilitating
conditions), to investigate its influence on employees’ attitudes toward ISP compliance
intention. They argue that demotivational factors have a negative impact on employees’
attitude toward ISP compliance. They developed their study model based on the TPB to
understand how employees perceived ISP compliance as a burden. An online survey
administered by a professional market research company was conducted to collect data, and a
sample of 464 employees from US companies, which have written ISPs that their employees
are aware of, was collected. The study found that the perceived burden of compliance has a
significant negative impact on employees’ attitudes toward ISP compliance, whereas
motivational factors (ISP awareness, ISP fairness, and facilitating conditions) were found to
have a positive significant impact. In another study which also drew on TPB, Bulgurcu,
Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2009) investigated the role of employees’ ISA and perceived
fairness of the requirements of the ISP in shaping their attitude toward their compliance
intention with the organization’s ISP. Their study argued that employees’ willingness to
comply with the rules is motivated by intrinsic desires that stimulate internal motivation to
comply/not to comply with ISP. The study found that ISA had a significant positive influence
on an employee’s perceived fairness of the ISP, which in turn leads to a higher positive
attitude and intention toward compliance.
To investigate the impact of the characteristics of the ISP on employees’ compliance
intention, Bulgurcu et al. (2010b) proposed two factors ,ISP fairness and ISP quality (clarity,
adoptability, and consistency), as predictors of employees’ compliance intention with the ISP.
The study argues that employees’ perceived ISP Quality has a positive impact on their
compliance perceptions. An online survey was conducted by a third party and a sample of 464
employees who are aware of the existence of written ISPs in their organization was used to
test the research model. The study found that both ISP fairness and ISP quality were shown to
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positively affect employees’ compliance intention. Taking another approach, Xue, Liang, and
Wu (2010) examined the relationship between punishment and IT compliance in mandatory.
The study extended TAM by drawing on punishment research and justice theory to
investigate how punishment affects employee compliance intention in mandatory settings.
Their model suggests that compliance intention is affected by PU, satisfaction, punishment
expectancy, perceived justice of punishment, and actual punishment. Perceived ease of use
was hypothesized to affect compliance intention indirectly; through satisfaction and through
PU. A sample of 118 accounting professionals from one of China’s top 500 companies that
implemented a large-scale ERP system was used to test the research model. Perceived justice
of punishment was found to be a strong predictor of IT compliance intention in mandatory
settings. Punishment expectancy and PU were found insignificant determinants of compliance
intention. Actual punishment and PEOU were found to significantly affect compliance
intention indirectly.
Chan, Woon, and Kankanhalli (2005) examined the effects of social contextual factors on
employees’ compliance intention. The study developed a model based on the social
information processing approach, and posits that organizational climate (information security
climate) will mediate the relationship between compliance behavior and social contextual
factors (management practices, supervisory practices, and coworker socialization). Selfefficacy was also hypothesized to affect compliance behavior. The study found that all social
contextual

factors

(management

practices,

supervisory

practices,

and

coworker’s

socialization) indirectly had positive impacts on compliance behavior, but self-efficacy was
found to be a strong predictor of employees’ behavioral compliance intention.
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Table 2.4: Information security policy compliance empirical studies
Author (s)

Dependent
Variable (DV)
Intention to
comply

Predictors

Theories

Findings and Comments

ISA, Belief about outcomes,
Belief about overall
assessment of consequences,
Attitude, self-efficacy, and
normative belief

TBP and RCT

Li, Zhang, et al.
(2010)

Internet use
policy
compliance
intention

Organizational norms,
organizational identification,
perceived risk, perceived
benefits, and personal norms

RCT

Myyry et al.
(2009)

Hypothetical
and actual
compliance
with ISP

TCMD and
TMTV

Siponen et al.
(2007)

Actual
compliance
with ISP

Preconventional reasoning,
conventional reasoning,
postconventional reasoning,
openness to change, and
conversation.
Threat appraisal, response
efficacy, self-efficacy and
sanctions

Herath and Rao
(2009b)

Security
policy
compliance
intention

PMT, GDT,
and DTPB

Herath and Rao
(2009a)

Policy
compliance
intention

Punishment severity,
detection certainty,
perceived probability of
security breach, perceived
severity of security breach,
security breach concern
level, response efficacy,
response cost
Severity of penalty, certainty
of detection, normative
beliefs, peer behavior, and
perceived effectiveness

Greene and
D’Arcy (2010)

Security
compliance
intention

Security culture, job
satisfaction, and perceived
organizational support.

TRA, TBP,
and SBT

Warkentin,
Johnston, et al.
(2011)

Behavioral
intention to
comply

Situational support, verbal
persuasion, and vicarious
experience

SLT

Zhang et al.
(2009)

Behavioral
intention to
comply

Perceived security protection Compensation
mechanism, SN, PBC, and
Theory and
attitude
TPB

Attitude, normative belief,
and self-efficacy have a
significant effect on
employee’s intention to
comply. Outcome of beliefs
significantly affected the
employee’s attitude
Perceived benefits, formal
sanctions, and security risk
are significant predictors of
compliance intention with
IUP.
Preconventional moral
reasoning, openness to
change, and conversation are
positively related to
compliance with ISP.
Threat appraisal, response
efficacy, self-efficacy, and
sanctions positively affect
actual compliance with ISP.
Severity of breach, social
influence, resource
availability, response
efficacy, organizational
commitment, and selfefficacy has a positive effect
on attitudes toward
compliance with ISP.
Severity of penalty
negatively affects policy
compliance intention,
whereas certainty of
detection, normative beliefs,
peer behavior, and perceived
effectiveness have a positive
effect.
Security culture and
perceived organizational
support are significant
determinants of compliance
intention with ISP.
Self-efficacy mediates the
effect of external cues on
employees’ intentions to
comply with ISP.
PBC, attitude, and perceived
technical protection were
found as significant
predictors of intention to
comply with ISP

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010a)

PMT, GDT,
and TRA

Principal
Agent Theory
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Table 2.4: Information security policy compliance empirical studies (Continued)
Author (s)
Anderson and
Agarwal (2010)

DV
Intention to
perform
securityrelated
behavior

Predictors
Concern regarding security
threats, perceived citizen
effectiveness, self-efficacy,
attitudes, SN, descriptive
norm, and psychological
ownership
Perceived threat severity,
perceived threat
susceptibility, response
efficacy, social influence,
and self-efficacy

Theories
PMT, TRA,
TBP

Findings and Comments
Computer users’ intentions to
perform security-related
behavior are formed by a
combination of cognitive,
social, and psychological
components.
Johnston and
Behavioral
PMT and Fear Perceived threat severity and
Warkentin
intention to
Appeal
susceptibility, response
(2010)
comply
Theory
efficacy, social influence,
and self-efficacy positively
affect intention to comply
with ISP.
Chenoweth et
Behavioral
Perceived vulnerability,
PMT
Perceived vulnerability and
al. (2009)
intention to
Perceived severity, fear
severity, fears appraisal,
comply
appraisal, response efficacy,
response efficacy and cost,
elf-efficacy, response cost,
and maladaptive coping are
and maladaptive coping
significant determinants of
compliance behavior.
Siponen et al.
Actual
Normative beliefs, threat
TRA, PMT,
Threat appraisal, self(2010)
compliance
appraisal, and self-efficacy,
IDT, and
efficacy, normative beliefs,
with ISP.
response efficacy, visibility, GDT
deterrence, and visibility of
deterrence, and rewards
information security policies
are significant predictors of
intention to comply.
Pahnila et al.
Intention to
Negative reinforcement (i.e., GDT, PMT,
Negative and positive
(2007)
Comply
sanctions, normative beliefs), and TRA
reinforcement have a
positive reinforcement (i.e.,
significant effect on actual IS
information quality and
security policy compliance.
habit), and attitude.
Bulgurcu et al.
Intention to
Burden of compliance, ISP
TPB
Perceived burden of
(2008)
comply
awareness, fairness of the
compliance negatively
ISP, and facilitating
impacts employees’ attitude
conditions
towards ISP compliance, and
motivational factors and
facilitating conditions have a
positive impact.
Bulgurcu et al.
Intention to
Information security
TPB
ISA positively influences
(2009)
comply
awareness, fairness, and
employees’ perceived
attitude
fairness of the ISP, which in
turn leads to compliance.
Bulgurcu et al.
Intention to
ISP quality and ISP fairness. TPB
ISP fairness and ISP quality
(2010b)
comply
positively affect employees’
compliance intention.
Chan et al.
Compliance
information security climate
Social contextual factors
(2005)
behavior
(coworker specialization,
(management practices,
direct supervisory practices,
supervisory practices, and
upper management
coworker’s socialization)
practices), and self-efficacy
positively impact compliance
behavior.
GDT-General Deterrence Theory, RCT-Rational Choice Theory, SCT-Self-Control Theory, TPB-Theory of
Planned Behavior, TCMD- Theory of Cognitive Moral Development, TMTV- Theory of Motivational Types of
Values, DTPB-Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior, SBT- Social Bond Theory, SLT- Social Learning
Theory, IDT-Innovation Diffusion Theory, PMT-Protection Motivation Theory.
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Protective and Preventive Technologies Studies
Preventive and protective technologies are used to protect systems, and data and information
from viruses, spywares, unauthorized access, disruptions, and many other threats which have
become very important to secure information assets (Dinev et al., 2009). The use of protective
information technologies has attracted the attention of researchers, and many studies (see
Table 2.5) that present theoretical insight into the users’ behavior toward these technologies
have emerged (Dinev & Hu, 2007). To examine the ability of security countermeasures to
protect information assets against deliberate and unauthorized misuse by users, Kankanhalli et
al. (2003) built a model based on GDT to test the effect of deterrent and preventive measures,
in addition to organizational factors (organizational size, top management support, and
industry type), on IS security effectiveness. A survey was conducted and data from 63 IS
managers from different sectors was collected. The study found that greater deterrent efforts
(measured in employee hours spent on IS security effort) and greater preventive efforts
(measured in more advanced IS security software) appear to contribute to better IS security
effectiveness, while enforcing more severe penalties for IS abusers does not seem to prevent
IS abuses.
Based on TPB and TAM, Dinev and Hu (2007) studied the factors that influence intentions to
use protective technologies and how they contribute to the formation of this intention. The
study integrated the role of technology awareness with TPB and TAM variables. A sample of
332 IS professionals and students was used to test the research model. Results show that
higher awareness leads to higher confidence in preventing negative technologies in the
systems, and also enhances users’ belief that they have the necessary skills and tools, by using
protective technologies, to successfully combat the effect of negative technologies. Regarding
PU and PEOU, results showed that they are not significant predictors of users’ intention to
use protective technologies, and computer self-efficacy was also insignificant in the context of
protective technologies. In another study aimed at examining the effect of cross-cultural
differences between the US and South Korea in user behavior toward protective technologies,
Dinev et al. (2009) tested a model built on TPB that integrated cultural effects as a moderator
variable of the key relationships. A sample of IS professionals and students from the US and
South Korea was collected to examine the research hypothesis. The study found that cultural
factors moderate the key relationships and play a significant role in the formation of user
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attitude and behavior toward using protective technologies. South Korean computer users
were found to exhibit a stronger relationship between the subjective norm and behavioral
intentions than American users.
Boss et al. (2009) examined employees’ security preventive behavior from an organizational
control perspective. The study argued that organizational control elements (specification of
sets of ISPs, evaluation of compliance with ISPs, and reward for compliance) are associated
with individuals’ perceived mandatoriness, which will influence the security precautions
behavior. A sample of 1682 computer users working at a large medical center in the US was
collected to test the research model. The study found that specifying policies and evaluating
behaviors significantly influenced the perceived mandatoriness of security policies.
Perception of mandatoriness was also found to be an effective motivator to individuals to take
security precautions. Along the same lines, Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009) established a
model based on Health Belief Model (HBM) to study users’ preventive security behavior and
to measure self-reported actual behavior. The study argued that individuals’ behavior depends
on their perceptions of security threats (perceived susceptibility to the threat and perceived
severity of the threat), and evaluation of behavior to resolve the threat (perceived benefits of
the security behavior, and perceived barriers to performing the preventive security behavior).
A sample of 134 employees from different organizations was used to test the hypothesis.
When applied to exercising care with email attachments, the study found that perceived
susceptibility, perceived benefits, and self-efficacy are strong determinants of individuals’
computer security behavior, while perceived severity, perceived barriers, cues to action, and
general security orientation are not significant predictors of users’ behavior. Results also
indicated that cues to action, such as awareness programs, are not significant in triggering an
individual to behave in a secure manner.
To investigate how personal computer users cope with an IT threat, Liang and Xue (2009)
proposed a theoretical model that helped to explain individual IT users’ behavior of avoiding
the information security threats. Drawing on Cybernetic Theory and Coping Theory,
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) defines the avoidance behavior as a dynamic
positive feedback loop in which users go through two cognitive processes; threat appraisal
(perceived susceptibility and perceived severity) and coping appraisal (perceived
effectiveness, perceived costs, and self-efficacy). Later Liang and Xue (2010) derived a model
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based on Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) to elucidate how individuals develop
threat perceptions, evaluate safeguard measures, and engage in avoidance behavior. The study
argues that individuals’ IT threat avoidance behavior is determined by avoidance motivation,
which, in turn, is affected by perceived threat, which is influenced by perceived severity and
susceptibility as well as their interaction. The model also suggests that avoidance motivation
is directly affected by safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy. A sample of
152 business students in a major American university was used to test the hypothesis. The
study found that avoidance motivation is a strong predictors of users’ IT threat avoidance
behavior, which is determined by perceived threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost,
and self-efficacy. The study found that users develop a threat perception when they believe
that the malicious IT is likely to attack them (perceived susceptibility) and the consequences
will be severe if they are attacked (perceived severity). When threatened, users are more
motivated to avoid the threat if they believe that the safeguarding measure is effective
(safeguard effectiveness) and inexpensive (safeguard cost), and if they have confidence in
using it (self-efficacy).
In an environment where employees who are trained and aware of security threats and
countermeasures, but choose not to comply with ISPs and implement security protections,
Workman et al. (2008) developed a Threat Control Model (TCM) based on PMT and social
cognitive theory, as an explanation for the gap between knowing and doing, and to test why
individuals omit security precautions. The study hypothesized that threat assessment and
coping assessment are predictors of individuals’ behavior. They argued that people with either
high perceived severity or high perceived vulnerability, or who have high self-efficacy or an
internal locus of control, are less likely to omit security precautions than people who have
either lower perceived severity or perceived vulnerability, or lower self-efficacy or an external
locus of control, to cope with an IS security threat. A field study using a sample of 612 people
from a large technology-oriented services corporation was conducted to investigate the TCM .
The study found that both threat assessment and coping assessment have a large influence on
the individual’s subjective and objective omissive behavior, and that factors drawn from
social cognitive theory (self-efficacy and locus of control) also have a significant influence on
omissive behavior.
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Table 2.5: Protective and Preventive Technologies Studies
Author (s)
Kankanhalli et
al. (2003)

Dependent
Variable
IS
effectiveness

Predictors

Theories

Organizational size, top
management support,
industry type, deterrent
efforts, deterrent severity,
and preventive effort

GDT

Findings and Comments

Deterrent efforts,
organizational size, top
management support,
industry type, and preventive
efforts contribute to better IS
security effectiveness.
Dinev and Hu
Behavioral
Technology awareness, PU, TPB and
Technology awareness,
(2007)
intention to
PEOU, self-efficacy,
TAM
controllability, attitude and
use protective controllability, attitude, SN,
PBC are significant
technology
and PBC
determinant of intention to
use protective technologies.
Dinev et al.
Behavioral
Technology awareness, PU, TPB and
Cultural factors moderate the
(2009)
intention to
PEOU, self-efficacy,
TAM
key relationships and play a
use protective controllability, attitude, SN,
significant role in the
technology
and PBC
formation of user attitude and
behavior towards using
protective technologies.
Boss et al.
Precautions
Control element
Specifying policies and
(2009)
taking
(specification, evaluation,
evaluating behaviors
behavior
and reward), and perceived
significantly influence the
mandatoriness.
perceived mandatoriness of
security policies.
Perception of mandatoriness
is an effective motivator to
individuals to take security
precautions.
Ng et al. (2009) Computer
Perceived susceptibility,
Health Belief Perceived susceptibility,
security
perceived benefits, perceived Model
perceived benefits, selfbehavior
barriers, cues to action,
efficacy, and perceived
general security orientation,
severity are strong
self-efficacy, and perceived
determinants of individuals’
severity.
computer security behavior.
Liang and Xue
Avoidance
Perceived severity, perceived Cybernetic
Perceived severity, perceived
(2010)
behavior
susceptibility, perceived
Theoryand
susceptibility, perceived
threat, safeguard
Coping
threat, safeguard
effectiveness, safeguard cost, Theory
effectiveness, safeguard cost,
self-efficacy, and avoidance
self-efficacy, and avoidance
motivation
motivation all found to have
a significant influence on
avoidance behavior.
Workman et al. Omissive
Perceived severity, perceived Social
Threat assessment and
(2008)
behavior
vulnerability, locus of
Cognitive
coping assessment have high
control, self-efficacy,
Theory and
influence on the individual’s
perceived response efficacy, PMT
subjective and objective
and response cost-benefit
omissive behavior, also selfefficacy and locus of control
have significant influence on
omissive behavior.
GDT-General Deterrence Theory, RCT-Rational Choice Theory, SCT-Self-Control Theory, TPB-Theory of
Planned Behavior, PMT-Protection Motivation Theory
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Security awareness education and training was and is still one of the most important
fundamentals to information security practices (Furnell, Gennatou, & Dowland, 2002;
Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Shaw et al., 2009). Unfortunately, security awareness is often
poorly managed due to the fact that it is descriptive in nature; organizations’ approaches for
delivering security awareness take the form of “informing” their employees of their security
policies, guidelines, and procedures (Layton, 2005). This approach only informs users that
they must act in accordance with policies and procedures because the management desires
them to do so (Layton, 2005). Information security awareness programs should be designed to
change users’ attitude and behavior to be more security-conscious (Ng & Xu, 2007; Thomson
& von Solms, 1998).
A few studies took a different approach, other than prohibition and sanctions, to study
employees’ compliance with ISPs by concentrating on education and training to encourage
desirable behavior. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) proposed a training program, based on the
universal constructive instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model, to promote
information security policy compliance. They found that in order to enhance employees’ IS
security policy compliance, information system security communication processes and
training programs are needed. These programs are assumed to utilize methods and learning
tasks that motivate employees to process information in accordance to policy. Karjalainen and
Siponen (2011) contended that IS security training needs a theory that lays down elementary
characteristics and explains how these characteristics shape IS security training principles in
practice. They developed a theory that suggests that IS security training has certain
elementary characteristics that distinguish it from other types of training, and needs to be
understood before educational principles for IS security training can be selected. To enforce
compliance with information security policy, Gupta and Zhdanov (2006) suggested a
compliance bonus, and found that providing employees with proper economic incentives and
building trust between organizational entities are good incentives for compliance. Choi, Kim,
Goo, and Whitmore (2008) examined the influence of managerial information security
awareness (MISA) on managerial actions toward information security (MATIS). The study
argued that creation of ISPs, execution of information security training and education,
implementation of information access control, updating information security systems, and the
retainment of an information security team will have a significant positive effect on MISA. A
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sample of 1773 Korean enterprises participated in the study, which found that MISA is one of
the major constructs influencing managerial actions, and the subsequent security performance
of the organization.
Limitations and Gaps in the Previous Literature
A thorough analysis of the previous literature showed the various behavioral theories that
have been employed to study employees’ attitudes toward compliance with information
security policies or to prevent systems misuse and abuse. While these studies have highlighted
either the deterrent effect of sanctions or the role of incentives in encouraging employees’
desirable behavior, none of the studies have addressed this problem as a system that
employees must accept first, as Davis (1986) did with the ordeal of accepting the technology .
Based on the analysis of the existing literature, it is evident that these theories have been
effective in defining the factors that enhance compliance behavior or prevent system abuse.
However, the limitation of previous literature is that it addresses the research problem only
from an organizational perspective, without considering the users’ perspective.
Information security researchers adapted different behavioral theories to study compliance
behavior with ISPs or systems abuse or misuse. Theories such as TRA, TPB, RCT, PMT,
GDT, SCT, TAM, and others were adopted as a theoretical foundation for their studies in
order to predict behavioral intention. Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB), and its extension, is a general model per se that does not specify the
beliefs that are operative for a particular behavior (Davis et al., 1989). Rational Choice
Theory (RCT) posits that an individuals’ decision to engage in a criminal behavior is a
function of their perceptions of cost and benefits of deviant behaviors in deciding whether or
not to offend (Hu et al., 2010; McCarthy, 2002; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). RCT’s
criticism stems from the confusion accompanied with its key concepts, premises, and
predictions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; McCarthy, 2002). General Deterrence Theory (GDT)
posits that individuals choose to go into crime when the benefits outweigh the costs (Forsyth,
1980; Siponen & Vance, 2010), and while they may not be completely rational, they are
reasonably aware of the benefits and potential costs associated with criminal behavior
(Agnew, 1993). GDT is criticized as being salient because of its implicit and explicit embrace
by lawmakers aimed at solidifying the punishments for virtually all types of crime (Agnew,

39
1993). At the macro-level, Alder, Schminke, Noel, and Kuenzi (2008) found that many of the
variables specified to test the deterrence perspective were regularly among the weakest
predictors of crime rates across nearly all levels of aggregation. The results of studies that
adopt GDT are inconclusive, and many authors have called for further research to better
understand what factors influence the effectiveness of security countermeasures (D'Arcy &
Hovav, 2009). Although the literature shows that employees’ perceptions of sanctions
produce a decrease in internal systems abuse by employees (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Lee et al.,
2004; Straub, 1990), different researchers found that deterrent factors are less effective in
predicting or reducing system abuse (Hu et al., 2010),while others point to an increased
frequency of computer abuse after changes to security policies and procedures are made
(Moore, Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008). These conflicting findings indicate there are likely
scenarios where increased deterrence measures may create negative results and a paradox of
increased internal system abuse.
Researchers argued that people make decisions based on simplifying strategies and heuristics,
which often lead to biases and errors in the resulting decision. In addition, they argue that
RCT is inadequate to explain how individuals make decisions in real life, and because of their
limited information-processing capacities, people tend to rely on some heuristic principles,
which enable them to reduce the complexity of problems (McCarthy, 2002; Shumarova &
Swatman, 2006). In contrast, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is specifically
designed for modeling user acceptance of information systems, and more importantly, it
provides a basis for tracing the impact of external factors on internal beliefs and intentions
(Davis et al., 1989), The TAM is also reported to be easy and simple to use, has the ability to
predict, and posits the power of explanation, which gives practitioners and researchers the
ability to recognize why certain systems might be acceptable or unacceptable (Davis et al.,
1989; Hubona & Cheney, 1994; Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003). Specifically, my study is
different than the work of Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) in the primary focus which is built on how
the inherent characteristics of the policies, as perceived by the users, affect their intention to
comply, while the primary focus of the Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) is on how the incentive
structures (e.g., rewards, benefits, cost, and sanctions) affect the users' intention to comply.
Moreover, my Security Acceptance Model (SAM) captures the complexity of the ISPs while
Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) did not, and from an abstract point of view, and regardless of rewards,
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SAM is driven by acceptance of the intrinsic characteristics of the ISPs, and therefore is
expected to be easy to understand.
Based on the above arguments, the TAM was adopted as the foundation for my model as it is
better than TRA in explaining the acceptance intention of users (Davis et al., 1989; Lee et al.,
2003), simpler and easier to use, more powerful than TPB and RCT (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a;
Hubona & Cheney, 1994; Lee et al., 2003), and TAM’s instrument is reliable and valid, which
will enhance the value of research (Lee et al., 2003). Moreover, TAM is designed to be used
with voluntary and mandatory systems (Davis et al., 1989), and is valid for application in
different cultures and with different systems (Lee et al., 2003; Straub, 1994). It is also
designed to be used alone, without needing another theory to support it, to understand why
people accept or reject using a system, unlike previous studies which adopted more than two
theories to build their models (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Dinev
& Hu, 2007). Therefore, SAM can be used to understand users’ compliance behavior, and is
expected to possess all of TAM’s distinctiveness, as well as being easy, simple, valid, and
applicable in different cultures and with all ISPs.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

Employees can impose excessive damage to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information security (IS) through deliberate activities (e.g., espionage), or they may present a
potential threat through passive noncompliance with security policies, laziness, poor training,
or lack of motivation to intensely ensure information security (Warkentin & Willison, 2009).
In order to foster employees’ rule adherence, Tyler and Blader (2005) classified studies in
organizational behavior that classify employees’ rule-following behavior into two motivation
approaches of human behavior. The first is the command-and-control approach, which is
linked to extrinsic motivational models of human behavior, where individuals respond to
external contingencies such as reward and punishment, and breaking the rules. The second
approach is the self-regulatory approach, which is linked to intrinsic motivational models, and
which emphasizes that individuals’ follow the rules as connatural drivers of behavior. The
intrinsic motivational model of human behavior was found to explain employees’ rulefollowing behavior better than the extrinsic motivational model, which has been built on
GDT, RCT, PMT, and other extrinsic behavioral theories (Son, 2011).
The command-and-control model symbolizes a conventional approach to animate rulefollowing; it is based on the idea that people abide by the rules as a function of the costs and
benefits they associate with doing so (Blair & Stout, 2001; McCarthy, 2002). This approach is
well represented in different theories such as GDT (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Siponen &
Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990), RCT (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Hu et al., 2010; Li, Zhang, et
al., 2010), and PMT (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen et al.,
2007). The approach contends that employees are materialistically motivated and will be
basically interested in the resources and outcomes they obtain from their organizations, and
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therefore in order to enforce policies, rules, and procedures, organizations must take an active
role by providing incentives (to encourage desired behavior) and sanctions (to discourage
undesirable behavior) (Tyler, Callahan, & Frost, 2007).
The question to ask at this point is do such techniques work? Studies indicated that these
strategies often help shape employees’ behavior (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy &
Hovav, 2009; Li, Sarathy, & Zhang, 2010; Straub, 1990). But such strategies also come with
significant costs. For example, in order for sanctions and deterrence systems to work,
organizations must be able to dedicate substantial resources to the surveillance needed to
detect systems misuse or abuse so that people are deterred (Tyler et al., 2007).
In this study I focused on the self-regularity approach which represents an alternate approach
to encouraging rule-following behavior, which is concentrated on employees’ intrinsic
motivations. This method identifies rule-following as an individual’s innate desire to follow
organizational rules, and not with external contingencies in the environment that are linked to
rule-following, such as rewards, penalty, fear, outcomes, or social pressure (Tyler & Blader,
2005). Therefore, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) works to investigate employees’
innate behavior toward complying with organizations’ ISPs, since it concentrates on
employees’ desire and willingness to follow the rules, as described in the ISPs, for the sake of
protecting the organization’s security, and not to maximize any outcomes for themselves.
Consequently, this study developed a Security Acceptance Model (SAM), analogous to the
TAM.
Chapter Three introduces the study’s research model, along with its theoretical base, and a
description of each construct and its foundation in the information security (IS) literature.
Specific hypotheses were identified, and related prior research that contributed to the
development of these hypotheses is presented.

Theoretical Framework
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) vs. Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TBP) are two of the
most widely researched and popular conceptual frameworks for the study of human behavior
(Ajzen, 2002b; Armitage & Conner, 2001). These theories are widely used in information
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systems; they were adapted by Davis (1986) to develop the Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM). Both theories are built on the assumption that human behavior is determined by
behavioral intentions, and behavioral intentions are a function of an individual’s attitude
toward the behavior and subjective norms surrounding the performance of the behavior
(Ajzen, 1991). A meta-analysis study conducted by Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988)
to investigate the effectiveness of the TRA found strong evidence for the utility of the model
in predicting behavioral intentions, and actions appropriate for detecting where and how to
target strategies for changing behavior.
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Figure 1) assumes that “since much human behavior
is under volitional control, most behaviors can be accurately predicted from an appropriate
measure of the individual’s intention to perform the behavior in question” (Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975, p. 380). The theory posits that explicit behavior can be predicted from the individual’s
intention, where intentions are an indicator of how much time and effort people are willing to
devote and planning to put forth to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Under volitional
control, the theory postulates that "a person’s intention to perform (or not perform) a behavior
is the most important immediate determinant of that action” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 117), and
intention alone is a sufficient predictor of the actual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) under
circumstances where there are no constraints on action. Antecedents to behavioral intentions
were divided into behavioral (personal in nature) and normative (social influence) factors; the
personal factors are assumed to be the individual's attitude toward performing the behavior,
whereas the normative beliefs influence the individual's subjective norm about performing the
behavior (Ajzen, 1988; Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992). As explained by Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975), external variables to the model are expected to influence intentions only to the extent
that they affect either attitudes or subjective norms.

Attitude
Intention
Subjective
Norms

Figure 1: Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen, 1988)

Behavior

44
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) model was developed to deal with behaviors that are under
volitional control and not outcomes or events that result from behaviors. This model holds
well within the constraints they defined; however, researchers identify some situations that do
not fit neatly within this framework (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Some behaviors are
involitional, so intention alone is not a sufficient predictor of the future behavior (Sheppard et
al., 1988). A behavioral criterion always contains an action element; intention implies that an
individual will work forward to perform a certain behavior. However, the degree of success of
achieving the required behavior depends not only on the person’s intention, but also on other
factors that are beyond the person’s direct control. Thus, the volitional assumption restricted
the applicability of the TRA to volitional behaviors (Ajzen, 2005).
Ajzen (2005) acknowledged that “complications are encountered, however, when we try to
apply the theory to behaviors that are not fully under volitional control” (p. 127). To
overcome this limitation, an extension of this model was developed, the Theory of Planned
Behavior (TPB) (Figure 2), to address the possibility of incomplete volitional control by
adding an additional construct, perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991), which received a
great deal of attention in different fields, including compliance with information security
policy (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Warkentin, Johnston, et al., 2011;
Zhang et al., 2009). Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) is defined as “people’s perceptions
of the ease or difficulty of performing the behavior of interest” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 183). As the
theory assumes, PBC has a direct and indirect effect on behavior through intentions (Ajzen,
1991, 2005), and it aims to allow prediction of behaviors that were not under complete
volitional control. In general this theory stands on the idea that “people intend to perform a
behavior when they evaluate it positively, when they experience social pressure to perform it,
and when they believe that they have the means and opportunities to do so” (Ajzen, 2005, p.
118).
In summary, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) could sufficiently predict the behavior
under volitional control under certain constraints, but the simple array of an intention is not
enough to predict behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). TRA does not deal directly with the
amount of control a person has in a given situation, and it considers the possible effects of
perceived behavioral control (PBC) on achieving the behavioral goal (Ajzen, 2005). PBC has
a different influence on intention. For instance, in some situations where attitudes are strong,
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PBC’s prediction power of intention might be low. Ajzen (1991, p. 188) state that “The
relative importance of attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control in the
prediction of intention is expected to vary across behaviors and situations”. Accordingly, PBC
will have lower predictive utility of intentions in situations where attitudes or normative
influences are strong. Therefore, the magnitude of the PBC–intention relationship is
dependent upon the type of behavior and the nature of the situation (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage &
Conner, 2001).
Attitude

Subjective
Norms

Intention

Behavior

Perceived
Behavioral
Control

Figure 2: Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1988)
Technology Acceptance Model
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) proposed by (Davis, 1986) is one of the most
frequently used models of IT adoption (Agnew, 1985, 1991). According to the TAM (Figure
3), actual adoption of technology is influenced by two perceptions; perceived usefulness (PU)
and perceived ease-of-use (PEOU). PU is defined as “the degree to which a person believes
that using a particular system would increase his or her performance”, whereas PEOU refers
to “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free of
effort” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 320). TAM is an adaptation of TRA, specifically modified for
modeling user acceptance of information systems (Davis et al., 1989). TAM is developed to
provide a clarification of the general determinants of computer acceptances, which is capable
of describing users’ behavior. Beside the ability to predict, TAM posits the power of
explanation, which gives the practitioners and researchers the ability to recognize why certain
systems might be acceptable or unacceptable (Davis et al., 1989).
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Figure 3: Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) adopted from (Davis et al., 1989)
The TAM consists of four variables; Perceived Usefulness (PU), Perceived Ease of Use
(PEOU), Behavioral Intention (BI), and Behavior or Actual Usage (B). PU is an independent
variable as it predicts BI, and it is a dependent variable as predicted by PEOU. Studies show
that there are strong relationships between these variables ; PU and PEOU are strong
predictors of BI (Lee et al., 2003). This model assumes that BI is a strong determinant of
computer usage, but differs from TRA in that BI is determined by a person’s attitude toward
using a system (A) and PU (Davis et al., 1989). TRA postulates that any other factors which
influence behavior do so only indirectly by influencing Attitude (A) and Subjective Norms
(SN); these factors are referred to as external variables (Peguero, Popp, Latimore, Shekarkhar,
& Koo, 2011). This indicates that TRA mediates the impact of uncontrollable variables and
controllable interventions on user behavior (Davis et al., 1989).
According to the TAM, PU can be affected more than PEOU by a variety of external
variables, as well; PEOU is also hypothesized to be determined by external variables. Thus,
the objective design of a system can have a direct and indirect effect, through PEOU, on PU
(Davis et al., 1989). Studies show that when different external variables were introduced into
TAM, the most frequent variables used as external variables, as Lee et al. (2003) found, are
system quality, training, compatibility, computer anxiety, self-efficacy, enjoyment, computing
support, and experience.
After the brief analysis of the TRA, TBP, and TAM, the question arises here is, which theory
is better to explain and predict behavior? And what is the criterion for selecting the
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appropriate theory? Ajzen (2005) stated that: “Volitional control is best defined as a
continuum; … purely volitional act … and behavioral events which are completely beyond
volitional control… Toward the volitional side of the continuum, it is possible to predict
behavior with a great deal of accuracy on the basis of intentions to perform the behavior in
question. Intentions also contribute to the attainment of behavioral goals that are only partly
under volitional control …. Perceived behavioral control can reflect the presence of such
factors and, to the extent that it does so accurately, contributes to the prediction of behavioral
achievement” (p. 140). This statement implies that intention is a sufficient predictor of
behavior under volitional control; therefore, TRA is preferred over TPB, but compliance with
ISPs is not volitional, and therefore TRA will not be able to predict behavioral intention
toward compliance if it is mandatory. The TAM is designed to explain and predict the
behavior while TRA is designed merely to predict the behavior .TAM includes the external
variables as a tested predictor, tools for explaining and predicting the behavior, and it was
found to be an appropriate model in mandatory sittings (e.g. Venkatesh & Davis, 2000;
Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) . Therefore, TAM is a better model to predict and
explain the users’ behavior toward the compliance with ISPs.
The Role of Attitude in the TAM
Davis et al. (1989) distinguished between TAM and TRA. They are similar because they both
posit that attitude is determined by one’s own belief, but they differ on two significant issues.
First the TRA contends that beliefs are extracted further for each new context, while the TAM
contends that PU and PEOU’s are based on theory and meant to be determinants of user
acceptance. Second, the TRA is the sum of all the beliefs multiplied by weight into a single
construct, whereas TAM deals with PEOU and PU as two separate constructs. Davis et al.
(1989) stated that “TAM treats [P]U and [P]EOU as two fundamental and distinct constructs.
Modeling beliefs in this disaggregated manner enables one to compare the relative influence
of each belief in determining A[attitude], providing important diagnostic information…. From
a practical standpoint, this enables an investigator to better formulate strategies for
influencing user acceptance via controllable external interventions that have measurable
influences on particular beliefs.” (p. 988).
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Since its introduction, many empirical studies have been done on behavioral intentions to use
different applications that give support for the TAM; communication systems such as email
(Straub, 1994), general purpose systems such as e-commerce (Gefen & Straub, 2000), office
systems such as spreadsheets (Venkatesh & Davis, 1996), specialized business systems such
as case tools (Xia & Lee, 2000), and Decision Support Systems (DSS), Group Support
Systems (GSS) and Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) (Sambamurthy & Chin, 1994).
The original model of TAM validated attitude as a mediator variable, while later studies
eliminated attitude from the model (e.g. Adams, Nelson, & Todd, 1992; Davis & Venkatesh,
1996; Koufaris, 2003; Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Thus, a direct path,
without attitude as a mediating construct, from PU and PEOU to BI, was proposed. The
elimination of attitude as a mediating construct contradicts TRA and TPB which posit that
attitude mediates the relationship between beliefs and intention. Davis et al. (1989) stated that
“within organizational settings, people form intentions toward behaviors they believe will
increase their job performance, over and above whatever positive or negative feelings may be
evoked toward the behavior per se” (p. 986). These direct paths of PU-BI and PEOU-BI imply
that even if employees may dislike the technology, they may still use it if they perceive it will
enhance their job performance (Dinev & Hu, 2007). In addition, Venkatesh et al. (2003)
eliminated the role of attitude in their Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
(UTAUT). They argued that attitude toward using technology is not to be a direct determinant
of intention, and found that it is a significant predictor only when performance and
expectancies constructs are not present in the model. Therefore, they assume any observed
relationship between attitude and intention to be spurious and resulting from the exclusion of
the other key construct.
Different empirical studies validated the original TAM in which attitude mediates the
relationships between PU and PEOU, and behavioral intention. In studies that validated the
complete mediation of attitude between PU and PEOU, and behavioral intention, results show
that attitude was a significant mediator (e.g. Agarwal & Prasad, 1997; Karahanna, Straub, &
Chervany, 1999; Taylor & Todd, 1995).
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Research Model and Hypotheses
Based on the TAM developed by Davis et al. (1989), a Security Acceptance Model (SAM)
(Figure 4) is proposed, which will help explain employees’ intention to comply with ISPs.
TAM is built on the premise that the greater the readiness of the users to accept a new system,
the more likely they are to make changes in their practices, and the more willing they are to
spend the time and effort to actually start using the system. About 30 different types of IS
were used as target systems in TAM studies (Lee et al., 2003). Analogous to this approach,
SAM is based on similar premises, with recognition that information security policies are not
a technology, but a system that users will use and comply with. In that regard, we draw on
Bulgurcu et al. (2010a, p. 527) definition of information security policy as a “statement of the
roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the information and technology
resources of their organizations”.
This study will examine the effect of external variables, namely users’ awareness of security
protection mechanisms (security policies, Security Education, Training and Awareness
(SETA) programs, and monitoring practices) proposed and tested by Straub (1990), D'Arcy et
al. (2009), and D'Arcy and Hovav (2009); controllability (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Rhee et al.,
2009); information security awareness (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a); and self-efficacy (Dinev &
Hu, 2007; Workman et al., 2008), on perceived usefulness of protection and perceived
complexity of ISPs. Information security awareness general security awareness, and
technology awareness, is hypothesized to directly influence employees’ perceived usefulness
toward compliance with ISPs. The original relations in the TAM model are posited to hold in
the context of ISPs too; perceived complexity and perceived usefulness of protection of ISPs
are postulated to impact behavioral intention to comply.
As for the IT usage in the original TAM, I focused on intention to comply rather than
intention to use, since it is more realistic in mandatory settings, and fits better in the sense of
compliance. Users perceived compliance with organizations’ ISPs as a compulsory action by
the organization. The literature review raised a number of issues related to mandatory vs.
volitional usage behavior; some suggest a continuum of voluntariness (e.g. Hartwick & Barki,
1994; Karahanna et al., 1999; Moore & Benbasat, 1991) in which individuals may perceive
voluntary differently. Also usage can be variable in mandatory settings, but that depends on
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how much the system/technology is integrated into one’s job, producing a high correlation
with job function but not necessarily with effect toward the system (Brown, Massey,
Montoya-Weiss, & Burkman, 2002). Accordingly, and as the system (compliance with ISPs)
must be used to complete one’s own job that is also integrated with other employees’ jobs,
this study proposes that employees do not have a decision regarding use or not. Discussed
below are the operationalization of the research constructs and the formation of the study
hypotheses.
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Figure 4: Research Model - Security Acceptance Model (SAM)
Constructs Adapted from TAM
Perceived Usefulness of Protection and Perceived Complexity
Theoretically, perceived usefulness is defined as “the degree to which an individual believes
that using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989, p.
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320), and perceived ease of use is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using
a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis, 1989, p. 320), whereas intention to
comply is defined as an “employee’s intention to protect the information and technology
resources of the organization from potential security breaches” (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a, p.
529).
In accordance with the existing literature, particularly TAM, it is assumed that an employee’s
intention to comply with the requirements of the organization’s ISPs is associated with the
degree to which the employee believes that using ISPs’ roles and responsibilities to safeguard
the organization’s information technology resources will enhance his/her job performance
(PUOP). PU is a key determinant of IT usage (acceptance) and it is described as the most
prominent belief driving IT (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004). PU has always been shown
to be a significant and strong determinant of behavioral intention, with predicted standardized
coefficients typically around 0.6 (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). The effect of PU on behavioral
intention toward compliance with ISPs or using protective technologies to secure information
assets was investigated by (Dinev & Hu, 2007), (Dinev et al., 2009), (Jones, 2009), and (Xue
et al., 2010). Congruent with the original TAM, these studies proposed that PU positively
affects behavioral intention to comply or to use protective technologies. The use of PU in this
study is consistent with the literature (Davis et al., 1989; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Venkatesh &
Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Xue et al., 2010).
Based on the previous literature that has investigated the effect of PU on behavioral intention
in the IS domain, and principally in information security compliance, the following is
hypothesized in the context of ISP compliance:
Hypothesis H1: An employee’s PU about complying with the organization’s ISP positively
affects intention to comply with the requirements of the ISP.
An employee’s intention to comply with the requirements of the organization’s ISP is
associated with the degree to which an employee believes that using the ISP in practice, and
undertaking related roles and responsibilities, is difficult to understand, learn, or operate.
Perceived ease of use and perceived complexity (the opposite of ease of use) have been used
interchangeably in innovation diffusion literature (Davis, 1989; Igbaria, Parasuraman, &
Baroudi, 1996). Due to the nature of ISPs, this study will investigate perceived complexity of
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compliance with ISPs rather than perceived ease of use. Perceived complexity was identified
by (Rogers, 1995) as one of five perceived characteristics of an innovation that influences
adoption; trialability, observability, compatibility, relative advantage, and complexity.
According to (Rogers, 1995, p. 257), perceived complexity is defined as “the degree to which
an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and use”.
Perceived complexity has been widely investigated in human computer interaction literature
and captures users’ personal interpretations of the systems and their interaction with it
(Nadkarni & Gupta, 2007). A meta-analysis study by Tornatzky and Klein (1982) found that
out of the 25 innovation characteristics, complexity was one of the most frequently studied by
researchers, and was always found to be a significant factor. Users’ involvement is expected
to be more critical where task and/or system complexity are higher (Mahmood, Burn,
Gemoets, & Jacquez, 2000). Studies found that the higher the complexity the less the
intention or the behavior toward using the system. For example, Chang and Cheung (2001)
found that complexity negatively affected intention to use the Internet, and Igbaria et al.
(1996) found that perceived complexity negatively affected system usage and perceived
usefulness. Thompson, Higgins, and Howell (1994) found that as individuals become more
experienced, they perceive they can handle the complexity of a computer. In an earlier study
Thompson, Higgins, and Howell (1991) also reported a strong negative affect of perceived
complexity on utilization of PCs. The TAM also proposed an indirect relationship between
PEOU and behavioral intention through PU (Davis, 1989), and this relationship is
hypothesized the same except the direction of the affect will be negative since complexity is
the opposite of PEOU.
Based on the previous literature that has investigated the effect of PEOU (opposite of PC) on
behavioral intention in an IS domain and principally in information security compliance, and
the discussion above, the following is hypothesized in the context of ISP compliance:
Hypothesis H2a: An employee’s PC of ISPs will negatively affect intention to comply with
the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H2b: An employee’s PC about complying with the organization’s ISPs
negatively affects PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs.
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Constructs Adapted from the Theory of Planned Behavior
Subjective Norm
Under the assumptions of TPB, an intention to perform a behavior is guided by three factors:
beliefs about the likely consequences or other attributes of the behavior (behavioral beliefs),
beliefs about the normative expectations of other people (normative beliefs), and beliefs about
the presence of factors that may further or hinder performance of the behavior (control
beliefs) (Ajzen, 1988, 2002b). Normative beliefs result in perceived social pressure or
subjective norms (SN) (Ajzen, 2002a) which are defined as “the person’s perception of social
pressure to perform or not perform the behavior under consideration” (Ajzen, 1988, p. 117).
Davis et al. (1989) did not include subjective norm (SN) in the TAM as it is the least
understood aspect of TRA, and it was also assumed that computer use was voluntary. Despite
that, many studies incorporate the construct thereafter, where it was found to have a
significant effect on intention in mandatory settings but not voluntary ones (Hartwick &
Barki, 1994; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003).
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) refer to the causal mechanism underlying this effect as
compliance. They posit that the direct compliance effect of SN on intention is theorized to
operate whenever a person perceived that an important referent(s) wants him/her to perform a
specific behavior, and that referent(s) has the ability to reward behavior or punish nonbehavior.
Based on TRA and TBP, the direct relationship between subjective norm and behavioral
intention is established on compliance, while TAM does not include SN. Technology
Acceptance Model 2 (TAM2) incorporates two additional theoretical correlations by which
SN has an influence on intention directly and indirectly through PU (Venkatesh & Davis,
2000). Under this theoretical base, if a superior suggests that a particular system is useful, a
person might believe it is actually useful and then form an intention to use it. Venkatesh and
Bala (2008) found that the effect of subjective norm on behavioral intention was stronger in a
mandatory setting and SN was a significant determinant of PU. In the information security
domain, subjective norm was found to be a significant predictor of behavioral intention to
comply or use protective security measures (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al.,
2010a; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009b). Therefore based on the literature that has
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investigated the relationships among the TBP, TAM2, and Technology Acceptance Model 3
(TAM3) constructs, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis H3: An employee’s subjective norm about complying with the organization’s
ISPs positively affects intention to comply with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H4: An employee’s subjective norm in complying with the organization’s ISPs
positively affects PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs.
Self-Efficacy and Controllability (Perceived Behavioral Control)
Perceived behavioral control (PBC) can function as a surrogate for actual control and
contribute to the prediction of the behavior in question to the degree that people are realistic
in their judgments of a behavior’s difficulty, and under the condition they have actual control
over the behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002b). The concept of PBC was introduced to the TPB to
overcome situations where behavior is mandatory or nonvolitional (Ajzen, 1991, 2002b).
Empirical evidence shows that self-efficacy (SE) and controllability (C) can be manipulated
and distinguished across behaviors (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006), however Ajzen (2002b, p.
678) asserts that “the fact that it is possible to distinguish reliably between two different types
of control - SE and controllability - does not invalidate the unitary nature of the [PBC]
construct”. C and SE are separable components of Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC)
(Ajzen, 2002b), which will allow for a more detailed examination of external control beliefs
(Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006). These beliefs can reflect internal as well as external factors
(Ajzen, 2002b).
Self-efficacy (SE) is a construct that has been examined in an exploratory sense in studies
pertaining to an individual’s use of IS (Rhee et al., 2009). Studies found that SE is a
significant predictor of behavioral intention (e.g. Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006; Rhee et al., 2009;
Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh & Davis, 1996). In the information security domain, SE was
found to be a significant predictor of behavioral intention to comply with ISPs or to use
protective security measures (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Dinev &
Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Pahnila et al., 2007). Selfefficacy (SE) is defined as a “subjective probability that one is capable of executing a certain
course of action” (Ajzen, 1988, p. 105). Consistent with this definition, this study defines SE
as an employee’s confidence in their ability, skills, and knowledge about satisfying the
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requirements of ISPs. Previous studies have empirically validated that SE has a significant
positive effect on the PEOU (e.g. Agarwal, Sambamurthy, & Stair, 2000; Venkatesh, 2000),
and on PU (Lai, 2009; Ong, Lai, & Wang, 2004; Ong & Lai, 2006). The confidence in one’s
security related knowledge and abilities can be expected to serve as the basis for judgment
about how easy or difficult compliance with an organization’s ISP will be, meaning that
individuals with a high computer SE magnitude might expect themselves to be able to
accomplish more difficult tasks or to complete them with less support and assistance
(Venkatesh, 2000). In the same vein of TAM, PU reflects the person’s beliefs or expectations;
therefore, SE might be an important factor affecting PU (Chau, 2001). Therefore, it is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis H5: An employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the organization’s ISPs
positively affects PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H6: An employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the organization’s ISPs
negatively affects PC to comply with the requirements of ISPs.
Controllability (C) is defined as "individual judgments about the availability of resources and
opportunities to perform the behavior" (Ajzen, 2002b, p. 672; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006, p.
119). The definitions of self-efficacy and controllability revealed that SE reflects internal
personality factors, while C reflects beliefs about external factors (Dinev & Hu, 2007),
however, there is no evidence to support this view (Ajzen, 2002b). According to Ajzen
(2002b), some studies employed either one item or a mixture of both items, and debate
surrounding the conceptualization of SE and C , and their relationship to PBC, still exists
(Trafimow, Sheeran, Conner, & Finlay, 2002). Previous studies have demonstrated the
combined set to be a better predictor of intentions (Ajzen, 2002b). Pavlou and Fygenson
(2006) viewed PBC as a formative two-dimensional construct formed by two underlying
indicators; SE and C. Controllability was found to be significant in predicting behavior but
not intentions, while SE was found to be significant in predicting intentions (Ajzen, 2002).
Relationships between C and PU and PEOU have been examined in previous studies. Kim,
Park, and Oh (2008) found C to have an indirect impact on a respondent’s continued intention
to use through its impact on PEOU. Trafimow et al. (2002) argue that if a behavior is not
controllable, then there is not much need to consider performing it, suggesting that a higher
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degree of controllability is an indication of a higher degree of certainty (Hu & Dinev, 2005),
making individuals feel more comfortable to comply. Therefore, the following is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis H7: An employee’s controllability positively affects PUOP to comply with the
requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H8: An employee’s controllability negatively affects PC to comply with the
requirements of ISPs.
Information Security Awareness
User Awareness of Information Security
Goodhue and Straub (1991) were the first scholars to denote the importance of awareness as a
a factor in users’ beliefs about information security. They believed that computer abuse is a
key problem that will not dwindle on its own, because “a lack of awareness of the danger may
lead to weak vigilance by users and greater potential for abuse” (p. 14). They also argued that
“… people who are more aware of the potential for abuse would be sensitized to the dangers
of inadequate security and would more likely feel that security was unsatisfactory” (p. 15).
Information Security Awareness (ISA) is defined as an “employee’s overall knowledge and
understanding of potential issues related to information security and their ramifications”
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010a, p. 532). Employees are expected to be aware and knowledgeable of
information security and cognizant of security technology, and should be able to formulate a
general perception of what it entails. This definition is coherent with the belief that ISA is
used to “refer to a state where users in an organization are aware of and ideally committed to
their security mission” (Siponen, 2000, p. 31).
An individual’s awareness and knowledge of information security is built from life
experiences, such as having been attacked by a virus, opening unknown emails, being
penalized for not complying to security policies and regulations, or obtaining information
from external resources such as the Internet, newspapers, or security journals (Bulgurcu et al.,
2010a; Goodhue & Straub, 1991). Goodhue and Straub (1991) associated awareness to
computer literacy and define awareness as years of experience, managerial level, and
user/systems staff status. However, results reveal weak support of their hypothesis that users’
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awareness of the technology will cause them to have higher concern for security, and they
attributed that to the fact that years of experience with information systems is a weak measure
of security awareness. Fishbein (2008) argues that there are an infinite number of variables
that may directly or indirectly influence the performance (or nonperformance) of any
behavior. TPB posits that background factors (e.g., social, demographic, experience,
knowledge, and values) may be related to or influence behavior indirectly by affecting
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs (Ajzen, 2005). In this context, it can be argued that
employees’ ISA, conceived of as a background factor, may play a role in the development of
their outcome beliefs, along with compliance behavior. Therefore, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis H9a: An employee’s general ISA positively affects PUOP toward complying
with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H9b: An employee’s general ISA negatively affects PC toward complying with
the requirements of ISPs.
Technology Awareness
The second component of information security awareness (ISA) is users’ awareness of
technological issues. Dinev and Hu (2007) define technology awareness as a “user’s raised
consciousness of and interest in knowing about technological issues and strategies to deal
with them” (p.391). It sounds very logical for employees to be aware of all issues surrounding
compliance with ISPs before they form either negative or positive beliefs about that.
Employees must make themselves aware of all potential threats and how compliance with
ISPs help protect information assets, and they also must be aware of the consequences of
noncompliance, and of the availability and effectiveness of protective technology (Dinev &
Hu, 2007). As the concept of awareness first appeared in the innovation diffusion theory
(Rogers, 1995), general information security awareness and technology awareness was
explained in the framework of an innovation-decision process, in which knowledge influences
persuasion, which in turn influences decisions. In this context, ISA can be viewed as
knowledge, perceptions (usefulness and complexity) as persuasion, and intention to comply as
a decision. Building on this process, employees can gain significant “awareness knowledge”
about different information security threats and protective technologies, along with
knowledge about how and what they are supposed to do with regard to information security,
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which will subsequently lead to compliance behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a). Accordingly,
knowledge of information security threats can be viewed as general information security
awareness, and knowledge about what employees are supposed to do can be viewed as
technology awareness.
Based on this argument, as ISA (knowledge) influences perceptions of usefulness and
complexity (persuasion) which, in turn, influences the decision to comply with the ISP, the
following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis H10a: An employee’s Technology Awareness positively affects PUOP toward
complying with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H10b: An employee’s Technology Awareness negatively affects PC toward
complying with the requirements of ISPs.
User’s Awareness of Security Countermeasures
Security policies
According to Straub (1990), security countermeasures include both deterrent and preventive
controls. Security policies, SETA programs, and monitoring practices were identified as
deterrent controls that can be used by organizations to prevent information systems misuse
(Straub, 1990). The direct effect of these countermeasures on IS misuse intention has been
reported by D'Arcy and Hovav (2009) and D'Arcy et al. (2009). Information security policy is
defined as a “state of the roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the
information and technology resources of their organizations” (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a, pp. 526527). Organizations develop security policies to ensure the security of information assets and
to encourage end-user behavior that helps protect information assets from threats posed to
them. Accordingly, if an organization’s end-users are not eager or are unwilling to comply
with security policies, then these efforts are useless (Herath & Rao, 2009b). Literature in
information security policies shows a need for empirical studies on security compliance
(Herath & Rao, 2009b).
Previous studies have shown that awareness of ISPs will decrease the behavioral intention to
systems misuse (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub, 1990). Herath and Rao
(2009b) found that if users perceive that their compliance has a positive effect on the
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organization, they are more likely to have a positive attitude toward the security policies.
Security policy can be best utilized by making sure that users understand it and accept
necessary precautions (D'Arcy et al., 2009). So in order to improve security efforts, policies
regarding proper and improper use of IS should be established, and then should be taught to
the users. The more detailed these policies are, and the more the users are aware and educated
about acceptable system use (Straub, 1990), the greater the employees’ perceptions about the
usefulness of protecting the IS, and the less their perception of complexity. Therefore, it is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis H11: An employee’s awareness of IS security policies positively affects PUOP
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H12: An employee’s awareness of IS security policies negatively affects PC
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs.
SETA Program
Organizations develop different measures to manage and control systems misuse; SETA
programs are a form of security countermeasure that educating users about has significant
security benefits (Dhillon, 1999; Straub & Welke, 1998). Awareness campaigns and
education help modify certain behaviors such as illegal drunk driving and shoplifting (D’Arcy
et al., 2009). Such training and awareness programs are extremely important in developing
“trusted” members of the organization (Dhillon, 1999). In the same context, the ongoing
SETA programs convey knowledge about threats in the organizational environment; they help
reduce system abuse and promote compliance with the ISPs by providing information about
the appropriate use of IS, as well as the disciplinary actions taken by the firm, including
policies and sanctions for violations. They also provide the necessary knowledge of
enforcement activities, and reveal threats to local systems and their vulnerability to attack
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub & Welke, 1998; Wybo & Straub, 1989). According to Straub and
Welke (1998, p. 445), the wisdom behind SETA programs is to “convince potential abusers
that the company is serious about security and will not take intentional breaches of this
security lightly”.
To increase users’ awareness, ongoing education and training programs should be developed
and maintained (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). According to Whitman and Mattord (2009),
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SETA programs are designed to improve an organization’s information security by improving
employees’ awareness of the needs to protect information resources, and developing users’
knowledge and skills to perform more secure tasks. SETA programs are rooted in information
security policy (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Peltier, 2005) and can take many forms, such as
reviewing an organization’s code of conduct (Harrington, 1996), or more general strategies
that promote awareness of day-to-day security issues (Furnell et al., 2002). Based on that, and
on the fact that SETA programs are designed to enhance employees’ awareness, knowledge,
and education of all security issues that will help them to comply with the requirements of the
ISPs, we posit that SETA programs will increase employees’ perceptions about the usefulness
of compliance with ISPs and help overcome the hurdles and complexity with compliance.
Therefore, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis H13: An employee’s awareness of SETA programs positively affects PUOP
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H14: An employee’s awareness of SETA programs negatively affects PC
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs.
Monitoring Practices
Mangers seek to reduce the sources of noncompliance behaviors with ISPs and look for
solutions to help with this quest. In response to that, organizations use monitoring practices to
increase and enforce employees’ compliance with rules and regulations (Urbaczewski &
Jessup, 2002) and distribute information about organizational guidelines for acceptable
system usage (Straub, 1990). Monitoring practices has two basic uses; providing feedback and
implementing control. The feedback function intends to monitor employees so as to provide
them with necessary suggestions for improvement. Monitoring for control is aimed at
employee observation in order to foster compliance with rules and regulations (Urbaczewski
& Jessup, 2002). When monitoring was used to give employees feedback on productivity
while ignoring the control scenario, Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) found that for some
employees the negative effects of monitoring are inherent, while for others its negative impact
can be mitigated by attention to feedback processes. Another study found that employee task
performance improved when they were monitored; either by a person or through computer
monitoring (George, 1996). A question to be asked here is; can monitoring be conducted to
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increase employees’ perceived usefulness of protection and eventually form a desirable
behavior toward compliance with ISPs?
To gain conformity with rules and regulations, organizations adopt monitoring practices
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002) using different techniques to achieve this,
including security audit, tracking users’ internet usage, and recording network activities
(D'Arcy et al., 2009). Studies have found that monitoring practices lead to a decrease in
information resource misuse as it enables the detection of serious and deliberate misuse
incidents that are likely subject to severe punishment (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub & Nance,
1990).
In this study, monitoring practices have been investigated as a security countermeasure ;
“policing” in order to gain compliance with rules and regulations, such as monitoring email
traffic and Internet use, as well as other network activities (Panko & Beh, 2002; Urbaczewski
& Jessup, 2002). Accordingly, in this study, it is argued that the use of monitoring practices
from a policing perspective will increase the difficulty and complexity of compliance with the
ISPs, and will affect employees’ perceived usefulness of protection since they have no
immediate benefits for them in terms of job performance and satisfaction Therefore, we
hypothesized:
Hypothesis H15: An employee’s awareness of monitoring practices negatively affects
PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs.
Hypothesis H16: An employee’s awareness of monitoring practices positively affects PC to
comply with the requirements of ISPs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter addresses the methodology of the study, and begins by discussing the research
design, followed by the presentation of the instrument design and a validation of the survey
instrument. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the sampling and data collection
procedure.

Research Design
The current study model, the Security Acceptance Model (SAM), is based on the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB) and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The basic premise
of these theories is that behavioral intention is a function of perception, attitude, and
perceived behavioral control. Such constructs are hard to observe and measure directly as they
represent an internal state, and therefore are “measured through indirect indicators, such as
verbal expressions or overt behavior” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 308). Considering it “is difficult to
get accurate information about internal states, such as attitudes or emotions, with anything
other than self-reports” (Spector, 2006, p. 229), and since “self-reports of participants via
surveys, questionnaires, and interviews are a very common way to gather data in almost all of
the social sciences” (Kline, Sulsky, & Rever-Moriyama, 2000), self-reports were utilized to
measure all study constructs. People are expected to be able to report many internal states,
including attitudes, emotions, perceptions, and values (Spector, 2006).
A field study approach was used to test the research model over a controlled experimental
design since it was argued that experimental and case researchers were less likely to validate
their instruments than field study researchers (Straub, 1989). Field studies according to
Kerlinger (1973) are described as strong in realism, significant, and encompassing heuristic
quality. Field study can be defined as "any scientific studies, large or small, that
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systematically pursue relations and test hypotheses, that are ex post facto, and that are done in
life situations like communities, schools, factories, organizations, and institutions" (Kerlinger,
1973, p. 405). Unlike controlled designs where experimental treatment and manipulation of
the independent variables can happen, field studies are “non-experimental inquires occurring
in natural systems where researchers cannot manipulate independent variables or control the
influence of confounding variables” (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001, p. 3).
For data collection techniques in field studies, a questionnaire is the most common method
used (Boudreau et al., 2001), as it provides a “quick, inexpensive, efficient, and accurate
means of assessing information about the population” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 175), and findings
can be generalized to the population studied (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). However,
different shortcomings are associated with this method, such as a weak questionnaire design,
and potential issues with sampling procedures and sampling size, survey administration, and
pretest of the questionnaires (Boudreau et al., 2001). To overcome these pitfalls, an extensive
survey of literature regarding ISPs and compliance behavior was reviewed. In addition,
having clearly defined independent and dependent variables, and a specific model of the
expected relationships among these variables (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993), are important
requirements to help enhance the research design. Finally, well-researched, known, and used
theories [the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and the Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM)], have been utilized as a theoretical framework for this study. The research model
depicted in Figure 4 contains strong a priori theoretical relationships as specified by these
theories, and supported, when needed, with other theoretical frameworks. Constructs of the
study were developed from previously validated instruments, which have been standardized
and adapted to the context of this study. To ensure greater reliability and validity, the survey
instrument was refined based on feedback obtained from information security faculty
members in the United States and Jordan, as well as from a number of employees working at
a variety of banks in Jordan. Based on the feedback, several items were reviewed and
modified. A pretest of the refined questionnaire was conducted to evaluate the reliability and
validity, using a confirmatory factor analysis (Al-Omari, El-Gayar, & Deokar, 2012).
The study design can be classified as a non-experimental, cross-sectional survey design in
which all data were collected at once. Using Campell and Stanley (1963), the research design
is diagrammed as follows:
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Where X is the “treatment” and O is an observation. In the context of the current study, the
treatment is having an information security policy at the organization.

Survey Instrument Design
An initial survey instrument was developed by identifying and creating appropriate
measurements based on a comprehensive literature review. The survey instrument is based on
constructs validated and tested in prior research (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy et al., 2009;
Davis, 1989; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Rhee et al., 2009; Siponen et
al., 2010), standardized and adapted to the context of this study. According Straub (1989)
using validated and tested items will improve the reliability of results. The constructs include
intention to comply, PUOP, PC, users’ awareness of general information security, technology
awareness, subjective norm and users’ awareness of ISPs, SETA programs, and computer
monitoring. The instrument also collected key demographic information. All constructs were
measured reflectivity with multiple items on seven-point Likert scales. A pretest and pilot test
were conducted to ensure the conceptual precision and face validity of the constructs. Table
4.1 presents all of the study constructs along with the types, source, and number of their
measurement items. A complete version of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix B.
Table 4.1: Sources of Measurement Items
Construct
Intention to Comply

Type
Reflective

Perceived Usefulness of Protection
Perceived Complexity
Self-Efficacy

Reflective
Reflective
Reflective

Controllability

Reflective

User Awareness of General Information Security
General Information Security Awareness
Technology Awareness
User Awareness of Information Security Policies

Reflective
Reflective
Reflective

User Awareness of SETA Program

Reflective

User Awareness of Computer Monitoring

Reflective

Subjective Norm

Reflective

Source
Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and Siponen
et al. (2010)
Davis (1989)
Davis (1989)
Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and Herath
and Rao (2009b)
Dinev and Hu (2007) and Rhee et
al. (2009)

Items
7

Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and
Dinev and Hu (2007)
D'Arcy (2005); D'Arcy et al. (2009)
and Bulgurcu et al. (2010a)
D'Arcy (2005), and D'Arcy et al.
(2009)
D'Arcy (2005) and D'Arcy et al.
(2009)
Herath and Rao (2009b)

3
4
9

13
12
6
4

9
7
5
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Demographics: To identify and describe the characteristics of the participants, some
demographic variables were collected, including gender, age, educational level, total years of
experience, and years of experience in the current bank. Other demographic variables related
to the work were collected as well, including the number of hours of using the computer at
work, the organizational hierarchal level, and the type of software or databases used in the
work site. Although some previous studies investigated the effect of demographic variables
(control variables) on policy compliance or system abuse, no hypotheses were developed in
this study regarding this; demographic information was merely used to describe the study
sample.
Intention to comply: Intention to comply is measured with seven items, five of which were
adopted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and two from Siponen et al. (2010). The items assess
employees’ behavioral intention to comply with the requirements of the ISPs of their bank,
and the employees’ intention to carry out their responsibilities as described in the bank’s ISP
to protect information and technology resources. It also assesses their intention to recommend
and assist others in complying with ISPs. Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) reported a reliability higher
than .88 for the three items, and Siponen et al. (2010) reported values exceeding the suggested
threshold of 0.60 for three items. Participants were asked to indicate the degree of their
behavioral intention to compliance on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with higher scores indicating higher behavioral intention.
Perceived usefulness of protection: Perceived usefulness of protection is measured with a
thirteen-item scale adapted from Davis (1989). The items measure three main things
pertaining to usefulness of compliance to enhance protection; compliance effectiveness,
productivity and time savings, and importance of compliance to one's job. Perceived
usefulness was investigated by three researchers in the security domain. Dinev and Hu (2007)
reported a reliability of 0.81 for the three items, Xue et al. (2010) reported a reliability of .84,
and finally, Jones (2009) reported a reliability of 0.95. In the IS field, this construct has been
used extensively and validated, and it has been found to be a rigorous and reliable construct
(Lee et al., 2003). Participants were asked to indicate their behavioral intention to compliance
degree on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7),
with higher scores indicating higher perceptions of usefulness of protection.
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Perceived complexity: Perceived complexity is measured with a twelve-item scale adapted
from Davis (1989). The items measure three main complexities; physical effort, mental effort,
and perceptions of how complex compliance is to learn and do. The majority of the studies in
the information systems domain investigated the perception of ease of use, and the results
always revealed a high reliability coefficient (Lee et al., 2003). In the security domain Dinev
and Hu (2007) reported a reliability of 0.81 for the three items, Xue et al. (2010) reported a
reliability of .90, and finally, Jones (2009) reported a reliability of 0.92. Participants were
asked to indicate their behavioral intention to compliance degree on a seven-point Likert
scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with higher scores indicating
higher perceptions of complexity to comply with ISP.
Self-efficacy: Self-efficacy is measured using six items adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a)
and Herath and Rao (2009b). The first three items assessed employees’ confidence in their
personal skills, knowledge, or competency about fulfilling the requirements of ISPs, whereas
the other three items assessed their confidence in their ability to comply with the requirements
of the ISPs on their own. This construct has been investigated in the IS field and is found to
be a significant predictor of behavioral intention (Lee et al., 2003) Likewise, this construct
was found to be a significant predictor of behavioral intention in the information security
domain as well (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Herath & Rao,
2009b; Siponen et al., 2007). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on
a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Controllability: Controllability is measured using four items, three of which were adapted
from Dinev and Hu (2007), and the fourth from Rhee et al. (2009). Items assess respondents’
judgment about the availability and capability of resources, and opportunities to comply with
the requirements of ISPs. Dinev and Hu (2007) reported a reliability of .92 for a three-item
scale. Response options for the items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging
from (1) strongly disagrees to (7) strongly agree.
General information security awareness: General information security awareness is
measured using three items adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a). The items assess
respondents’ overall knowledge and understanding of all probable matters related to
information security and their consequences and complications. Bulgurcu et al. (2008) and
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Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) reported a reliability higher than 0.90 for the three item scale.
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale,
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Technology awareness: Four items were used to measure technology awareness adapted from
Dinev and Hu (2007). The construct items measure respondents’ perception of and interest in
knowing about technological issues and strategies that help them comply with the
requirements of the ISP, so they can help protect the organization’s information assets. Dinev
and Hu (2007) reported a reliability of .93 for this four-item scale. In another study, Dinev et
al. (2009) investigated the effect of technology awareness on intentional behavior in different
countries and reported a high reliability value of .86 in South Korea. Respondents were asked
to indicate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
User awareness of information security policies: User awareness of information security
policies is measured with nine items, seven of which were adapted from D'Arcy (2005), and
the other from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a). The items measure respondents’ knowledge and
understanding of the requirements established in the bank’s ISP and the aim of those
requirements. Researchers reported a high reliability score for this construct; for example,
D'Arcy (2005) reported a reliability of .89 for a seven-item scale. Respondents were asked to
rate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the items on a seven-point scale,
ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.
User awareness of SETA program: The security, education, training, and awareness program
is measured with nine items, eight of those adapted from D'Arcy (2005) and D'Arcy et al.
(2009), with the ninth being developed for this study. These items measure respondents’
awareness of education and training programs at their organization that help improve their
compliance behavior and enhance their awareness of information security issues. D'Arcy
(2005) reported a reliability of .88 for the eight-item scale. Respondents were asked to
indicate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree
(1) to strongly agree (7).
User awareness of computer monitoring: User awareness of monitoring practices is
measured with seven items adapted from D'Arcy (2005) and D'Arcy et al. (2009). These items
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assess the respondents’ awareness of monitoring practices that include, but are not limited to,
tracking users’ internet usage and recording network activities. D'Arcy (2005) reported a
reliability of .87 for the seven-item scale. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of
agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree
(7).
Subjective norm: Five items were used to measure the subjective norm adapted from Herath
and Rao (2009b). These items assess respondents’ perceptions of social pressure about
compliance with the requirements of the bank’s ISP, which is a result of their beliefs about
how important people would like them to behave in this regard. High reliability scores were
recorded in the IS field and in information security; Herath and Rao (2009b) reported a
reliability score higher than .88 for the five-item scale. Respondents were asked to indicate
their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to
strongly agree (7).

Survey Instrument Validation
Face and Content Validity
Boudreau et al. (2001) argued that each instrument must be pretested as a primary step to
eliminate any unexpected future difficulties. Therefore, a pretest of the study instrument was
conducted with a group of specialists from the United States and Jordan. The questionnaire
was sent to a carefully selected group of information security researchers and faculty
members in the United States and Jordan (Five MIS faculty members and researchers in the
US and five MIS faculty members in Jordan), and to a number of employees working at
variety of banks in Jordan (Five individuals), to see whether the items seemed like a good
translation of the construct. Each one of these individuals received an electronic copy of the
drafted questionnaire along with an explanation of the purpose of the study, study questions,
and construct definitions. They were asked to respond to the survey by indicating the
appropriateness of the item in measuring the construct, and if the item was not appropriate,
they were asked to recommend changing or deleting it, or recommending other items. They
were also asked to comment on the content and structure of the instrument as a whole.
Employees were asked to focus and comment more on the understandability of the
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questionnaire items, language issues, level of difficulty, and implication issues related to ISPs,
than were the faculty and researchers.
Unfortunately, only seven out of ten questionnaires were returned to the researcher from the
faculty, and two from banks employees. The feedback focused primarily on language issues
and suggested revising the wording of some of the questions to eliminate ambiguity. The
survey instrument was refined based on the feedback obtained and several items were
reviewed and modified. To make sure that all recommended feedback was taken into account,
the questionnaire was sent to one MIS faculty member in the US and one faculty and one
bank’s employee in Jordan to confirm that the changes enhanced the readability and
understandability of the instrument, in addition to confirming if the items measured the target
constructs. The result of the pretest suggested that the instrument possesses both types of
translation validity; face and content.
Construct and Discriminant Validity
After the pretest, a pilot study was conducted on a convenience sample of 205 employees
from four different banks in Jordan. The pilot test served several purposes. First, it helped
ensure that the time needed for filling out the survey was reasonable. Second, the data
collected from this pilot group were analyzed and used in calculating different validity
measures.
In order to assess the measurement quality of the eleven reflective scales, convergent validity,
reliability, and discriminant validity were calculated. The distribution of all variables was
analyzed, and it was found that all variables included in the model were normally distributed.
Later, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted to calculate measurement quality of
the constructs. The number of factors was left to be defined by the Eigenvalue, which
produced 11 factors (all their Eigenvalues are greater than 1.00) which are the number of
constructs included in the model. All 11 factors accounted for 63.2% of the total variance.
To provide an adequate basis for proceeding to an empirical examination of adequacy for
factor analysis at the overall level, as well as for each variable, an inspection of the correlation
matrix was done. This revealed that most of the correlations are significant at 0.01 level.
Bartlett’s test was used to assess the overall significance of the correlation matrix and found
to be significant at the 0.0001 level. To assess the patterns between variables, the measure of
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sampling adequacy (MSA) was computed. The overall MSA value was 0.788, which is higher
than the acceptable range (above 0.50) (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2009). As
for each variable, MSA values were also found to be higher than the acceptable threshold of
0.50 (Hair et al., 2009).
To measure convergent validity, factor analysis was performed using the principal component
extraction method, followed by orthogonal varimax rotation. Convergent validity captures
how well the measurement items relate to the construct, and it is acceptable if factor loadings
of each measurement item with the one construct it is related to is at 0.70 or higher, and each
item loads significantly on its latent construct (Gefen & Straub, 2005). The unrotated
component analysis factor matrix revealed that some of the items did not load highly on their
hypothesized factor or on any other factors. Varimax rotation was performed based on this
observation, and most of the items loaded well on their latent constructs. Items that had low
factor loadings or those that cross loaded on other factors were removed from the analysis.
Results from the final rotated factor pattern matrix indicate that all items loaded with
significant t-values on their respective latent constructs and have loading values above 0.70.
Therefore, all these reflective scales exhibit sound convergent validity (Gefen & Straub, 2005;
Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000).
To confirm the scale reliability and internal consistency, composite reliability (CR) and
average variance extracted (AVE) for the pilot study was examined. A scale is deemed to be
reliable if it has CR above 0.70 and an AVE of more than 0.50 (Gefen et al., 2000). Results
show that all the reflective scales were reliable. To establish discriminant validity, both the
loading and cross loading matrix and the correlation matrix were examined (see Al-Omari et
al., 2012). All measurement items found to load more strongly on their respective construct
than on other constructs, which were found to be less than 0.50 for all items in the study
(Gefen et al., 2000). Second, Table 4.2 shows that the square root of AVE of each construct is
higher than the correlations between that construct and any other construct (inter-correlations)
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). As shown in the table, all constructs in the model satisfy these
criteria for discriminant validity. Consequently, the measurement tool demonstrates adequate
reliability and validity required for further data collection for testing the hypotheses.
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Table 4.2: Composite Reliability, AVE, and Latent Variable Correlations
CR
AVE MPA Cont. GISA IC
ISPA PC
PUOP SE
SETA SN
TA
MPA 0.876 0.780 0.883
Cont. 0.865 0.783 0.123 0.885
GISA 0.841 0.838 0.134 0.333 0.916
IC
0.823 0.787 0.123 0.150 0.394 0.887
ISPA 0.826 0.796 0.201 0.276 0.415 0.266 0.892
PC
0.832 0.775 0.168 0.242 0.443 0.260 0.374 0.880
PU
0.892 0.683 0.124 0.253 0.358 0.253 0.368 0.376 0.826
SE
0.905 0.767 0.136 0.268 0.325 0.352 0.294 0.259 0.161 0.876
SETA 0.837 0.880 0.246 0.058 0.122 0.217 0.225 0.170 0.117 0.133 0.938
SN
0.837 0.769 0.030 0.043 0.009 0.041 0.075 0.036 0.098 0.050 0.035 0.877
TA
0.865 0.798 0.202 0.254 0.269 0.301 0.379 0.474 0.310 0.339 0.083 0.051 0.893
CR = Composite reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; MP = Monitoring Practices; Cont. =
Controllability; GISA = General Information Security Awareness; IC = Intention to Comply; ISPA = Information
Security Awareness; PC = Perceived Complexity; PU = Perceived Usefulness of Protection; SE = Self-Efficacy to
Comply; SETA = Security, Education, Training and Awareness; SN = Subjective Norms; TA = Security
Awareness.
Diagonal elements in bold display the square root of AVE.

Finally, a paper presenting the pilot test results was published (Al-Omari et al., 2012). Results
revealed that all constructs in the model satisfy the criteria for discriminant validity, and that
all the reflective scales were reliable.

Sampling and Data Collection
Sample Size
Representativeness of the sample and correctly choosing the appropriate sample size is very
critical as it can significantly weaken the generality of the findings (Boudreau et al., 2001)
and influence the detection power of the significant relationships and interactions. Statistical
tests with larger sample sizes are more likely to be overly sensitive, whereas for a small
sample size, statistical tests will be insensitive and fail to detect even large effects (Hair et al.,
2009; Straub, 1989). However, the smaller the sample size the less its precision (Boudreau et
al., 2001), and the harder to determine whether findings are generalizable or peculiar to the
case (Poole & DeSanctis, 2004). Since statistical significance reflects sample size and effect
size, two studies might have different results and conclusions using the same model, as a
result of having two different sample sizes (Biddle & Marlin, 1987; Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
Therefore, an appropriate sample size should be selected; not so small that only large effects
are detectable, nor so large that it is overly sensitive and detects small effects of little
scientific importance.
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Inferences in cross-sectional self-report survey studies are made from a sample which is
believed to be representative of the population. The precision of the inference is highly
dependent on the degree to which the information available in a sample reflects population
information. The general rule is that the larger the sample size the “more information is
available and, therefore, more confidence can be expressed for the model as a reflection of the
population process” (Tanaka, 1987, p. 134). The question is how large of a sample is required
to be representative, or more specifically, to deduce research findings back to a population?
Unfortunately, there is no precise answer for this question as recommendations vary
drastically. Gorsuch (1983) proposed a ratio of 5 participants per measured variable and that
the sample size should be higher than 100. Hair et al. (2009) suggested that sample size
should be a minimum of 200 participants and recommended that researchers should always
try to obtain the highest cases-per-variable ratio. Everitt (1975) suggested a ratio of 10
participants per measured variable. Bentler and Chou (1987) provide a rule of thumb that
under normal distribution the ratio of sample size to number of variables should be 10:1 to
obtain significant tests.
Obviously there is no consensus between researchers and methodologists on a “rule of
thumb” that can be relied upon to determine the best sample size. Hair et al. (2009) argued
that these “previous guidelines … are no longer appropriate” (p. 635); they suggested model
complexity and basic measurement model characteristics should determine the sample size.
Partial Lease Square (PLS) was used to analyze the data. One guideline for setting sample
size in PLS according to Gefen et al. (2000) requires a sample size of ten times the most
complex construct in the model. Accordingly, if the most complex relationship involved a
construct with six formative indicators, the required minimum sample size would be 60.
Based on the previous discussion, and with a fairly complex model with ten or more
constructs, most with seven or more observable items, and following Hair et al. (2009)
recommendation, a minimum sample of 800 was needed to test the study model.
Data Collection
Most of the previous IS literature on ISP compliance or misuse has focused solely on IS
employees (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Li, Zhang, et
al., 2010; e.g. Siponen et al., 2007; e.g. Straub, 1990). This study reflects a large number of
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bank employees who are required to comply with their bank’s ISPs. The population for the
current study is all employees, who speak and understand English, and who are working at
any bank in Jordan that already has a developed ISP that they are currently using The target
sample was a large mix of employees from different banks working in different departments
(i.e., tellers, research and design, marketing and sales, and information technology) at
different hierarchal levels (i.e., non-managerial, line management, senior, and CEOs), with
various years of experiences at a bank.
The study participants were bank employees for several reasons. First, banks are a prime
target for hackers, given that they maintain important information about customers, and have
access to large amounts of monetary assets. Second, banks employ individuals with a diverse
range of ages, education levels, and job titles, which allows for a representative sample.
Finally, banks are heavy users of information technology, networks, and the Internet.
The data were gathered from Jordan for a few reasons. First, Jordan is the home country of the
researcher, giving him access to different sectors such as banking and education. Second,
Jordan is considered one of the largest computer user countries in the Middle East after UAE.
Third, Jordan has a strong banking system that started to employ technology quite a while
ago. Finally, Jordan is now starting to be a prime target for hackers because of the current
absence of detailed regulations and laws in place to protect information resources in banks.
A list of all banks in Jordan that have ISPs in action were developed based on the researcher’s
personal contact, and through various contacts obtained from Dr. Aleassa, at Yarmouk
University in Jordan, who also administered the questionnaire distribution. An email was sent
to about twenty large bank administrators (either CEO or chief information officer or human
resource department), which described the benefits and costs involved in participating in this
research. Approximately one week after the email, each executive/manager was contacted by
the researcher or by the survey administrator, and their willingness to participate in the
research was determined. Thirteen large banks agreed to participate, but the rest declined for
various reasons, such as time constraints and security concerns. Of the thirteen banks, nine
were found to have a written and clear ISP under action, with most of their employees being
fluent in English. The executive/manager from the nine banks was asked to provide a name of
the contact person who would serve as a liaison with the researcher and the survey
administrator, and facilitate the survey administration. Each designated contact person was
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given an abstract description of the purpose of the study and the questionnaire, along with
instructions for survey distribution. Specifically, the contact persons were instructed on the
concept of random sampling and asked to randomly select a sample of employees from
different departments, at different hierarchal levels, and with different years of experience and
educational levels. They were also asked to equally survey both males and females.
Although a paper-based survey is expensive, and slow and difficult to deliver to respondents
at different geographical locations, it was still selected as a method for collecting data because
banks do not have business emails for their employees for security reasons, most
communication with employees is done on paper or by phone, and most importantly, the
researcher was told by some banks’ CEOs that they do not have a list of personal emails for
their employees, also for security reasons. In July – October of 2010, the researcher provided
the instrument to the survey administrator who made copies with a “cover letter” attached to
each copy. The survey administrator delivered about 150 copies for each contacted person at
the nine banks, who then personally distributed the questionnaire to the randomly selected
employees in the different bank branches. The cover letter emphasized the anonymous nature
and confidentiality of the survey, and explained that participation was voluntary and
withdrawing from the study was possible at any time without any consequences. The survey
administrator contacted the liaison person within each bank approximately every week and
collected the completed questionnaires and provided him with more copies when needed. As a
primary screening process, participants were asked about their awareness of the existence of
the ISPs and about their fluency in the English language. Only those participants that
indicated some awareness with ISPs and those that were fluent in English were included in
the survey study.
Two thousand one hundred and seventeen (2117) employees received the questionnaire, and
nine hundred and thirty seven (937) filled it out, for an initial response rate of 44 percent. The
researcher went over every questionnaire and deleted incomplete or unusable entries from the
dataset. Every questionnaire that was less than 90 percent completed (Meaning that it was
missing at least one question from each construct) was discarded. Of the questionnaires that
were completed, a check question was used to see if the respondents fully read and
understood the questionnaire. If the answers were contradictory, the questionnaire was
discarded. A total of 878 questionnaires were found to be usable, for a response rate of 41
percent.
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A random sample of employees at different job levels and in different departments at nine
banks was taken. Usually a sample size of 10 to 20 percent of all employees is used with this
type of sampling technique. According to Hair et al. (2009), a general rule is to have at least
five times as many observations as the number of variables to be analyzed, and a more
acceptable sample size would have a 10:1 ratio. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) requires
a larger sample relative to other multivariate approaches; Hair et al. (2009) stated “when the
number of factors are larger than six, some of which use fewer than three measured items as
indicators, and multiple low communalities are present, sample size requirements may exceed
500” (p. 742).
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CHAPTER FIVE
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter presents the data analysis and results of the hypotheses tests. The chapter begins
with a description of the study sample, along with the initial instrument validation. The Partial
Least Square (PLS) is used to test the validity and reliability of the instrument, and a
description of the hypothesized relationships in the research model is presented. Finally,
results of the PLS analysis is presented for the structural model.

Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics
Employees at banks in Jordan which have developed ISPs in action represented the study
population. A random sample was collected from employees working in nine different banks.
Table 5.1 contains the demographic profile of the survey participants.
As shown in table 5.1, of the 878 respondents in the final sample, 44% were female, 68.9%
were in the 20-29 age range, 62.8% held a bachelor’s degree, and more than 16% held
advanced degrees. The majority of the sample (54.6%) had 1 to 5 total years of experience.
The table also shows a diverse distribution of jobs in various departments at different
organizational levels; 25.9% were in middle management and 3.4% were CEO/president. The
average length of computer usage was 9.93 years, the average use of the computer at work
was 6.29 hours per days, and the average period of speaking English was 10.44 years.
Participants reported using different computer software such as spreadsheets, word processing
packages, e-mail, programming languages, database applications, and their bank’s special
tailored software. The sample was quite evenly distributed in terms of the responsibilities of
the respondents and in terms of the managerial level. The data collected represents a diverse
employee population since it includes employees from local as well as international banks in
Jordan.
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Table 5.1: Sample Characteristics
Variable
Sex
Age

Educational level

Experience

Years of experience with
the current bank

Functional area of work

Organizational level

Computer software used
for job-related work

Computer use at work
(hrs./day)
For how long you have
been using the computer
For how long you have
been speaking English

Category
Male
Female
20-29 ears
30-39 years
40-49 years
≥ 50 years
High School
Collage
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree
Doctoral Degree
1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
More than 20 years
Less than 6 months
6 months to 1 year
1 to 2 years
2 to 4 years
4 to 6 years
6 to 10 years
10 to 15 years
More than 15 years
Teller
Administration/Clerical
Information Technology
Audit
Marketing and Sales
Credit Department
Non-management
Line Management (supervising non-management personnel)
Middle Management
Senior Management
Executive/Senior Vice President
CEO/President
Spreadsheets (e.g., Microsoft Excel)
Word processing (e.g., Microsoft Word)
E-mail
Programming languages (e.g., C++, Java, Visual Basic)
Application packages (e.g., accounting or payroll software)
Database applications
Bank’s special tailored software
Mean
Std. Deviation
Mean
Std. Deviation
Mean
Std. Deviation

Frequency Percentage
492
56.0%
386
44.0%
605
68.9%
175
19.9%
66
7.5%
32
3.6%
61
6.9%
122
13.9%
551
62.8%
119
13.6%
25
2.8%
479
54.6%
181
20.6%
72
8.2%
95
10.8%
51
5.8%
142
16.2%
62
7.1%
146
16.6%
128
14.6%
147
16.7%
141
16.1%
60
6.8%
52
5.9%
160
18.2%
171
19.5%
257
29.3%
76
8.7%
132
15.0%
82
9.3%
238
27.1%
188
21.4%
227
25.9%
142
16.2%
53
6.0%
30
3.4%
564
64.2%
589
67.1%
638
72.7%
244
27.8%
201
22.9%
236
26.9%
398
45.3%
6.29
2.67
9.93
5.73
10.44
7.53
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Initial Assessment of Validity and Reliability
As a first step in the analysis, and before proceeding with testing the research model and
hypotheses, the validity and reliability of the constructs were assessed. A construct will be
considered valid if both convergent and discriminant validity are achieved (Straub, Boudreau,
& Gefen, 2004; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). Convergent validity means that “each
measurement item correlates strongly with the one construct it is related to, while correlating
weakly or not significantly with all other constructs, while discriminant validity is shown
when each measurement item correlates weakly with all other constructs except for the one to
which it is theoretically associated” (Gefen & Straub, 2005, p. 92). Reliability is concerned
with measurement accuracy, and is "the extent to which the respondent can answer the same
questions or close approximations the same way each time" (Straub, 1989, p. 151). To assess
convergent validity, both item loading on constructs and Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
need to be calculated. AVE measures the variance captured by the latent construct. As a rule
of thumb, AVE should be more than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005).
Exploratory Factor Analysis
As recommended by Heck (1998), EFA was conducted as an essential first step in data
analysis when relationships among observed indicators and underlying factors are not tested
or investigated beforehand. EFA basically classifies the essential latent variables that explain
the pattern of correlations within a set of measurement items (Gefen & Straub, 2005). This
study adopted different factors from different studies and built relationships between those
variables that have never been tested or examined. Although most of the items for measuring
the constructs were developed and tested in different studies in the information security policy
compliance or misuse domain, some of these items adopted from the literature are being
studied for the first time in the security domain. The most important reason for us to conduct
this analysis is the fact that these items and relationships will be tested for the first time in
Jordan. According to the SPSS manual, EFA objectives are “to establish that the measurement
items converge into the appropriate number of theoretical factors, and that each item loads
with a high coefficient on only one factor” (Gefen & Straub, 2005, p. 92).
To provide an adequate basis for proceeding to an empirical examination of adequacy for
factor analysis at the overall level as well as for each variable, an inspection of the correlation
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matrix as recommended by Hair et al. (2009) was done, and results revealed no substantial
number of correlations higher than 0.30 inspected between items of different constructs, in
other words, correlations between items of the same factor found to be high, and low
correlations, were recorded with other factors items. This initially could give an indication
that they are not explained to any great extent by the other variables, but do explain each
other. Bartlett’s test was used to assess the overall significance of the correlation matrix and
found to be significant at the 0.0001 level. To assess the patterns between variables, the
measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) was computed. The overall MSA value was 0.937;
categorized as “meritorious”, it is higher than the acceptable range (above 0.50) (Hair et al.,
2009). As for each variable, MSA values were also found to be higher than the acceptable
threshold of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2009).
Using SPSS version 17, an EFA with principle components analysis and varimax rotation
method was conducted. The setup option regarding selecting the number of factors was left to
be determined by the eigenvalue which is supposed to exceed 1.0. According to Hair et al.
(2009) the choice of the rotation method, either orthogonal or oblique, should be based on the
assumption and study needs of a given research problem. Since the goals of this study are to
identify the underlying latent variables, and to signify that these factors are independent of
each other, and to improve the interpretation by reducing some of the ambiguities that often
accompany the preliminary analysis, varimax orthogonal rotational method was used. The
result produced theoretically meaningful factors and the simplest factor structure (Hair et al.,
2009).
For the factor loading acceptable level, guidelines from Hair et al. (2009) were adopted to
assess the factor loadings. According to Hair et al. (2009) and Chin (1998) a .30 loading
accounts for nearly 10 percent of the variance, while a .50 loading indicates that 25 percent of
the variance is accounted for by the factor, and in order to account for 50 percent of the
variance, a variable loading must exceed .70 . Based on these guidelines any item loaded less
than .70 on an assigned factor, or loaded high on two factors (cross-loading), was deleted. As
shown in table 5.2, EFA produced eleven factors with eigenvalues greater than 2.0, which is
exactly the same number of factors investigated in the study. The eleven factors accounted for
76.71 percent of the total variance, which is higher than the generally accepted level of 60
percent (Hair et al., 2009).
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Table 5.2: Measurement Items and Item Loadings
Items
IC

Dimensions/Questions
Mean
Intention to Comply
I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my organization
5.450
I intend to protect information resources according to the requirements of the ISP
of my organization.
5.539
I intend to protect technology resources according to the requirements of the ISP
of my organization.
5.527
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization
when I use information resources.
5.579
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization
when I use technology resources.
5.569
I intend to recommend that others comply with ISP.
5.591
I intend to assist others in complying with ISP.
5.541
Eigenvalue = 9.579
Variance Explained = 12.773
PUOP Perceived Usefulness of Protection
My job would be easier to perform without complying with my organization’s ISP 5.330
Complying with my organization’s ISP gives me greater control over my work.
5.460
Complying with my organization’s ISP does not hinder my job performance.
5.385
Complying with my organization’s ISP addresses my job-related security needs.
5.375
Complying with my organization’s ISP saves me time.
5.382
Complying with my organization’s ISP enables me to accomplish tasks more
securely.
5.443
Complying with my organization’s ISP supports critical security aspects of my job 5.351
Complying with my organization’s ISP reduces unproductive activities.
5.432
Complying with my organization’s ISP enhances my effectiveness on the job.
5.375
Complying with my organization’s ISP improves the quality of the work I do.
5.470
Complying with my organization’s ISP improves my productivity.
5.409
Complying with my organization’s ISP makes it easier to do my job.
5.396
Overall, I find complying with my organization’s ISP useful in my job.
5.423
Eigenvalue = 7.370
Variance Explained = 9.827
PC
Perceived Complexity
I often become confused when complying with the requirements of my
2.456
organization’s ISP.
I make errors frequently when complying with the requirements of my
2.483
organization’s ISP.
Complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is often frustrating.
2.634
Learning to comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is hard for me 2.665
Compliance with the requirements of my organization’s ISP requires a lot of
2.498
mental effort.
I find it easy to comply with my organization’s ISP.
2.270
It is easy for me to remember how to perform tasks while complying with my
2.531
organization’s ISP.
My organization’s ISP provides helpful guidance in performing tasks.
2.605
Eigenvalue = 7.152
Variance Explained = 9.536
SE
Self-Efficacy
I have the necessary skills to fulfill the requirements of the ISP.
5.117
I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the requirements of the ISP.
5.163
I have the necessary competencies to fulfill the requirements of the ISP.
5.052
I would feel comfortable following my organization’s ISP on my own.
5.136
If I wanted to, I could easily comply with my organization’s ISP on my own.
5.028
I would be able to follow most of ISP even if there was no one around to help me. 5.077
Eigenvalue = 6.373
Variance Explained = 8.497

STD

Loading

1.645

.863

1.528

.859

1.607

.845

1.545

.830

1.505
1.470
1.463

.825
.785
.740

1.653
1.612
1.590
1.688
1.646

.747
.799
.784
.821
.833

1.590
1.614
1.640
1.591
1.575
1.571
1.585
1.603

.789
.812
.782
.806
.796
.804
.772
.770

1.417

.946

1.445

.839

1.592
1.605
1.503

.887
.872
.718

1.266
1.484

.846
.935

1.559

.718

1.735
1.781
1.741
1.723
1.741
1.767

.774
.807
.805
.806
.781
.746
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Table 5.2 Measurement Items and Item Loadings (Continued)
Items
Cont.

Dimensions/Questions
Mean
Controllability
I have the resources (like antivirus, firewall, brochures) to help me comply with
the requirements of my organization’s ISP.
5.588
I have the resources to protect my organization’s information and technology
assets from potential threats.
5.557
Threats to information security in my work are under control.
5.645
In general, technology used at my organization is advanced enough to prevent
information security threats.
5.581
Eigenvalue = 5.478
Variance Explained = 7.304
GISA General Information Security Awareness
Overall, I am aware of the potential security threats and their negative consequences
5.489
I have sufficient knowledge about the cost of potential security problems.
5.335
I understand the concerns regarding information security and the risks they pose
in general.
5.564
Eigenvalue = 5.355
Variance Explained = 7.140
TA
Technology Awareness
I follow news and developments about the security related technologies.
5.390
I discuss Internet security issues or anecdotes with friends and people around me 5.440
I read about the problems of malicious threats attacking users’ computers.
5.387
I seek advice about security issues through online discussion forums, magazines,
and other media sources
5.397
Eigenvalue = 4.474
Variance Explained = 5.965
ISPA User Awareness of Information Security Policies
I am aware of my organization’s rules of behavior for use of computer resources. 2.869
I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use
of information systems.
2.875
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use.
2.916
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from
installing their own software on work computers.
2.818
I am aware that my organization has specific guidelines that govern what tasks
employees are allowed to perform on their work computers.
2.836
I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use
of computer passwords.
2.790
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
2.874
I understand the rules and regulations prescribed by my organization’s ISP.
2.821
I understand my responsibilities toward enhancing my organization’s information
system security as prescribed in the organization’s ISP.
2.825
Eigenvalue = 3.798
Variance Explained = 5.064
SETA User Awareness of SETA Program
I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees comply with
the organization’s ISP.
5.248
I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees improve
their awareness of computer and information security issues.
5.313
I am aware that my organization provides employees with education on computer
software copyright laws.
5.236
I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
5.315
I am aware that my organization educates employees on their computer security
responsibilities.
5.238

STD

Loading

1.509

.837

1.458
1.455

.785
.793

1.546

.747

1.502
1.655

.804
.765

1.551

.882

1.603
1.553
1.505

.746
.785
.775

1.591

.727

1.764

.791

1.815

.818

1.755

.836

1.793

.822

1.718

.808

1.733

.796

1.721
1.748

.823
.809

1.657

.778

1.696

.801

1.709

.816

1.707

.837

1.714

.841

1.712

.833
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Table 5.2 Measurement Items and Item Loadings (Continued)
Items

MPA

SN

Dimensions/Questions
Mean
I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use.
5.318
I am aware that employees in my organization are instructed in the appropriate
usage of information technologies.
5.175
I am aware that my organization educates employees on their responsibilities for
managing computer passwords.
5.297
I am aware that my organization educates employees on appropriate use of
information technology resources (e.g. email).
5.265
Eigenvalue = 2.945
Variance Explained = 3.926
User Awareness of Monitoring Practices
I am aware that my organization monitors any modification or altering of
computerized data by employees.
5.173
I am aware that employees’ computing activities are monitored by my organization
5.352
I am aware that my organization monitors computing activities to ensure that
employees are performing only explicitly authorized tasks.
5.286
I am aware that my organization reviews logs of employees' computing activities
on a regular basis.
5.196
I am aware that my organization conducts periodic audits to detect the use of
unauthorized software on its computers.
5.161
I am aware that my organization regularly monitors employee access to sensitive
computerized information.
5.255
I am aware that my organization actively monitors the content of employees'
work e-mail messages.
5.253
Eigenvalue = 2.741
Variance Explained = 3.654
Subjective Norm
Upper level management thinks I should comply with the requirements of my
organization’s ISPs.
5.263
My boss thinks that I should comply with the requirements of my organization’s
ISPs.
5.292
My colleagues think that I should comply with the requirements of my
organization’s ISPs.
5.259
The information security/technology department in my organization thinks that I
should comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs.
5.240
Other computer technical specialists in the organization think that I should
comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs.
5.213
Eigenvalue = 2.267
Variance Explained = 3.022

STD

Loading

1.642

.836

1.630

.829

1.620

.816

1.683

.803

1.691
1.630

.790
.773

1.687

.769

1.812

.835

1.709

.830

1.641

.803

1.714

.809

1.682

.803

1.706

.808

1.683

.814

1.644

.803

1.655

.779

First, we conducted EFA run on all items with the same procedures described before. Results
showed that all items loaded high only on the target factor, and no cross loading were found.
Only four items from perceived complexity (PC) were found not to satisfy the 0.70 loading
requirements. Although confirmatory factor analysis (discussed later in the chapter) showed
that maintaining these items was not problematic from a loading perspective, we still chose to
stick to the 0.70 loading rule, hoping to concentrate the variance effect of the variable in the
structural model. Furthermore, we found that the deletion of these items (PC6, PC7, PC9, and
PC12) had no effect on the content validity since the PC construct consisted originally from
12 items, leaving it with 8 highly loading items.
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After the deletion of the low loading items, we conducted a second EFA on the remaining
items. Results from the final rotated factor pattern matrix indicated that all items loaded high
only on their respective latent constructs, and had loading values above 0.70. Therefore, all
these reflective scales exhibited sound convergent and discriminant validity at this stage of the
analysis.
Assessment of Reliability
Following the EFA analysis, refinement, and deletion of low loaded items, revised items
reliability was calculated. The philosophical foundations of reliability according to Straub et
al. (2004) submit that the researcher is endeavoring to find contiguous measures of the “true
scores” that perfectly describe the phenomenon. An internal consistency measure was used to
assess each construct inter-item correlations. Table 5.3 shows the Cronbach’s alpha values for
each construct based on the results of the last EFA results. In order for the construct to
demonstrate acceptable reliability, Cronbach’s alpha values should be 0.7 or greater (Gefen et
al., 2000; Hair et al., 2009). As reported in Table 5.3 the Cronbach’s alpha values for all of
the constructs in the research model were greater than 0.89, demonstrating that all constructs
had adequate reliability assessment scores.
Table 5.3: Reliability of Construct
Construct
Intention to Comply
Perceived Usefulness of Protection
Perceived Complexity
Self-Efficacy
Controllability
General Information Security Awareness
Technology Awareness
User Awareness of Information Security Policies
User Awareness of SETA Program
User Awareness of Monitoring Practices
Subjective Norm

Number of Items
7
13
8
6
4
3
4
9
9
7
5

Cronbach’s Alpha
0.948
0.962
0.958
0.939
0.896
0.908
0.915
0.963
0.962
0.946
0.936

Common Methods Bias
Common methods variance is one of the most prevalent problems in behavioral research
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) which happens when most of the variables
cross-load across regular phases (Straub et al., 2004), as a result of using a single instrument
that is obtained from one source, and not measured in a different context (Straub et al., 2004),
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as in the case of TAM ( Gefen et al. (2000) . Since this study falls under the category of
behavioral studies that adopted the TAM, common methods variance could be a problem.
Several procedural steps were implemented in the instrument design phase to minimize the
potential sources of common methods bias described by Podsakoff et al. (2003). Still these
procedures are not enough to completely eliminate the potential of such an effect. Following
Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommendations, we conducted Harmon’s single factor test to
examine the existence of this problem.
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), Harmon test is the most widely used statistical
technique to examine common methods variance. This technique involves subjecting all the
study items to a single factor analysis and then analyzing the unrotated factor matrix.
Common methods variance is assumed to exist if either (a) a single factor emerged from the
factor analysis or (b) one factor accounted for the majority of the variance among variables.
Results of this test as demonstrated in table 5.4 shows that multiple factors emerged from the
factor analysis (11 factors) and no single factor accounted for the majority of the variance
among the factors. These results indicate that common methods variance is not a significant
problem in this study.
Table 5 4: Harmon’s Single-factor Results
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Total
16.620
8.829
6.722
4.652
4.321
3.521
3.001
2.813
1.739
1.428
1.203
.951
.752

Initial Eigenvalues
% of Variance Cumulative %
17.367
17.367
11.945
29.313
9.279
38.591
6.658
45.249
6.239
51.489
5.227
56.716
4.568
61.283
4.330
65.614
2.970
68.584
2.577
71.161
2.292
73.453
1.973
75.425
1.721
77.146

Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total
% of Variance Cumulative %
14.326
14.995
14.995
8.559
12.035
27.030
6.425
9.333
36.363
4.395
6.763
43.126
4.061
6.340
49.467
3.257
5.322
54.789
2.732
4.658
59.447
2.547
4.424
63.870
1.505
3.105
66.975
1.158
2.666
69.641
0.975
2.434
72.075

Data Analysis and Results
Following the recommendations of Barclay, Higgins, and Thompson (1995) , the model
reliability and validity is assessed to ensure that the construct measures are valid and reliable
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before assessing the correlations between the constructs in the structural model. the structural
model is assessed. The measurement and the structural models were examined using structural
equation modeling.
Assessment of Measurement Model
The component-based partial least squares (PLS) approach, a structural modeling technique,
was used to test and evaluate the psychometric properties of the constructs and to test the
study hypotheses. Currently, PLS is superior to traditional first generation statistical methods
such as regression, LOGIT, ANOVA, and MANOVA as it tests the measurement model
(relationships between constructs and measures) and the structural model (theoretical
relationships among constructs) simultaneously. Initially, PLS estimates the items loading on
constructs and then estimates casual relationships among construct iteratively (Gefen et al.,
2000).
PLS is the most widely used statistical package in information system research (Rouse &
Corbitt, 2008). PLS, as a component-based approach, is the most used as it allows the analysis
of non-normal data, is less sensitive to sample size, is supportive of exploratory research
(Gefen et al., 2000), does high quality theory testing, (Rouse & Corbitt, 2008), and processes
each indicator separately, allowing each item to differ in the amount of influence on the
construct estimate (Chin, Marcolin, & L., 2003). PLSs is the most appropriate for this study
because of its focus on prediction of data, and it is best suited for exploratory research and
theory building. The Smart-PLS software package (version 2.0.M3) (Ringle, Wende, & Will,
2005) was used to assess the measurement model fit indices and to evaluate the validity and
reliability.
In order to assess the measurement quality of the eleven reflective scales, factorial validity
(convergent validity and discriminant validity), individual item reliability, and composite
reliability were calculated (Barclay et al., 1995; Gefen & Straub, 2005). A confirmatory factor
analysis was produced using PLS to assess the quality of the measurement model. All of the
items that resulted from the exploratory factor analysis, explained previously, were included
in the model. Gefen et al. (2000) stated that PLS and EFA might produce different factor
loadings; for example, an item loading of .50 in PLS could be below .40 in EFA. Therefore,
we could have claimed higher loading of these items in PLS, but actually they created
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different problems, some of which were related to the directions of the correlations, so we
chose to eliminate them.
Table 5.5 summarizes the items constituting the research model. The table shows the
questionnaire items, as well as weight, factor loading, and t-value of each item. Even though
PLS does not require the items to be normally distributed, the distribution of all variables
were still analyzed, and it was found that all variables included in the model were normally
distributed. The number of factors was set to 11, which are the number of constructs included
in the model. All 11 factors accounted for 88.5% of the total variance.
Table 5 5: Measurement Items and Item Loadings
Constructs
Intention to Comply

Perceived Usefulness of Protection

Perceived Complexity

Self-Efficacy

Controllability

Item
IC1
IC2
IC3
IC4
IC5
IC6
IC7
PUOP1
PUOP2
PUOP3
PUOP4
PUOP5
PUOP6
PUOP7
PUOP8
PUOP9
PUOP10
PUOP11
PUOP12
PUOP13
PC1
PC2
PC3
PC4
PC5
PC8
PC10
PC11
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
CONT1
CONT2

Weight
0.161
0.161
0.162
0.168
0.165
0.161
0.167
0.083
0.100
0.094
0.092
0.088
0.095
0.095
0.100
0.089
0.094
0.089
0.094
0.093
0.127
0.145
0.165
0.173
0.134
0.103
0.139
0.145
0.186
0.191
0.181
0.193
0.197
0.195
0.250
0.334

Loading
0.890
0.890
0.891
0.880
0.880
0.853
0.830
0.768
0.850
0.823
0.850
0.846
0.831
0.850
0.838
0.831
0.836
0.827
0.814
0.810
0.937
0.872
0.941
0.938
0.785
0.803
0.950
0.805
0.862
0.887
0.881
0.891
0.872
0.860
0.895
0.886

T-value
100.721
81.519
99.004
77.272
81.326
60.444
55.355
38.277
71.378
53.145
68.214
66.364
48.694
67.495
57.763
57.299
63.735
56.202
46.697
41.500
111.186
47.703
169.689
168.319
41.033
34.703
176.761
47.567
69.703
95.984
75.753
98.389
80.163
74.461
75.716
73.887
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Table 5.5 Measurement Items and Item Loadings (Continued)
Constructs

General Information Security Awareness

Technology Awareness

User Awareness of Information Security
Policies

User Awareness of SETA Program

User Awareness of Monitoring Practices

Subjective Norm

Item
CONT3
CONT4
GISA1
GISA2
GISA3
TA1
TA2
TA3
TA4
ISPA1
ISPA2
ISPA3
ISPA4
ISPA5
ISPA6
ISPA7
ISPA8
ISPA9
SETA1
SETA2
SETA3
SETA4
SETA5
SETA6
SETA7
SETA8
SETA9
MPA1
MPA2
MPA3
MPA4
MPA5
MPA6
MPA7
SN1
SN2
SN3
SN4
SN5
IC1

Weight
0.281
0.282
0.348
0.371
0.369
0.275
0.301
0.258
0.286
0.133
0.121
0.130
0.131
0.124
0.121
0.123
0.122
0.133
0.133
0.126
0.130
0.120
0.133
0.138
0.116
0.115
0.130
0.149
0.163
0.167
0.160
0.161
0.175
0.176
0.226
0.223
0.221
0.233
0.217
0.161

Loading
0.874
0.837
0.885
0.916
0.955
0.893
0.902
0.888
0.889
0.874
0.887
0.901
0.906
0.883
0.868
0.869
0.858
0.862
0.865
0.875
0.881
0.887
0.880
0.889
0.873
0.865
0.867
0.863
0.864
0.853
0.876
0.878
0.875
0.876
0.893
0.894
0.896
0.900
0.875
0.890

T-value
63.720
50.886
71.593
91.949
205.336
82.578
88.558
65.075
77.342
89.664
105.782
120.514
121.848
85.926
73.585
80.327
75.911
81.183
79.371
87.401
93.488
94.152
91.381
96.799
78.226
74.858
83.409
79.691
68.932
66.398
91.917
87.151
75.389
84.233
90.175
90.098
95.866
119.214
87.589
100.721

First, to ensure convergent validity and reliability of every item, factor loading of each
individual item on its underlying construct was examined, as well as the Average Variance
Extracted (AVE). As shown in table 5.5, all item loadings exceeded the recommended
minimum value of 0.70, indicating that at least 50 percent of the variance was accounted for
by the construct (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2009). Results also showed that all items loaded
significantly (p < 0.000) on their underlying constructs as evident from the t-values, which are
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higher than 1.96 for all items. As shown in Table 5.6, the AVE was higher than the minimum
recommended value of 0.5 for each construct, indicating that the items satisfied the
convergent validity.
To establish the discriminant validity of the constructs in the study model, the square root of
the average variance extracted for each construct, with the correlation scores of that construct
with other constructs, was compared. For each scale, the square root of the AVE of each
construct, reported in the diagonal of the correlation matrix in Table 5.6, was higher than the
correlations between that construct and any other construct (inter-correlations). The cross
loading matrix from confirmatory factor analysis was also utilized as another requirement to
assess discriminant validity of the constructs (see Table C1 in Appendix C). From the cross
loading matrix it was found that, as recommended, all measurement items loaded higher than
0.768 on their underlying construct, and loaded very low, less than 0.40, on other constructs
(Gefen et al., 2000). As shown in Table 5.6 and Table C1 (Appendix C), all constructs in the
model satisfied these criteria for discriminant validity.
Table 5 6: Composite Reliability, AVE, and Latent Variable Correlations
CR
AVE MPA Cont. GISA
IC
ISPA
PC
PUOP
SE
SETA SN
TA
MPA 0.956 0.756 0.869
Cont. 0.928 0.762 0.314 0.873
GISA 0.942 0.845 0.359 0.266 0.919
IC
0.958 0.763 0.320 0.221 0.040 0.874
ISPA 0.968 0.772 0.419 0.381 0.343 0.309 0.879
PC
0.965 0.777 0.240 -0.154 -0.215 -0.203 -0.099 0.881
PU
0.966 0.687 0.327 0.221 0.350 0.310 0.311 -0.254 0.829
SE
0.952 0.766 0.408 0.396 0.253 0.284 0.359 -0.285 0.384 0.875
SETA 0.967 0.767 0.343 0.329 0.227 0.360 0.359 -0.231 0.326 0.421 0.876
SN
0.951 0.795 0.311 0.070 0.252 0.368 0.356 -0.251 0.365 0.354 0.315 0.892
TA
0.940 0.797 0.322 0.243 0.210 0.302 0.447 -0.218 -0.093 0.297 0.319 0.288 0.893
CR = Composite reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; MP = Monitoring Practices; Cont. =
Controllability; GISA = General Information Security Awareness; IC = Intention to Comply; ISPA =
Information Security Awareness; PC = Perceived Complexity; PU = Perceived Usefulness of Protection; SE =
Self-Efficacy to Comply; SETA = Security, Education, Training and Awareness; SN = Subjective Norms; TA =
Security Awareness.
Diagonal elements in bold display the square root of AVE.

To confirm the scale reliability and internal consistency, the composite reliability (CR) and
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated. A scale is deemed to be reliable if it has CR and Cronbach’s
alpha above 0.70 (Gefen et al., 2000). Table 5.6 shows that all composite reliability values are
more than 0.982, and Cronbach’s alpha, as shown in Table 5.3, are higher than 0.896,
demonstrating that all constructs had adequate reliability assessment scores and all construct
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measures were considered to be reflective as all indicators satisfy the recommended criteria
specified by Petter, Straub, and Rai (2007). These items will be used in future studies for
testing the proposed theoretical research model.
Consequently, the results of the measurement model demonstrated adequate convergent
validity, discriminant validity, and reliability required for further testing of our research
hypotheses.
Structural Model Testing
Having established that the model demonstrated adequate factorial validity and reliability, a
test of the structural model was conducted. As stated in the research methodology, PLS
approach to structural equation modeling was used to estimate the measurement model. The
PLS algorithm and the bootstrapping re-sampling method with 878 cases and 1756 re-samples
were used to estimate the structural model. Figure 5 shows the results of the model
estimation, path coefficients, paths significant level based on a two-tailed t-test, and the
variance explained by the independent variables (R2). Together, path coefficients (loadings
and significant) and R2 are indicators of the model performance , with R2 indicating the
predictive power of the model, which is equivalent to the R2 in a regression model (Gefen et
al., 2000). Path coefficients are significant and directionally consistent with the assumptions
of the study.
As shown in figure 5, the structural model could explain 17.8 percent of the variance for the
intention to comply, where 26.6 percent of the variance could be explained for perceived
complexity, and 44.1 percent of the variance for perceived usefulness of protection. In the
variance explained by the original TAM constructs (PC and PUOP), and SN, perceived
complexity accounts for 12.2 percent of the variance explained in intention to comply,
perceived usefulness of protection accounts for 18.7 percent, and subjective norm accounts
for 31.6 percent of the variance. All of these figures are greater than the minimum value of a
10 percent criterion that was suggested by Falk and Miller (1992) as an indicator of
substantive explanatory power.
Consistent with hypotheses 1 through 4 (H1 – H4), perceived usefulness of protection was
found to have a significant impact on intention to comply (β = 0.188, P < 0.001); therefore H1
is supported. Perceived complexity was found to have significant impact on intention to
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comply directly (β = -0.085, p < 0.01) and a significant impact on perceived usefulness of
protection (β = -0.197, p < 0.001); therefore, both H2a and H2b are supported. Subjective
norm was found to have a significant impact on intention to comply (β = 0.278, P < 0.001)
and a significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection (β = 0.201, P < 0.001);
therefore, H3 and H4 are supported.
Subjective Norm
(SN)

Self-efficacy
(SE)

Controllability
(Cont.)

0.278*

0.157*

PUOP
(R2 = 0.441)
0.187*

General Information
Security Awareness
(GISA)

IC
(R2 = 0.178)

User Awareness of

-0.197*
Technology
Awareness
(TA)
-0.085**

Security Policies
(ISPA)
PC
(R2 = 0.266)
SETA Program

Monitoring
Practices (MPA)

* P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01
Note: Paths in dash are not significant

Figure 5: The Results of the Structural Model Testing
Consistent with H5 – H8, self-efficacy has a significant impact on perceived usefulness of
protection (β = 0.57, P < 0.001) and on perceived complexity (β = -0.200, P < 0.001);
therefore, H5 and H6 are supported. However, controllability was not found to have a
significant impact on either perceived usefulness of protection or perceived complexity:
therefore, H7 and H8 are not supported. For H9a – H10b, general information security

91
awareness was found to have a significant effect on perceived usefulness of protection (β =
0.157, P < 0.001) and on perceived complexity (β = 0.-176, P < 0.001); therefore, H9a and
H9b are supported. Regarding technology awareness, it was found to have significant effect
on perceived usefulness of protection (β = -0.468, P < 0.001) and on perceived complexity (β
= -0.224, P < 0.001), however, the direction of the relationship with perceived usefulness was
opposite to that hypothesized; therefore, H10a is not supported while H10b is supported.
Consistent with H11 – H16, users’ awareness of security policy was found to have a
significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection (β = -0.260, P < 0.001) and on
perceived complexity (β = -0.466, P < 0.001), however, the direction of the relationship with
perceived usefulness was opposite to that hypothesized; therefore, H11 is not supported while
H12 is supported. SETA program was found to have a significant effect on perceived
usefulness of protection and on perceived complexity (β = 0.128, -0.131, P < 0.001,
respectively); therefore, H13 and H14 are supported. Monitoring practices was not found to
have a significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection (β = 0.079, P < 0.10), and
therefore H15 is not supported. On the other hand, it was found to have a significant impact
on perceived complexity (β = 0.155, P < 0.001), and therefore H16 is supported. Table 5.7
summarizes the results of the hypotheses testing.
Table 5 7: Main Effect Path Coefficient (Structural Model Results)
H#

Hypothesis (Direction)

H1
H2a
H2b
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9a
H9b
H10a
H10b
H11
H12
H13
H14
H15
H16

PUOP → IC (+)
PC → IC (-)
PC → PUOP (-)
SN → IC (+)
SN → PUOP (+)
SE → PUOP (+)
SE → PC (-)
Cont. → PUOP (+)
Cont. → PC (-)
GISA → PUOP (+)
GISA → PC (-)
TA → PUOP (+)
TA → PC (-)
ISPA → PUOP (+)
ISPA → PC (-)
SETA → PUOP (+)
SETA → PC (-)
MPA → PUOP (-)
MPA → PC (+)

Path
Coefficient
0.187
-0.085
-0.197
0.278
0.201
0.157
-0.200
0.049
-0.059
0.157
-0.176
-0.468
-0.224
-0.260
-0.466
0.128
-0.131
-0.079
0.155

t-value
4.414
2.270
5.487
6.223
4.811
3.718
5.145
1.188
1.670
3.815
4.751
14.313
7.007
5.561
13.792
3.158
3.848
1.872
3.952

Significance

Supported?

P < 0.001
P < 0.01
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
NS
NS
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
P < 0.001
NS
P < 0.001

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Overview of the Study and Findings
Compliance with information security policies became a main concern for organizations since
ISP violations have significantly increased information security threats and vulnerabilities,
and contribute significantly to information security breaches. Employees who are aware of the
information security policies of their institutions and deliberately violating the policy, are
considered a big problem and a hidden threat, since awareness and training programs will
have little impact on their behavior. Information security policy violation varies from
behaviors that are unethical (such as inappropriate use of e-mail, and shopping or selling
using the company’s network), to ones that are criminal or illegal (such as sabotage, data
theft, and data destruction), to ones that are unintentional or accidental (forgetting to change a
password or the careless discarding of sensitive information rather than shredding it). Such
acts are often known as information security non-compliance behavior. This study focused on
all types of policy violation by employees or users; intentional or unintentional, inappropriate
or illegal, and considers any act of violating the ISPs as a noncompliance problem.
Employees can impose excessive damage to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the
IS through deliberate activities (espionage), or they may present a potential threat through
passive noncompliance with security policies (laziness, poor training, or lack of motivation to
adequately ensure information security) (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). In order to foster
employees’ rule adherence, different approaches have been adopted to investigate and explain
employees’ rule following behavior (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Some studies adopted the
command-and-control approach, which is linked to extrinsic motivational models of human
behavior, such as the external contingencies of reward (e.g. Siponen et al., 2010) and
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punishment (e.g. D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub, 1990), and breaking the rules (Hu et al., 2010;
Posey et al., 2010). Other studies have employed a self-regulatory approach, which is linked
to intrinsic motivational models, emphasizing individuals follow the rules as connatural
drivers of behavior. Intrinsic motivational models of human behavior were found to explain
employees’ rule-following behavior better than extrinsic motivational models which have
been built on GDT, RCT, PMT, and other extrinsic behavioral theories (Son, 2011).
From the extensive review of systems abuse literature, it was obvious that the command-andcontrol model symbolizes a conventional approach to animate rule-following; it is based on
the idea that people abide by the rules as a function of the costs and benefits they associate
with doing so. This approach is well represented in different theories such as GDT (e.g.
D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990), RCT (e.g. Bulgurcu et al.,
2010a; Hu et al., 2010; Li, Zhang, et al., 2010), and PMT (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009b;
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen et al., 2007). The approach contends that employees
are materialistically motivated, and are basically interested in the resources and outcomes they
obtain from their organizations. Therefore, in order to enforce policies, rules, and procedures,
organizations must take an active role by providing incentives (to encourage desired behavior)
and sanctions (to discourage undesirable behavior) (Tyler et al., 2007).
The question to ask at this point is “do such techniques work?” The analysis of the literature
and the results of this study indicate that these strategies often help shape employees’
behavior. But such strategies also come with significant cost because in order for sanctions
and deterrence systems to work, organizations must be able to dedicate substantial resources
to the surveillance needed to make the detection of systems misuse or abuse likely enough
that people are deterred.
This study focused on the self-regularity approach, which represents an alternate approach to
encouraging rule following behavior, since it is concentrated on employees’ intrinsic
motivations. This method identifies rule following as initiated with an individual’s innate
desire to follow organizational rules, and not with external contingencies in the environment
that are linked to rule following, such as rewards, penalty, fear, outcomes, or social pressure
(Tyler & Blader, 2005). Therefore, the technology acceptance model (TAM) was found
appropriately fit to investigate employees’ innate behavior toward complying with
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organizations’ ISPs since it concentrates on employees’ desire and willingness to follow rules
as described in the ISPs, for the sake of protecting the organization information systems, and
not to maximize any outcomes for themselves. Utilizing TAM and TBP, this study developed
a Security Acceptance Model (SAM), analogous to the TAM, to explain compliance intention
behavior among bank employees. The model explained users’ compliance behavior with ISPs
in terms of perceived complexity of ISPs, perceived usefulness of protection afforded by
ISPs, and user awareness of information security issues and countermeasures. It was posited
that among different factors, information security awareness likely plays a major role in
shaping user compliance behavior with ISPs.
The model was tested in Jordan for several reasons. First, Jordan became a target for hackers
due to the absence of governmental legislation and a delayed interest by institutions in
security and data protection. As well as the absence of security policies to these banks, beside
the novelty of the concept of security awareness among employees and their belief that they
are immune from security threats. Second, Jordan is the researcher’s home country, giving
him access to information there. Third, Jordan is considered one of the largest users of
computers in the Middle East after the UAE. Finally, Jordan has a strong banking system that
has been using technology for some time.
Data was collected via a self-reported questionnaire from a sample of 878 bank employees.
The resulting data was analyzed by two main statistical techniques; exploratory factor
analysis and component-based partial lease square approach. The validity and reliability tests
indicated that the designed model SAM fit the data well. Perceived complexity (PC) and
perceived usefulness of protection (PUOP) were significantly related to employees’ intention
to comply with ISPs. These findings provided strong statistical support that SAM is a useful
theoretical framework for predicting users’ intention behavior with ISPs. The downstream
effect of the SAM is evident not only in the significance of the paths linking perceived
complexity and perceived usefulness of protection with compliance behavioral intention, but
also in the significant relationships between employees’ awareness of security
countermeasures (structured and unstructured) with PC and PUOP.
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Discussion of Findings
This study presented a Security Awareness Model (SAM) that underscores the user
dimension in addressing ISP compliance issues. This user focus, along with consideration of
ISPs as a system, is a novel approach as compared to extant theoretical frameworks such as
GDT, PMT, TRA, and TPB, among others. The model tries to explain user compliance
behavior with ISPs in terms of perceived complexity of ISPs, perceived usefulness of
protection afforded by ISPs, and the user awareness of information security issues and
countermeasures. It is posited that among different factors, information security awareness
likely plays a major role in shaping user compliance behavior with ISPs. The results of this
study supported the validity of the SAM as a useful theoretical framework to predict
employees’ behavioral compliance intention with ISPs. The model explained about 18 percent
of the total variance in the dependent variable, and the casual structural paths of the main
predictors (PC and PUOP) were statistically significant (β = -0.085, t = 2.270, and β = 0.187, t
= 4.414, respectively). These results refute the assumptions of some researchers (e.g. Johnston
& Warkentin, 2010) that technology adoption theories do not have the ability to explain the
acceptance and use of security policies because they do not include the concept of thread as
productivity-based applications.
Consistent with the predictions of SAM, perceived complexity (PC) and perceived usefulness
of protection (PUOP) both had a significant impact of behavioral intention to comply with
ISPs. These results are consistent with TAM literature (e.g. Davis & Venkatesh, 1996;
Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Perceived complexity was found to have
a significant negative effect on behavioral intention to comply and on perceived usefulness of
protection. The importance of perceived complexity was further explained by its indirect
impact on intention to comply through perceived usefulness of protection. This suggests that
if employees perceive ISPs to be easy to use and not complex, they will perceive their security
compliance behavior to have a favorable impact on their performance to protect an
organization’s information assets, and they are more likely to use it. Further, compared to
productivity-based software tools such as spreadsheets, emails, and word processors, which
can improve job performance and productivity, compliance with ISPs to secure the working
environment impede performance (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). These findings are
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consistent with the recommendations of Whitman and Mattord (2008) that when designing
ISPs, they should be easy to use. Moreover, these results are consistent with a number of
studies which used perceived complexity instead of perceived ease of use, and found that
perceived complexity negatively affected behavioral intention (Chang & Cheung, 2001;
Igbaria et al., 1996; Thompson et al., 1991). In the security domain, these results were
different than the results of Dinev and Hu (2007) and Xue et al. (2010), which found that PU
and PEOU had no significant impact on behavioral intention.
As compliance with ISPs is mandatory, subjective norm is a significant factor that predicts
behavioral intention. Under this assumption, if a superior suggests that a particular system is
useful, a person might believe it is actually useful and then form an intention to use it.
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) refer to the casual mechanism underlying the impact of
subjective norm on behavioral intention as compliance. Consistent with TAM results in
mandatory environments (Hartwick & Barki, 1994; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh &
Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003), subjective norm was found to have a significant effect
on intention to comply with ISP, which is also consistent with the results of studies in the
same field of security compliance (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a;
Herath & Rao, 2009a; Siponen et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2009). Subjective norm accounts for
the highest percent (31.6%) of the variance explained in intention to comply. This suggests
that employees will form favorable perceptions toward compliance through the social
influence of superiors, managers, or colleagues, more than any other reason. The implication
of this highest effect on intention to comply could be due to cultural issues since the study
sample was from Jordan, where it is very unorthodox and shameful for an employee’s peers
and superiors to discover that s/he did not comply with ISPs. What confirms this assumption
is the effect of subjective norm on PUOP, where it was found to have the highest percent
(20%) of the variance explained in PUOP; meaning if peers and superiors perceive it as
useful, and then an employee will perceive it to be too.
To overcome situations where behavior is nonvolitional, Ajzen (1991) introduced the concept
of perceived behavioral control (PBC) that consists of two components; self-efficacy and
controllability. The results of this study found that self-efficacy has a significant effect on
PUOP and PC (β = 0.157, p < 0.001, and β = -0.200, p < 0.001, respectively), while
controllability was not significant. Self-efficacy was found to have a positive impact on
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PUOP, which is consistent with TAM studies in both voluntarily and mandatory
environments (e.g. Ong et al., 2004; Ong & Lai, 2006; Venkatesh et al., 2003), and also with
the results of security compliance studies which have investigated its impact on intention to
comply (e.g. Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen
et al., 2010). This result suggests that if employees perceive ISPs as relevant to their work and
important for protecting information assets, they will comply with the policies. Inconsistent
policies and procedures can lead to frustration, confusion, and potential non-compliance. The
results also showed that self-efficacy had a negative significant impact on PC. This result was
consistent with TAM studies in both voluntarily and mandatory sittings (e.g. Ong et al., 2004;
Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 1996; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Wu, Chen, &
Lin, 2007), as well as with the results of security compliance studies which investigated its
impact on intention to comply (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010;
Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2010). According to self-efficacy theory,
this suggests that in order for employees to comply with ISPs, they must understand these
policies. This also confirms the recommendations of different studies on the importance of
designing clear and easy to understand policies (Hone & Eloff, 2002; Whitman et al., 2001).
As for controllability, the non-significant impact was inconsistent with the previous literature
(Dinev & Hu, 2007; Kim et al., 2008), while it was consistent with (Dinev et al., 2009). A
plausible explanation is that the adoption and use of the technology and resources to protect
information assets to a large extent is mandated by the bank.
In terms of the research model, findings demonstrated that perceived complexity and
perceived usefulness of protection are key prevailing variables linking information security
awareness to compliance behavior with ISPs.
General information security awareness was found to have a positive significant impact on
perceived usefulness of protection (β = 0.157, p < 0.001). The result suggests that an
employee’s perceived usefulness of the ISP toward compliance can be enhanced by his/her
general security awareness. This result was consistent with the findings of Bulgurcu et al.
(2010a) and Bulgurcu et al. (2009). The results also showed that general information security
awareness has a negative significant impact on perceived complexity (β = -0.176, p < 0.001).
This result suggests that higher general security awareness increases employees’ confidence
in overcoming the complexities and hurdles toward compliance with the requirements of the
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ISPs. This result is also very consistent with the findings of Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) that
employees’ perception that compliance impedes job-related functions can be reduced by
information security awareness. As for employees’ knowledge and understanding of security
related technologies, it was found that it has a negative significant impact on perceived
usefulness of protection. The negative direction suggests that employees think they are savvy,
encompass enough knowledge, and have enough resources (e.g., magazines, discussion
forums, and online help) about security issues which make ISPs obsolete to their work
compared to the size of knowledge they possess. This result was inconsistent with the
findings of Dinev and Hu (2007) which showed that technology awareness has a positive
impact on employees’ attitude toward intention to use protective technologies. On the other
hand, the negative impact of technology awareness on employees’ perceptions of complexity
of ISPs was consistent with the theoretical base. The result suggests that an employee’s
perception of the complexity of the ISP toward compliance can be enhanced by the
knowledge s/he generates about security issues from different resources, such as magazines,
online help, and discussion forums. This result is consistent with previous studies that
investigated the effect of ISA on intention to comply (Bulgurcu et al., 2009, 2010a; Dinev &
Hu, 2007).
Users’ awareness of information security policies had a negative impact on their perception of
the usefulness of ISPs in protecting information resources. This suggests that information
security policies at these banks are not defined clearly and lack the processes that will help to
ensure system security. This is confirmed by Whitman et al. (2001, p. 13) where he stated that
“if security procedures unnecessarily inhibit employees’ use of the information system, they
will be less productive or will bypass the procedure”. Moreover, Straub (1990) emphasized
the necessity to develop detailed policies defining proper and improper use of information
systems. This result was not consistent with the prior research that found clearly defined
security policies will reduce the behavioral intention of system misuse (D'Arcy, 2005; D'Arcy
& Hovav, 2007, 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2009). Another suggestion for the negative effect that
comes with (Finch, Furnell, and Dowland (2003) line of thinking, is that employees might not
be fully aware of the existence of security policy within their banks. On the contrary, users’
awareness of information security policies had a negative impact on their perception of the
complexity of complying with ISPs. This suggests that high awareness of information security
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policies will reduce employees’ complexity perception in complying with ISPs. This result is
consistent with (Lee et al., 2004) and with the results of studies adopted from GDT (D'Arcy,
2005; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2004) which found that awareness of information
security policies enhances users’ perception and understanding of punishment for systems
misuse, which will decrease misuse behavioral intention. In general, these two results suggest
that when designing ISPs, banks should emphasize the ease of understanding the policy more
than its usefulness in protecting the bank’s information systems and resources.
Users’ awareness of SETA programs had a significant positive impact on perceived
usefulness of protection, while it was found to have significant negative impact on perceived
complexity. This suggests that proper cognitive education, and awareness and training for
employees on security issues, such as threats, technologies, and compliance, are effective in
enhancing their perceptions of the usefulness of ISPs for protecting information and
technology resources, which eventually will increase compliance behavioral intention with the
rules and requirements of the ISPs. These programs will also decrease employees’ perceptions
about the complexity of compliance with the ISPs. Previous literature emphasized the
importance and benefits of SETA programs in altering users’ behavior in a positive direction
(e.g. Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Schultz, 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998; von Solms & von
Solms, 2005), but little empirical work has been put into practice (D'Arcy et al., 2009;
Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Posey et al., 2010; Straub, 1990). This study provides empirical
evidence that SETA programs are effective mechanisms for enlightening employees about the
importance of complying with ISPs by improving their perceptions about the usefulness of
ISPs in protecting information and technological resources, and by reducing perceived
complexity of compliance. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) emphasized the quality of training
programs by utilizing methods and learning tasks that stimulate learners to complete
organized cognitive processing of information.
Users’ awareness of monitoring practices had an insignificant negative impact on perceived
usefulness of protection, while it had a positive significant impact on perceived complexity.
This suggests making employees aware that they are electronically monitored increases their
perceived complexity in compliance with ISPs, and although not significant, decreases their
satisfaction with usefulness of protection. These results are consistent with Urbaczewski and
Jessup (2002) findings that reported when employees were aware of electronic monitoring
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“policing”, their focus was more on task and they were less satisfied. These findings are
applicable to this study, because when employees are aware of monitoring “policing”
practices, they concentrate literally on compliance more than on work, and that impacts their
perception about the usefulness of compliance negatively, since they see it as an impediment
of their performance, making it more complex to comply since they will be very cautious not
to make mistakes. This result was also consistent with prior research which found monitoring
to lower employee satisfaction and increase turnover in some cases (Alder et al., 2008;
Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; George, 1996). However, it is still important to note that
monitoring can play a key role in protecting an organization from employee abuse (e.g. Ariss,
2002; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998).
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that each of the information security awareness
countermeasures plays an important role in enhancing users’ perception about the usefulness
of protecting information and technology resources and lowering the degree of complexity of
compliance, which in turn increases intention to comply with ISPs. Awareness of information
security policy seems to have the highest impact on intention to comply, followed by
technology awareness, with monitoring practices having the least impact.

Theoretical Contribution
Different behavioral theories have been adopted in the information security domain to
investigate either compliance intention or to deter misuse behavior, and others have been
adopted to deploy preventive and protective technologies. Theories such as TRA, TPB, RCT,
PMT, GDT, SCT, RCT, TAM, and others were adopted as the theoretical foundation for their
studies, since each of them has the potential to predict behavioral intention. Much of the
previous literature concentrated on the deterrent effect of sanctions or incentives to encourage
employees’ desirable behavior, but none of the studies addressed this problem as a system
that employees must accept first. Accordingly, this study is the first to develop a model, the
Security Acceptance Model (SAM), to investigate the users’ perceptions about complying
with ISPs, motivated only by intrinsic desire, and a willingness to follow rules as described in
the ISPs for the sake of protecting the organization’s information systems, and not to
maximize any outcomes for themselves.
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Another important contribution this study makes to the behavioral aspects of the information
security body of knowledge is being the first study to present empirical support that
technology adoption theories have the ability to explain the acceptance and use of security
policies as they were found to include the concept of thread as productivity-based
applications. This study demonstrated that employees’ intrinsic desire and willingness to
follow rules as described in the ISPs can be traced back to normative beliefs, and perceived
behavioral control.
Third, the field of security awareness is lacking research which views this concept from a
behavioral perspective and that employs behavioral theories, such as TRA, TPB, TAM, and
others, to help understand its effect on shaping compliance intention or deterring misuse
intention. Thus, this study is the first to assess the impact of structured and unstructured
information security awareness on compliance intention. The findings showed that
information security awareness (ISA) exerts a significant impact on users’ perceived
usefulness of protection and perceived complexity, which shapes users’ intentional behavior
to comply with ISPs. Accordingly, this study will contribute to the library of security
awareness research.
Finally, this study is the first to investigate the complexity of complying with ISPs. Most of
the previous studies adopted TAM, and investigated the role of PEOU, which has not been
found to be an appropriate or significant predictor of intention to comply. Due to the nature of
ISPs which involve compliance rather than using, and are mostly described as difficult, it is
more appropriate to utilize this factor than the PEOU.

Practical Contribution
The results of this study will help senior management to understand the factors that encourage
behavior toward the adoption of security countermeasures, which will help to elicit positive
behaviors from employees, leading to a decrease in human errors and reducing the cost of
security. The subjective norm had the highest impact on employees’ intention to comply with
ISPs. This means that employees’ intention to comply with the ISPs is greatly affected by
opinions and by significant others. Thus, when developing security awareness programs,
management and practitioners need to be aware that perceived social pressure is an important
factor that helps enhance compliance with ISPs by concentrating on social and organizational
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matters. Puhakainen (2006) proposed a framework for analyzing employees’ motivation to
comply with ISPs and noted that the subjective norm is one of the main factors that helps us
to understand the reasons for compliance and non-compliance with the instructions. Most of
the literature on ISP compliance or misuse investigated the impact of subjective norm (e.g.
Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Siponen et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2009), and
showed the importance of significant others and opinions in the compliance process.
Accordingly, management should take compliance with ISPs seriously and emphasize to
employees firmly that they should comply. Management can do that through day-to-day
activities such as brochures, emails, and posters, or by other means, such as training or during
meetings.
The results of this study provide significant evidence that users’ awareness of the existence of
security policies, SETA programs, and monitoring practices are each a significant factor in
improving users’ intention to comply with the ISPs. Therefore, each of these countermeasures
should be an essential component of a bank’s security management program. Some previous
studies found that managers did not believe that the role of these countermeasures is
significant in changing users’ behavior toward compliance or in deterring systems misuse
(Hoffer & Straub, 1989; Straub & Welke, 1998). The results of this study prove otherwise,
and suggest that organizations can help improve compliance behavior by (1) developing
comprehensive detailed policies that define appropriate and inappropriate use of the
resources; (2) conducting special educational, training, and awareness programs that instruct
employees in different security issues, such as why security policies are important, security
technology, security threats and controls, cost of compliance and non-compliance, legitimate
and illegitimate use of IS resources, consequences of non-compliance, and how to enforce
information security policies; and (3) building an effective monitoring program designed to
control and provide feedback at the same time, and conducting periodical audits on all
employee activities.
In designing security policies, management should develop clear, concise, detailed, direct, and
easy to understand security procedures that do not obstruct employees’ use of the information
system. The policy should be available for all employees on paper or electronically.
Acceptable and unacceptable, and legal and illegal use of information resources must be
clearly defined in the policy and instructed to all users. Management should also try to make

103
use of international security standards as guidelines when developing ISPs, and periodically
assess security policies, procedures, and guidelines.
In designing SETA programs, a training program targeting top management about the
necessity of security awareness programs must be developed and presented first. Then a
security awareness committee can be established that will be responsible for reviewing and
recommending training needs and tools. Next, evaluations regarding employees’ training and
awareness needs must be conducted, and based on this assessment, development of
educational and awareness programs. Overall, SETA programs must be designed based on the
roles and responsibilities defined in an employee’s job description since some educational
programs are not suitable for certain jobs and some users may have more knowledge on
certain issues than the designed program itself. Ethical ideology is an important factor in
security, and especially in compliance with ISPs; therefore, a special ethical program should
be delivered to all employees aimed at influencing their morals toward compliance with ISPs.
Monitoring employees’ practices to ensure compliance with rules and requirements as
described in the ISPs is important. Studies found that users believe that monitoring their
practices is a kind of violation of their privacy, and it can lower their job satisfaction, and in
some cases, increase the turnover rate (e.g. Alder et al., 2008; Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989;
Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002). Therefore, when designing monitoring systems it is important
to educate all employees about the program, and explain to them its purpose, which must be
control and providing feedback. Policing the users’ activities must be removed from their
minds through training and awareness programs, and by empirically providing them with
feedback when necessary, such as when violation is unintentional. Interestingly, monitoring
practices were found to have no significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection. This
has a practical implication; a training program about the importance and usefulness of
monitoring in protecting information resources and its role in confirming compliance with
ISPs could be given to all employees.
As the results show, employees’ personal education and knowledge about security issues
(unstructured awareness) was found to have a significant effect on compliance behavior.
Therefore, management must provide employees with training sessions about the different
resources and their reliabilities for solving security issues. Further, management can leverage
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this by having a special room with PCs to be used for self-education purposes, which define
and specify certain websites and forums for employees to help them solve specific security
issues.
Perceived behavioral control was partially (self-efficacy) found to have a significant impact
on intention to comply with ISPs. This suggests that employees perceive that they are capable
of complying with the rules and requirements of ISPs . Therefore, management should
enhance and strengthen this perception by giving limited controlled privilege for employees
that will increase their confidence in their abilities to handle security issues and to comply
with ISPs.

Limitations
As with any other study, this study had some limitations. The first limitation is related to the
self-reported measure and cross-sectional design. A common method bias and social
desirability bias were important problems to this study. In the common method bias, several
procedures were adopted to contain and minimize its effect, and these procedures were
effective in showing that this bias was not a threat for this study. With the social desirability
bias threat, anonymity of respondents was confirmed to respondents, there were not any signs
or indicators of who the respondents were, and a pilot study was conducted to ensure no
significant differences between the respondents.
A second limitation is also related to the measurement tool (the questionnaire). This tool was
developed in English and distributed in an Arabic speaking country. Some interpretation and
translation problems occurred with some respondents, who had some difficulty understanding
some questions. The researcher considered translating the questionnaire into Arabic, but by
doing so, many of the questions would lose their intended meanings. To overcome these
limitations, a question was added about the number of years the respondent had been speaking
English. Those who spoke no English at all were excluded from the sample, and those whose
English was not proficient enough to answer the questionnaire, did not participate in the
survey.
The third limitation is also related to the measurement tool. Items and factors were validated
and tested in the United States and other countries, but to the best of the researcher’s
knowledge, they had never been tested in an Arabic speaking country. Thus a pilot study was
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conducted to validate the instrument before collecting the final study sample. Results of the
pilot study showed valid and reliable results of the instrument.
The fourth limitation is related to the administration of the data collection. A friend of the
researcher administered the distribution of the questionnaire, working with a designated
contact person from each bank. To make sure that the sample collected was representative, the
researcher informed the friend and the designated contact people about the purpose of the
study, explained the questionnaire, and gave instructions for survey distribution and sample
representation. Regarding the sample representation, these individuals were specifically
instructed on the concept of random sampling and asked to randomly select a sample which
took into consideration demographic variables to ensure a representative sample. Related to
the data collection limitations, a paper-based survey was used since it was impossible to
conduct an electronic survey for the various reasons explained in Chapter Four. This created a
problem of cost and time. To make sure that data was collected in a short timeframe, the
researcher and data collection administrator kept following up with the designated contact
person at each bank and collected completed questionnaires on weekly basis. In the data entry
process, initially professional people were used to enter the data; however, later the researcher
entered the data to ensure data accuracy and integrity. Future Research
The aforementioned limitations can establish a base for future studies. First, to lower the
threat of social desirability biases, Siponen and Vance (2010) proposed using scenarios with a
full description of a hypothetical situation, and indirectly asking the study participants about
their perception of the situation. Scenarios also help capture detailed explanations about
specific policies, rules, and guidelines. Therefore, we recommend future research develop
hypothetical scenarios to measure users’ perceptions about the usefulness and complexity of
compliance with ISPs.
This study focused on the self-regularity approach, concentrating on employees’ intrinsic
motivations, and as Myyry et al. (2009) argued, moral and ethical values play an important
role in shaping users’ compliance behavior. Knowing that ethical ideology in the security
domain is rarely investigated, this stream of research will be very fruitful and promising.
This study was the first to investigate users’ perceptions of the complexity of compliance with
ISPs. No study was found to investigate the impact of compliance complexity except maybe
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Bulgurcu et al. (2008) who investigated the perceived burden of compliance as time
consuming and hindering work progress and personal productivity. This factor is totally
disregarded in spite of its importance, and therefore, there is an urgent need for studies in this
fruitful and important research stream.
An in-depth investigation of subjective norm and perceived behavioral control is
recommended, since they show significant impact on compliance behavior. These factors
should be investigated in the context of ethical ideology and perceived complexity
respectively, as the theoretical base of these factors shows that they are correlated to the
proposed research domain.
Finally, this study focused on information security awareness (ISA) as a container or
motivator for the compliance behavioral intention, but future research might investigate the
impact of other factors such as rewards, cost of compliance and non-compliance, or
deterrence, on employees’ perceptions of complexity and usefulness of protection toward
compliance.

Conclusion
This study presented a Security Awareness Model (SAM) that underscores the user dimension
in addressing ISP compliance issues. This user focus, along with consideration of ISPs as a
system, is a novel approach as compared to extant theoretical frameworks such as GDT, PMT,
TRA, and TPB, among others. The model explained user compliance behavior with ISPs in
terms of perceived complexity of ISPs, perceived usefulness of protection afforded by ISPs,
and user awareness of information security issues and countermeasures. It is posited that
among different factors, information security awareness likely plays a major role in shaping
user compliance behavior with ISPs. The findings were consistent with previous studies
which utilized TAM and TBP to explain information security policy compliance behavior or
to deter system misuse. Results of this study revealed astonishing findings regarding
subjective norm which was found to account for the highest percentage (31.6%) of the
variance explained in intention to comply.
Of the security countermeasures, the results also show that information security policies had
the highest path coefficient impact, which suggests that developing clear and comprehensive
information security policies is the most effective and important factor in changing users’
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behavior toward compliance with ISPs. Unstructured information security awareness (general
information security awareness and technology awareness) was also found to be an essential
factor in shaping behavioral intention to comply. This suggests that organizations should
motivate their employees to educate themselves with different security issues.
Overall this study presents a significant contribution by explaining the impact and
relationships between information security awareness and intention to comply with ISPs.
Most importantly, the study confirms the applicability of technology adoption theories in the
security compliance domain, and highlights the concept of perceived complexity as a better
predictor of compliance behavior than perceived ease of use.
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Appendix A
Cover Letter

Dear Banks' employees
Thank you for participating in this survey. I am conducting a research project entitled
"Information Security Policy Compliance: A user Acceptance Perspective" as part of a
dissertation at Dakota State University.
The purpose of the study is to examine users' behavioral intention to comply with
Information Security Policies (ISPs). You as an employee are invited to participate in the
study by completing the attached survey. We realize that your time is valuable and have
attempted to keep the requested information as brief and concise as possible. It will take you
approximately 20 minutes of your time. Your participation will contribute significantly to the
successful completion of this study. Your participation in this project is voluntary and
anonymous. You may withdraw from the study at any time without consequence.
There are no known risks to you for participating in this study. Your responses are strictly
confidential, you are not required to provide your name or what bank you are working at or
other information that may reveal your identity. The collected data will not be used for any
purposes other than research purposes. When the data and analysis are presented, you will not
be linked to the data by your name, title, place of work or any other identifying item.
If you have any questions regarding this study, please feel free to contact us
Ahmad Al-Omari
Dakota State University
College of Business & Information Systems
Dept of Management of Information Systems
aaal-omari8026@pluto.dsu.edu
+605-270-1215

Dr. Omar El-Gayar
Dakota State University
College of Business & Information Systems
Dept of Management of Information Systems
Omar.El-gayar@dsu.edu
+605-256-5799

Dr. Amit Deokar
Dakota State University
College of Business & Information Systems
Dept of Management of Information
Amit.Deokar@dsu.edu
+605-256-516
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Appendix B
Survey Instrument
1. Has your bank establish Information Security Policy
 Yes



No

2. Gender



Male



Female

3. Age




20-29 years
40-49 years




30-39 years
≥ 50 years

4. Education level





High School
Bachelor's Degree
Doctoral Degree





Collage
Master's Degree
Other (____________________)

5. Experience





1-5 years
11-15 years
> 20 years




6-10 years
16-20 years

6. Years with the Bank






Less than 6 months
1 to 2 years
4 to 6 years
10 to 15 years






6 months to 1 year
2 to 4 years
6 to 10 years
More than 15 years

7. Functional area of work






Teller
Information Technology
Marketing and Sales
Treasury & investment






Administration/Clerical
Audit
Credit Department
Other (____________________)

8. For how long you have been using the computer

_______________ years.

9. For how long you have been speaking English

_______________ years.

10. How many hours a day do you use the computer at work

_______________ hours?

11. Organizational level (managerial) put others
 Non-management
 Line management (supervising non-management personnel)
 Middle management
 Senior management
 Executive/Senior Vice President
 CEO/President
12.

Please indicate whether you use, or have used in the past, any of the following computer software for jobrelated work: (check all that apply)

Spreadsheets (e.g., Microsoft Excel)

Word processing (e.g., Microsoft Word)

E-mail

Programming languages (e.g., C++, Java, Visual Basic)

Application packages (e.g., accounting or payroll software)

Database applications

Bank’s special tailored software

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Neither agree nor
disagree

Intention to Comply
1 I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my organization
1 2
2 I intend to protect information resources according to the requirements of the ISP of my
1 2
organization.
3 I intend to protect technology resources according to the requirements of the ISP of my
1 2
organization.
4 I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I
1 2
use information resources.
5 I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I
1 2
use technology resources.
6 I intend to recommend that others comply with ISP.
1 2
7 I intend to assist others in complying with ISP.
1 2
Perceived Usefulness of Protection
1 My job would be easier to perform without complying with my organization’s ISP.
1 2
2 Complying with my organization’s ISP gives me greater control over my work.
1 2
3 Complying with my organization’s ISP does not hinder my job performance.
1 2
4 Complying with my organization’s ISP addresses my job-related security needs.
1 2
5 Complying with my organization’s ISP saves me time.
1 2
6 Complying with my organization’s ISP enables me to accomplish tasks more securely.
1 2
7 Complying with my organization’s ISP supports critical security aspects of my job.
1 2
8 Complying with my organization’s ISP reduces unproductive activities.
1 2
9 Complying with my organization’s ISP enhances my effectiveness on the job.
1 2
10 Complying with my organization’s ISP improves the quality of the work I do.
1 2
11 Complying with my organization’s ISP improves my productivity.
1 2
12 Complying with my organization’s ISP makes it easier to do my job.
1 2
13 Overall, I find complying with my organization’s ISP useful in my job.
1 2
Perceived Complexity
1 I often become confused when complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP 1 2
2 I make errors frequently when complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP 1 2
3 Complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is often frustrating.
1 2
4 Learning to comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is hard for me.
1 2
5 Compliance with the requirements of my organization’s ISP requires a lot of mental effort. 1 2
6 I find it easy to recover from errors encountered when complying with my organization’s
1 2
ISP
7 The compliance requirements of my organization’s ISP are rigid and inflexible.
1 2
8 I find it easy to comply with my organization’s ISP.
1 2
9 I find it hard to comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISP.
1 2
10 It is easy for me to remember how to perform tasks while complying with my
1 2
organization’s ISP.
11 My organization’s ISP provides helpful guidance in performing tasks.
1 2
12 Overall, I find my organization’s ISP easy to use.
1 2
Self-Efficacy
1 I have the necessary skills to fulfill the requirements of the ISP.
1 2
2 I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the requirements of the ISP.
1 2
3 I have the necessary competencies to fulfill the requirements of the ISP.
1 2
4 I would feel comfortable following my organization’s ISP on my own.
5 If I wanted to, I could easily comply with my organization’s ISP on my own.
1 2
6 I would be able to follow most of the ISP even if there was no one around to help me
1 2
Items 6, 7, 9, and 12 load low on Perceived Complexity so they are removed from the final analysis.
Items in Italic are reversed coded.

Somewhat Disagree

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
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1
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Neither agree nor
disagree

Somewhat agree

I have the resources (like antivirus, firewall, brochures) to help me comply with the
requirements of my organization’s ISP.
2 I have the resources to protect my organization’s information and technology assets from
potential threats.
3 Threats to information security in my work are under control.
4 In general, technology used at my organization is advanced enough to prevent
information security threats.
User Awareness of General Information Security
General Information Security Awareness
1
Overall, I am aware of the potential security threats and their negative consequences.
2
I have sufficient knowledge about the cost of potential security problems.
3
I understand the concerns regarding information security and the risks they pose in
general.
Technology Awareness
I follow news and developments about the security related technologies.
4
I discuss Internet security issues or anecdotes with friends and people around me.
5
I read about the problems of malicious threats attacking users’ computers.
6
I seek advice about security issues through online discussion forums, magazines, and
7
other media sources
User Awareness of Information Security Policies
I am aware of my organization’s rules of behavior for use of computer resources.
1
I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use of
2
information systems.
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from
3
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use.
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from
4
installing their own software on work computers.
I am aware that my organization has specific guidelines that govern what tasks
5
employees are allowed to perform on their work computers.
I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use of
6
computer passwords.
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from
7
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
I understand the rules and regulations prescribed by my organization’s ISP.
8
I understand my responsibilities toward enhancing my organization’s information
9
system security as prescribed in the organization’s ISP.
User Awareness of SETA Program
I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees comply with the
1
organization’s ISP.
I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees improve their
2
awareness of computer and information security issues.
I am aware that my organization provides employees with education on computer
3
software copyright laws.
I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of
4
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
I am aware that my organization educates employees on their computer security
5
responsibilities.
I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of
6
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use.
I am aware that employees in my organization are instructed in the appropriate usage of
7
information technologies.

Somewhat Disagree

1

Disagree

Controllability

Strongly Disagree
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Neither agree nor
disagree

Disagree

User Awareness of SETA Program
I am aware that my organization educates employees on their responsibilities for
8
managing computer passwords.
I am aware that my organization educates employees on appropriate use of information
9
technology resources (e.g. email)
User Awareness of Computer Monitoring
I am aware that my organization monitors any modification or altering of computerized
1
data by employees.
I am aware that employees’ computing activities are monitored by my organization.
2
I am aware that my organization monitors computing activities to ensure that employees
3
are performing only explicitly authorized tasks.
I am aware that my organization reviews logs of employees' computing activities on a
4
regular basis.
I am aware that my organization conducts periodic audits to detect the use of
5
unauthorized software on its computers.
I am aware that my organization regularly monitors employee access to sensitive
6
computerized information.
I am aware that my organization actively monitors the content of employees' work e7
mail messages.
Subjective Norm
Upper level management thinks I should comply with the requirements of my
1
organization’s ISPs.
My boss thinks that I should comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs.
2
My colleagues think that I should comply with the requirements of my organization’s
3
ISPs.
The information security/technology department in my organization thinks that I should
4
comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs.
Other computer technical specialists in the organization think that I should comply with
5
the requirements of my organization’s ISPs.

Strongly Disagree
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Appendix C
Table C1. Cross Loadings
CMA1
CMA2
CMA3
CMA4
CMA5
CMA6
CMA7
CONT1
CONT2
CONT3
CONT4
GISA1
GISA2
GISA3
IC1
IC2
IC3
IC4
IC5
IC6
IC7
ISPA1
ISPA2
ISPA3
ISPA4
ISPA5
ISPA6
ISPA7
ISPA8
ISPA9
PC1
PC10
PC11
PC2
PC3
PC4
PC5
PC8
PU1
PU10
PU11
PU12
PU13
PU2
PU3
PU4
PU5
PU6

CMA
0.863
0.864
0.853
0.876
0.878
0.875
0.876
0.268
0.250
0.303
0.278
0.335
0.338
0.319
0.261
0.266
0.296
0.295
0.267
0.259
0.311
-0.394
-0.379
-0.361
-0.388
-0.387
-0.360
-0.343
-0.330
-0.371
-0.185
-0.217
-0.227
-0.205
-0.224
-0.243
-0.196
-0.180
0.252
0.251
0.239
0.275
0.294
0.296
0.256
0.261
0.260
0.273

Cont.
0.267
0.322
0.278
0.237
0.255
0.273
0.274
0.895
0.886
0.874
0.837
0.231
0.281
0.221
0.149
0.140
0.209
0.162
0.206
0.216
0.268
-0.329
-0.357
-0.343
-0.347
-0.339
-0.305
-0.310
-0.338
-0.345
-0.112
-0.119
-0.127
-0.139
-0.165
-0.167
-0.117
-0.122
0.108
0.220
0.203
0.179
0.187
0.202
0.177
0.183
0.160
0.194

GISA
0.309
0.314
0.308
0.255
0.284
0.363
0.347
0.242
0.244
0.196
0.245
0.885
0.916
0.955
-0.052
-0.037
-0.050
-0.028
-0.042
-0.029
-0.010
-0.340
-0.298
-0.297
-0.319
-0.315
-0.321
-0.266
-0.256
-0.293
-0.202
-0.193
-0.188
-0.136
-0.192
-0.197
-0.208
-0.211
0.249
0.321
0.315
0.289
0.266
0.299
0.305
0.286
0.282
0.309

IC
0.291
0.287
0.312
0.268
0.276
0.250
0.267
0.178
0.198
0.210
0.185
-0.025
-0.069
-0.018
0.890
0.890
0.891
0.880
0.880
0.853
0.830
-0.296
-0.288
-0.246
-0.287
-0.261
-0.282
-0.251
-0.253
-0.279
-0.154
-0.145
-0.174
-0.188
-0.224
-0.217
-0.171
-0.124
0.220
0.233
0.202
0.261
0.279
0.281
0.261
0.260
0.263
0.261

ISPA
-0.399
-0.409
-0.375
-0.330
-0.341
-0.350
-0.353
-0.331
-0.337
-0.356
-0.306
-0.270
-0.377
-0.295
-0.257
-0.259
-0.285
-0.277
-0.277
-0.251
-0.282
0.874
0.887
0.901
0.906
0.883
0.868
0.869
0.858
0.862
-0.070
-0.095
-0.105
-0.069
-0.124
-0.134
-0.069
0.011
-0.215
-0.264
-0.262
-0.255
-0.300
-0.309
-0.248
-0.221
-0.220
-0.281

PC
-0.168
-0.233
-0.191
-0.229
-0.196
-0.222
-0.219
-0.098
-0.167
-0.123
-0.138
-0.224
-0.171
-0.200
-0.148
-0.140
-0.146
-0.184
-0.199
-0.226
-0.195
-0.078
-0.112
-0.120
-0.090
-0.085
-0.061
-0.077
-0.066
-0.092
0.937
0.950
0.805
0.872
0.941
0.938
0.785
0.803
-0.200
-0.226
-0.227
-0.240
-0.228
-0.201
-0.228
-0.205
-0.206
-0.170

PU
0.272
0.262
0.303
0.257
0.283
0.301
0.306
0.179
0.213
0.192
0.182
0.288
0.348
0.328
0.266
0.284
0.278
0.257
0.276
0.258
0.275
-0.292
-0.253
-0.270
-0.284
-0.267
-0.267
-0.268
-0.270
-0.287
-0.204
-0.231
-0.253
-0.208
-0.240
-0.262
-0.219
-0.144
0.768
0.836
0.827
0.814
0.810
0.850
0.823
0.850
0.846
0.831

SE
0.371
0.370
0.355
0.346
0.348
0.349
0.344
0.350
0.352
0.354
0.327
0.211
0.243
0.243
0.193
0.202
0.241
0.240
0.258
0.272
0.325
-0.317
-0.309
-0.313
-0.334
-0.320
-0.345
-0.287
-0.334
-0.285
-0.202
-0.227
-0.214
-0.290
-0.301
-0.325
-0.209
-0.202
0.244
0.355
0.303
0.358
0.325
0.339
0.314
0.291
0.278
0.317

SETA
0.326
0.332
0.313
0.265
0.283
0.296
0.279
0.280
0.294
0.299
0.274
0.178
0.230
0.215
0.287
0.285
0.298
0.308
0.323
0.333
0.364
-0.296
-0.297
-0.298
-0.339
-0.322
-0.325
-0.299
-0.317
-0.348
-0.168
-0.199
-0.196
-0.219
-0.226
-0.244
-0.181
-0.180
0.223
0.303
0.251
0.272
0.250
0.299
0.275
0.294
0.255
0.283

SN
0.259
0.251
0.242
0.272
0.265
0.296
0.304
-0.081
-0.042
-0.048
-0.079
0.207
0.263
0.223
0.323
0.315
0.320
0.343
0.316
0.305
0.326
-0.325
-0.282
-0.301
-0.334
-0.332
-0.355
-0.307
-0.287
-0.295
-0.192
-0.224
-0.222
-0.189
-0.265
-0.277
-0.208
-0.157
0.240
0.282
0.302
0.320
0.314
0.317
0.307
0.293
0.284
0.336

TA
0.303
0.336
0.313
0.274
0.224
0.271
0.246
0.204
0.215
0.222
0.206
0.193
0.230
0.157
0.221
0.238
0.250
0.261
0.261
0.327
0.290
-0.391
-0.386
-0.383
-0.425
-0.404
-0.429
-0.374
-0.362
-0.381
-0.181
-0.173
-0.173
-0.254
-0.195
-0.186
-0.195
-0.182
-0.120
-0.071
-0.067
-0.052
-0.031
-0.081
-0.078
-0.096
-0.080
-0.077
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Table C1. Cross Loadings (Continued)
PU7
PU8
PU9
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SETA1
SETA2
SETA3
SETA4
SETA5
SETA6
SETA7
SETA8
SETA9
SN1
SN2
SN3
SN4
SN5
TA1
TA2
TA3
TA4

CMA
0.295
0.298
0.266
0.335
0.338
0.350
0.354
0.385
0.377
0.311
0.327
0.284
0.291
0.263
0.312
0.274
0.311
0.332
0.302
0.284
0.260
0.267
0.275
0.270
0.296
0.273
0.310

Cont
0.197
0.177
0.188
0.328
0.344
0.361
0.341
0.334
0.373
0.294
0.320
0.272
0.280
0.272
0.266
0.275
0.296
0.323
-0.058
-0.053
-0.076
-0.063
-0.063
0.210
0.216
0.228
0.216

GISA
0.260
0.295
0.299
0.189
0.214
0.233
0.227
0.227
0.238
0.196
0.194
0.161
0.203
0.188
0.216
0.211
0.216
0.206
0.251
0.266
0.183
0.213
0.208
0.149
0.226
0.185
0.189

IC
0.294
0.269
0.248
0.249
0.230
0.216
0.272
0.232
0.288
0.335
0.335
0.321
0.321
0.306
0.326
0.280
0.298
0.311
0.327
0.299
0.322
0.349
0.344
0.267
0.231
0.300
0.288

ISPA
-0.254
-0.274
-0.242
-0.319
-0.335
-0.310
-0.321
-0.296
-0.306
-0.319
-0.311
-0.283
-0.313
-0.310
-0.286
-0.349
-0.345
-0.327
-0.314
-0.312
-0.298
-0.335
-0.329
-0.403
-0.373
-0.401
-0.421

PC
-0.176
-0.228
-0.207
-0.250
-0.254
-0.260
-0.223
-0.277
-0.235
-0.214
-0.199
-0.197
-0.187
-0.227
-0.245
-0.191
-0.154
-0.198
-0.243
-0.217
-0.256
-0.209
-0.193
-0.171
-0.215
-0.186
-0.205

PU
0.850
0.838
0.831
0.322
0.334
0.303
0.361
0.333
0.359
0.298
0.284
0.298
0.272
0.287
0.293
0.256
0.279
0.299
0.331
0.352
0.324
0.332
0.289
-0.128
-0.074
-0.059
-0.070

SE
0.347
0.328
0.325
0.862
0.887
0.881
0.891
0.872
0.860
0.363
0.392
0.355
0.382
0.364
0.361
0.357
0.359
0.385
0.301
0.320
0.299
0.337
0.320
0.238
0.289
0.259
0.273

SETA
0.281
0.281
0.238
0.388
0.357
0.351
0.367
0.370
0.376
0.865
0.875
0.881
0.887
0.880
0.889
0.873
0.865
0.867
0.282
0.298
0.257
0.264
0.305
0.284
0.266
0.291
0.300

SN
0.303
0.335
0.291
0.308
0.301
0.270
0.336
0.314
0.327
0.285
0.264
0.258
0.275
0.279
0.300
0.283
0.271
0.268
0.893
0.894
0.896
0.900
0.875
0.267
0.241
0.264
0.259

TA
-0.086
-0.097
-0.063
0.281
0.283
0.261
0.238
0.237
0.262
0.279
0.273
0.231
0.299
0.270
0.278
0.308
0.280
0.303
0.261
0.239
0.273
0.241
0.271
0.893
0.902
0.888
0.889

